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Abstract 
 
 
The First World War led to the collapse of a number of prominent European empires, allowing 
for the spread of new ideas into Europe. US President Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric of national 
self-determination attracted particular symbolic importance because it legitimised popular 
sovereignty through the use of plebiscites. German-Austrians, like other national groups within 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, used self-determination to justify establishing independent 
successor states after the war. The German-Austrian Republic, founded in 1918, claimed all 
German-speaking regions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire on the basis of self-
determination. This thesis examines claims to self-determination in three different cases: German 
Bohemia, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia. Representatives from each region took their case to the 
Paris Peace Conference, appealing to the Allied delegations to grant international recognition. 
These representatives faced much opposition, both from local non-German populations and 
occasionally even from the German-Austrian government itself. 
German-Austrian politicians in the Czech lands opposed the incorporation of German-
majority lands into Czechoslovakia, and instead sought to establish an autonomous German 
Bohemian province as part of German-Austria. In Paris, Allied delegations supported the 
historic frontier of the Czech lands, and therefore opposed local German self-determination 
outright, refusing demands for a plebiscite in German Bohemia. Vorarlberg representatives 
sought Vorarlberg’s secession from German-Austria, hoping instead for union with Switzerland. 
Vorarlbergers held a plebiscite to join Switzerland on their own initiative, initially with some 
degree of international support, but ultimately the international community, fearful of the 
disintegration of Austria, refused to allow Vorarlbergers to realise their wishes. Carinthian 
German representatives opposed Yugoslav claims to sovereignty over the region, seeking to 
remain part of German-Austria. Disagreements between and within the Allied delegations over 
Carinthia resulted in a decision to hold a plebiscite, which showed a majority in favour of 
remaining part of Austria. The thesis suggests that the implementation of self-determination in 
the Carinthian case resulted in a more successful resolution of border disputes. Unlike in the 
other two cases, the new Carinthian border mostly reflected the desires of the local population. 
Despite idealistic rhetoric, the final Austrian frontier suggested that Allied delegations at the 
Paris Peace Conference routinely favoured strategic justifications over self-determination.  
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Note on Naming Conventions 
 
This thesis has adopted the place name convention: “German name/non-German name”. For 
reasons of consistency I have decided to acknowledge that multiple names exist, but retain the 
same order throughout. This style in no way reflects that the German name is dominant, but 
reflects that my focus lies with German-speakers who tended to use the German name regardless 
of whether German was the majority language of that particular area or not. As my focus is on 
German-speakers, I have also used primarily German-language sources, which tend also to use 
the German name. The usage of multiple names for locations represents an attempt to approach 
the region inclusively and to accept that many different groups of people held ties with those 
regions in recent history, rather than to make a political statement about a particular region. 
Rather than to diminish the importance of non-German languages by using German language 
names for majority non-German areas, the chosen style is one that seeks to promote 
inclusiveness of non-German language names where they are not used in German-language 
sources.  
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Provinces of German-Austria 1918-19191 
   
 
 
Notes on Map 
 
The different coloured regions each represent a German-Austrian province in 1918-1919, as 
claimed by the government of the German-Austrian Republic. Germans in the Czech lands 
separated into four provinces: German Bohemia in north-western Bohemia, Sudetenland in 
northern Moravia and Austria Silesia, the Bohemian Woods in southern Bohemia, and German 
South-Moravia in southern Moravia. Note that the Bohemian Woods is considered part of the 
province of Upper Austria, and German South-Moravia part of the province of Lower Austria. 
Vorarlberg is the western-most province. The frontier examined in the Carinthia chapter 
includes the territory lying roughly between the cities of Tarvis and Marburg.  
 
 
                                         
1 Provinces of German-Austria 1918-1919, cited from 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fb/GermanAustriaMap.png 
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Introduction 
 
The end of the First World War laid the foundations for twentieth-century European 
politics by popularising the then somewhat radical idea of national self-determination. 
Understandably, historians of the Paris Peace Conference have placed most of their 
attention on the Treaty of Versailles and its contribution to the Second World War.2 By 
comparison, historians have neglected the Treaty of St. Germain, which also reshaped 
Europe’s borders. This thesis examines attempts by local German-speakers to claim 
national self-determination in three cases: German Bohemia, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia. 
Representatives from each of these three provinces joined the delegation of the German-
Austrian government at the Paris Peace Conference, attempting to influence post-war 
borders through plebiscites, enjoying varying degrees of success.3 Ultimately, of the three 
cases, Allied delegations implemented self-determination only in Carinthia. The result of 
this decision led to a more successful resolution of disputed frontiers in the period 1918-
1920. 
 Authoritarian multi-ethnic empires, which had theretofore dominated Central and 
Eastern Europe, gave way to democratic nation-states. US President Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points symbolised the new era.4 Erez Manela labelled this period the “Wilsonian 
Moment”, while Tomáš Masaryk described it as a “World Revolution”.5 Such radical 
changes in political legitimacy paved the way for the creation and recreation of a number 
of states. According to Wilson, the future of Europe would instead be decided by the free 
self-determination of people achieved through “consent of the governed”.6 
Representatives from German Bohemia, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia, citing Wilsonian 
principles, therefore petitioned the Peace Conference to decide the post-war borders 
through plebiscites. However, despite all the idealistic rhetoric at the Paris Peace 
                                         
2 For example see: A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Athenum, 1961); Victor Rothwell, The 
Origins of the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Manfred Boemecke, Gerald Feldman, 
and Elizabeth Glaser, ed., The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Norman A. Graebner and Edward M. Bennett, The Versailles Treaty and its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
3 For more on Austria at the Paris Peace Conference see: Jamie Bulloch, Karl Renner: Austria – The Peace Conferences of 
1919-23 and their Aftermath (London: Haus Publishing Ltd, 2009); Franz Klein, Fritz Felner, Hiedrun Marschl, ed.,     
“Saint-Germain im Sommer 1919”: die Briefe Franz Kleins aus der Zeit seiner Mitwirkung in der österreichischen Friedensdelegation, 
Mai-August 1919 (Salzburg: W. Neugebauer, 1977); Franz Klein, Austria and the Peace Treaty of St. Germain (Vienna: Frisch, 
1920). 
4 See: Woodrow Wilson, “Fourteen Points”, cited from:  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp; for 
more on Wilson see: Mario Dinunzio, ed., Woodrow Wilson: Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President (New York: 
New York University Press, 2006); Arthur Roy Leonard, ed., War Addresses of Woodrow Wilson (Boston: The Athenum 
Press, 1918); Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002). 
5 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); Tomáš Masaryk, Světová Revoluce (Prague: Orbis, 1925). 
6 Woodrow Wilson, “Permanent Peace”, 5 March 1917, cited from Arthur Roy Leonard, ed., War Addresses of Woodrow 
Wilson (Boston: The Athenum Press, 1918), 8; Woodrow Wilson, “Second Inaugural Address”, cited from: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson2.asp. 
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Conference, the Allied delegations refused plebiscites.7 This thesis examines why Allied 
delegations granted self-determination in Carinthia, and why they denied it in the other 
two cases. 
  
Austria and the Evolution of “German” Nationalism 
 
Ideas about “Germanness” motivated many German-speaking politicians to seek 
self-determination after the First World War. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy removed the obstacle for the promotion of nation-states, and national groups 
competed against one another to extend the border of their new states as much as 
possible. Defining and highlighting different historic understandings of the terms 
“German” and “German nationalism” is important in understanding German-Austrians in 
the period 1918-1920, since, as Franz Szabo and Charles Ingrao argue, “to speak of 
‘Germans’ and ‘Germany’... means to enter into the debate on German identity”. The 
historic scholarly underuse of the term “Germanophone” as exists for speakers of other 
languages complicates discussions of German nationalism.  The failure of this term to 
enter popular usage creates difficulties in that the term “German” typically refers to 
citizens of the German state centred either in Berlin or Bonn, whether Wilhelmine 
Germany, Weimar Germany, Nazi Germany or its successor states. However, the term 
“German” is also used to refer to people identifying as German living outside Germany 
or to German-speakers who do not identify as German. Szabo and Ingrao note that in 
1910 almost twenty-five percent of German-speakers in Europe lived outside the borders 
of Imperial Germany.8 “Germans” therefore inhabited many geographic and political 
locations, both in Central and Eastern Europe. This uncertainty over definitions applies 
especially to German-speakers in the Habsburg Empire prior to the creation of an 
independent Austrian state and Austrian national distinctiveness. 
The creation or use of new terms has assisted with the problem posed by 
terminology in discussions of German nationalism. Reichsdeutsche [Imperial Germans] is 
used post-1871 German unification to refer to German citizens of Imperial Germany and 
its successor states, while Volksdeutsche [ethnic Germans] typically refers to German-
speakers outside these borders.9 Many Habsburg Germans opposed this binary definition 
                                         
7 For more on consequences of the failure to implement self-determination see: David A. Andelman, A Shattered Peace: 
Versailles 1919 and the Price we Pay Today (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2008). 
8 Franz Szabo and Charles Ingrao, “Introduction”, in Charles Ingrao and Franz Szabo, ed., The Germans and the East 
(West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), 1. 
9 Szabo and Ingrao, “Introduction”, in Ingrao and Szabo, ed., The Germans and the East , 3; For general histories of 
Germany see: W. Carr, A History of Germany 1815-1985 (London: Edward Arnold, 1987); G. A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); G. A. Craig, The Germans (New York: Putnam, 1982); J. C. G. Röhl, From 
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of “Germanness”, and promoted a distinctive “Austrianness” at the end of the 
nineteenth-century, which will be discussed later in this section. For the sake of 
consistency this thesis refers to Germans of the Habsburg Empire as Habsburg Germans, 
and Germans of the Austrian crown lands [Cisleithania] as Austrian Germans. From late-
October 1918, the Austrian successor was officially known as German-Austria, and 
citizens of this state were known as German-Austrians. After the signing of the Treaty of 
St. Germain on 10 September 1919, German-Austrians became simply Austrians, and the 
state’s name reverted to Austria. The Germans discussed in this thesis are those living in 
the Czech lands (hereafter referred to as German Bohemians), Vorarlbergers, and 
Carinthian Germans.  
The period in which German nationalism first appeared is disputed by historians.10 
Hans Gatzke and Harold James highlight the importance of the Wars of Liberation 
against Napoleonic France and the revolutions of the 1840s in the development of 
German nationalism.11 Geoffrey Drage agrees, arguing that Napoleon was primarily 
responsible for creating the idea of a German nation.12 This idea of a “German nation” 
initially encompassed all German-speakers based around the formation of Grossdeutschland 
[Greater Germany]. The Greater German vs Smaller German problem reached a pinnacle 
during the 1848 revolution but declined in importance in the following decades, largely 
falling out of popular thought after German unification in 1871.13  
Ideas of what Grossdeutschland entailed attracted different opinions. Michael 
Hughes argues that the definition did not include Swiss Germans or Germans isolated 
from the core German-speaking regions, such as the Transylvanian Saxons.14 However, as 
Gatzke notes, some pan-German enthusiasts envisioned a federation not only between 
the various German-speaking states, but also with other “Germanic people” in 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Advocates considered cultural, ethnographic, 
and historical arguments the most important justifications for this “reunion”.15 Opinions 
also varied as to whether Germans should be united under a single state, or were 
                                                                                                                      
Bismarck to Hitler: The problem of continuity in German history (London: Longman, 1970); A. J. Ryder, Twentieth Century 
Germany: From Bismarck to Brandt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). 
10 For more on the creation of nations see: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 2006); Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991). 
11 Hans W. Gatzke, Germany’s Drive to the West (Drang nach Westen): A Study of Germany’s Western War Aims During the First 
World War (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), 3; Harold James, A German Identity: 1770 to the present day (London: 
Phoenix Press, 2000), 38, 48. 
12 Geoffrey Drage, Austria-Hungary (London: John Murray, 1909), 533. 
13 For more on the German Question see: Robert Billinger, Metternich and the German Question: States’ Rights and Federal 
Duties, 1820-1834 (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1991); Wilhelm Röpke, The German Question (Auburn, 
AL: Ludwig Mises Institute, 2008); Wilhelm Schmidt, Eine praktische Lösung der Deutschen frage (Nuremberg: Wilhelm 
Schmidt Verlag, 1862); Stefan Wolff, The German Question since 1919: An Analysis with Key Documents (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 2003).  
14 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 7. 
15 Hans W. Gatzke, Germany’s Drive to the West, 3. 
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numerous enough to form several German states.16 Grossdeutschland proposals also gained 
support later from the “pseudo-scientific racial theories” of Arthur de Gobineau and 
Houston Stewart Chamberlain.17 Given such endorsements it is perhaps worthwhile to 
note that Robert Kann refers disparagingly to pan-Germanism simply as “day dreams of 
beer-consuming German secondary-school teachers”.18  
The importance of German unification in the development of German 
nationalism is also disputed. Christian Jansen argues that “continuous national political 
movements” appeared only after German unification in 1871.19 As with much of German 
history such a date, however, suggests a Prusso-centric view of German nationalism. 
Other historians oppose the idea that the unification of Germany represented a truly 
German unification. Hughes argues that German unification created a “Reich without a 
nation”, failing both to promote unity and to receive popular legitimacy. This state instead 
represented “a division of the German nation”.20 According to Hughes, unification 
instead represented a Prussian colonisation of German states. He argues that nationalism 
“was more a consequence than a cause of unification”.21 James also argues that Imperial 
Germany “stood halfway between a Prussian dynastic and a modern nation-state”.22 
Jansen importantly also notes the existence of individual state nationalism, as in the case 
of Prussian and Bavarian nationalism.23 The growth of German nationalism, therefore, 
resulted not from German unification in 1871, but from the earlier growth of the pan-
German movement.  
Many Imperial Germans remained opposed to a merger of the German and 
Austrian branches of the German nation. Until the First World War the German state 
based in Berlin, whether Prussia or Imperial Germany, viewed the unaltered retention of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire as beneficial. Otto von Bismarck, mastermind of German 
unification, argued: “The German Austrian is justified to aspire for political leadership and 
should safeguard the interests of Germandom in the Orient, serving as the tie of contact 
between Germans and Slavs by hindering their collision”.24 Bismarck opposed Austro-
German unification partly over fears of Austrian Catholicism, stating that even 
                                         
16 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 7. 
17 Hans W. Gatzke, Germany’s Drive to the West (, 3. 
18 Robert Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 499. 
19 Christian Jansen, “The Formation of German Nationalism, 1740-1850”, 234-259, in Helmut Walser Smith, ed., The 
Oxford Handbook of Modern German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 235. 
20 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 4. 
21 Ibid, 101-102. 
22 Harold James, A German Identity: 1770 to the present day (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 89. 
23 Christian Jansen, “The Formation of German Nationalism, 1740-1850”, in Smith, ed., The Oxford Handbook, 235-236. 
24 Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 384-385. 
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acquisitions of provinces like Austrian Silesia or parts of Bohemia would not strengthen 
what he referred to as “the Prussian state”.25  
The government of Imperial Germany also often downplayed its Germanness. 
Hughes argues that “[t]he power of the German state, not sympathy for members of the 
German nation, dominated policy-making”. 26 Bismarck repeatedly opposed Germany’s 
definition as a German state. When the Russian ambassador to Germany, Peter 
Alexanderovich Saburov, described the Baltic provinces as “German provinces”, 
Bismarck angrily responded: “Call them Lettish provinces. In any case they are not 
German lands as we understand that term”.27 Such attitudes explain why Bismarck and 
other Imperial Germans opposed the concept of Grossdeutschland. 
Pan-Germanism attracted less support in the Habsburg Empire than it did in 
Germany.28 According to Drage, pan-Germanism began to appear in Cisleithania from 
1871, several decades later than in other German states.29 The pan-German movement 
grew in Cisleithania through the 1870s, culminating in 1882 when Georg von Schönerer, 
perhaps the most prominent pan-Germanist in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, founded 
the Pan-German People’s Party.30 However, Julie Thorpe argues that few Habsburg 
Germans supported von Schönerer, Austro-German unification, pan-Germanism, or even 
Germanisation.31  
Other historians note that some Habsburg Germans considered themselves 
nationally German.32 For example, in 1900 Otto Bauer, Social Democrat and post-war 
German-Austrian Foreign Minister, wrote that Austria-Hungary was “politically and 
culturally a German state”.33 Although German national sentiments increased amongst 
Habsburg Germans from 1871, Hughes argues that they nevertheless remained “socially 
and politically divided”.34 Helmut Walser Smith notes that the unity of the German nation 
often suffered from both religious and political divisions.35 The fact that increasing 
numbers of Habsburg Germans identified as German should therefore not give the false 
impression of any great unity among this population.  
                                         
25 Geoffrey Drage, Austria-Hungary (London: John Murray, 1909), 535. 
26 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 170. 
27 Nicholas Der Bagdasarian, The Austro-German Rapprochement, 1870-1879: From the Battle of Sedan to the Dual Alliance 
(London: Associated University Presses, 1976), 307-308. 
28 For more on Habsburg pan-Germanism see: Andrew Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and 
Austrian Pan-Germanism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); F. L. Carsten, Fascist Movemnets in Austria: From 
Schönerer to Hitler (London: Sage Publications, 1977). 
29 Geoffrey Drage, Austria-Hungary (London: John Murray, 1909), 535-536. 
30 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 169. 
31 Julie Thorpe, Pan-Germanism and the Austrofascist State, 1933-38 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 21-25. 
32 For example see Lonnie Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbours, Friends (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
192; Werner Conze, The Shaping of the German Nation: A Historical Analysis (London: George Prior Publishers, 1979), 64. 
33 Otto Bauer, The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2000), 196. 
34 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 165. 
35 Helmut Walser Smith, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 9. 
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The proposed political union between Germany and Austria, known as Anschluss, 
consistently reappeared in the history of “Germans” in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Anschluss regained popularity after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
and featured prominently in the immediate post-war period and throughout the 1930s. 
Despite the strength of the pro-Anschluss movement in Austria in the period covered by 
this thesis, the issue has intentionally been avoided, as it has been addressed by many 
historians already.36 
Interpretations of Germanness among Habsburg Germans changed a great deal 
over time. In the early-nineteenth century, most Habsburg Germans associated 
nationalism with ideas of “personal, communal, political, and social freedom”.37 Werner 
Conze argues that culture and linguistics defined local understandings of Germanness as 
much as politics.38 Hughes notes that family, class, occupation, locality, region, state, and 
church all defined individual Germanness as well.39 In the nineteenth century, most 
Habsburg Germans felt themselves culturally a part of a German nation only in that they 
were concerned for its welfare. This meant that although Habsburg Germans sympathised 
with other German-speakers, they remained loyal to the Empire and the dynasty, feeling 
that it best served their interests.40 Based on historical, linguistic, and cultural similarities, 
Lonnie Johnson argues that “German-speaking Austrians considered themselves 
Germans: not Prussians but Germans, just as the inhabitants of Bavaria or Hamburg were 
Germans and not Prussians”.41 As a result of this loyalty, Cisleithania remained officially 
non-national.42  
Understandings of “Germanness” varied greatly depending on the region in which 
one lived. Pieter Judson argues that individual definitions of Germanness were shaped by 
different local conditions. For example, staunch Catholicism defined Germanness in 
Tyrol, scepticism towards Catholicism and opposition to Slovenian priests defined 
Germanness in Styria and Carinthia, while opposition towards Habsburg hegemony 
                                         
36 For example see: Arthur Kogan, “Genesis of the Anschluss Problem: Germany and the Germans of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy in the Autumn of 1918”, Journal of Central European Affairs, vol.XX (1960); Alfred Low, The Anschluss Movement 
1918-1919 and the Paris Peace Conference (Philidelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1974); Stanley Suval,  The 
Anschluss Question in the Weimar Era: A Study of Nationalism in Germany and Austria, 1918-32 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1974); M. Margaret Ball, Post-War German-Austrian Relations: The Anschluss Movement, 1918-1936 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1937); Jürgen Gehl, Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss 1931-1938 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963); Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1973). 
37 Pieter Judson, “Changing Meanings of ‘German’ in Habsburg Central Europe”, in Charles Ingrao and Franz Szabo, 
ed., The Germans and the East (Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), 115-116. 
38 Werner Conze, The Shaping of the German Nation: A Historical Analysis (London: George Prior Publishers, 1979), 1. 
39 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 15. 
40 Low, The Anschluss Movement,  15. 
41 Lonnie Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbours, Friends (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 192. 
42 Pieter Judson, “Changing Meanings”, in Ingrao and Szabo, ed., The Germans and the East, 119. 
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defined Germanness in Bohemia.43 Traditional conservatism in Tyrol meant the 
nationality question failed to influence Tyrolers as much as it did Carinthians and Styrians. 
Arnold Suppan argues that although German-Slovene tensions never reached the height 
of German-Czech tensions, anxiety amongst German minority groups remained largely 
responsible for centralising national tendencies throughout the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.44 However, Judson notes that only rarely did regional Germanness have political 
connotations. For this reason Judson argues that it is inaccurate to speak simply of 
“Germans” in East Central Europe in the nineteenth century, explaining that it is more 
accurate to “speak of those Tyrolers, Upper Austrians, Styrians, Bohemians, or Moravians 
who also considered themselves to be German”.45  
Habsburg Germanness changed in the second half of the nineteenth century, as 
Slavic-speakers increasingly challenged the pre-eminent position of German language and 
culture in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.46 Use of the German language declined as Slavic 
linguistic nationalism intensified, even though German remained the official language of 
the imperial bureaucracy.47 One of the important resulting changes was the politicisation 
of place names.48 As a result of Slavic nationalism, the way in which Habsburg Germans 
viewed Germanness changed. Although the number of Habsburg Germans identifying as 
German had increased by 1900, no uniform definition existed of what this meant. 
According to Pieter Judson, by 1910 nationality had become a “fixed personal identity”, 
and the function of language lost its importance as a determinant of this identity.49 
Instead, regional loyalties remained important in defining Germanness. 
Regional Germanness also came to influence the creation of a distinctive 
“Austrianness” in the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the late nineteenth century. Prior 
to 1866, Suppan argues that “the Germans of the Habsburg Empire were ‘Austrians,’ and 
Austrian citizenship did not amount to denial of German nationality”. However, 
“Austrianness” and “Germanness” gradually came into increasing conflict, and Greater 
Germanism declined as a movement in Austria-Hungary after German unification. 
Nicholas Der Bagdasarian and Michael Hughes both argue that after 1871 Austria-
                                         
43 Ibid, 113; Arnold Suppan, “’Germans’ in the Habsburg Empire: Language, Imperial Ideology, National Identity, and 
Assimilation”, in Ingrao and Szabo, ed., The Germans and the East, 171-172. 
44 Arnold Suppan, “’Germans’ in the Habsburg Empire”, in Ingrao and Szabo, ed., The Germans and the East, 148; For 
more on the artificial creation of political contention to counter non-German nationalists see: Pieter Judson, Guardians of 
the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jeremy 
King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
45 Pieter Judson, “Changing Meanings”, in Ingrao and Szabo, ed., The Germans and the East, 113-117. 
46 For example see: Paul Vyšný, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs, 1898-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 
47 Judson, “Changing Meanings”, in Ingrao and Szabo, ed., The Germans and the East, 120. 
48 For an example of this see: Peter Bugge, “The Making of a Slovak City: The Czechoslovak Renaming of 
Pressburg/Pozsony/Prešporok, 1918-1919”, Austrian History Yearbook, vol.35 (2004), 205-277; Pieter van Duin, Central 
European Crossroads: Social Democracy and National Revolution in Bratislava (Pressburg), 1867-1921 (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2009), 163-331. 
49 Judson, “Changing Meanings”, in Ingrao and Szabo, ed., The Germans and the East,, 122-124. 
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Hungary rapidly lost any of its original German character.50 Like the pan-German People’s 
Party for pan-Germanists, a political party arose in Austria-Hungary representing those 
Germans who favoured this “Austrianness”. Karl Lueger, future mayor of Vienna, 
founded the Christian Social Party in 1889 to represent such Germans. The Christian 
Social Party differed from von Schönerer’s pan-German Party in a number of important 
ways. Although pro-German in a linguistic sense, the Christian Socials lacked German 
nationalism as a core policy. The party instead remained loyal to the Empire and the 
Catholic Church, focussing more on social issues.51 The policies adopted by the Christian 
Socials proved popular amongst Habsburg Germans. 
Habsburg Germans consistently defended Austrian distinctiveness against pan-
Germanism. Hughes argues that many Habsburg Germans considered themselves 
distinctively part of a Staatsvolk [state nation].52 For example, in 1919 some Vorarlbergers 
defended Austrian distinctiveness as the Ostmark [Eastern March], viewing a powerful 
Austria as an important bridge between Germany and the Balkans.53 The concept of 
Austria as the Ostmark helped foster Austrian distinctiveness within the German nation 
from the late nineteenth century. The creation of Austrian distinctiveness also later helped 
secure Austria’s independence in the interwar period, despite widespread support for 
Anschluss with Germany.  
Regional Germanness proved particularly important in the cases examined by this 
thesis. Interestingly, German-speakers in the Czech lands identified as German 
Bohemians rather than as Austrian Bohemians, and sought union with German-Austria in 
1919 rather than Germany. Austrian distinctiveness encouraged German-speakers along 
the German-Austrian frontier to advocate for self-determination in order to allow political 
union with German-Austria. In the period 1918-1920, German-Austrians sought to use 
plebiscites to give legitimacy to their own regional interpretations of “Germanness”. 
 
Historic Understandings of Plebiscites 
 
Allied delegations favoured plebiscites as the most objective way to implement 
national self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference.54 Exploring the influence of 
self-determination therefore requires an understanding of the origins of plebiscites. 
                                         
50 Nicholas Der Bagdasarian, The Austro-German Rapprochement,, 298; Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society, 167. 
51 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 170-171. 
52 Ibid, 164. 
53 “Gedanken zur Anschlußfrage,” Vorarlberger Volksblatt, no.204. (6 September 1919), 1-2. 
54 For an excellent discussion of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference see: Tom Gullberg, State, Territory and 
Identity: The Principle of National Self-Determination, The Question of Territorial Sovereignty in Carinthia and other post-Habsburg 
Territories after the First World War (Turku: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2000). 
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Plebiscites had been used before the conference, but Wilson’s rhetoric led to their 
reappearance in 1919. Although many discussions of modern plebiscites exist, this thesis 
focuses exclusively on nineteenth and early twentieth century understandings of 
plebiscites.55  
A number of scholars have distinguished between plebiscites and referendums. 
Although similar in practice, Johannes Mattern differentiates plebiscites and referendums 
by defining a referendum as “the practice or principle … of submitting a question at issue 
to the whole body of voters”, and a plebiscite as “a direct vote of the whole of the 
electors of a state to decide a question of public importance”.56 In 1882, Émile de 
Laveleye made a similar distinction, defining plebiscites as “direct legislation by the 
people” and referendums as “the acceptance or the rejection, by universal suffrage, of the 
laws voted by the deputies”.57 According to these definitions, referendums asked broad 
opinions on a general subject, while plebiscites asked specific questions about a particular 
issue. Defining terms often proves difficult though, and some scholars have even 
distinguished between different kinds of plebiscites.58 For the sake of consistency, this 
thesis has adopted the approach of using the term plebiscite throughout to refer to the 
popular votes held to express self-determination.  
Prior to the Paris Peace Conference, governments generally opposed the use of 
plebiscites to determine borders. Mattern argues that plebiscites threatened the very 
existence of states by promoting secession. He explains that, while it makes sense for a 
government to advocate for a plebiscite in a region if the result is likely to end favourably, 
it makes equal sense for a government to oppose plebiscites when the result is likely to be 
unfavourable. Mattern argues: 
 
It is thus easy to understand that a multi-national, or multi-racial, state like the 
former Austro-Hungarian Empire, or Turkey, or Germany with the Polish, 
the Danish, and the Alsace-Lorraine problem, or Great Britain with her 
colonies and dominions and hostile Ireland, or in fact any federated state 
body, should in principle or practice be opposed to the doctrine of popular 
consent.59 
 
                                         
55 For more modern discussion on plebiscites see: David Butler and Austin Ranney, ed., Referendums: A Comparative Study 
of Practice and Theory (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978); Antonio Cassese, Self-
Determinaion of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Raič, Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
56 Johannes Mattern, The Employment of the Plebiscite in the Determination of Sovereignty (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 
1920), 11. 
57 Émile de Laveleye, “La démocratie et le regime parlementaire,” Revue des deux mondes, volume. LIV (1882), 47, cited 
from Mattern, The Employment of the Plebiscite, 11-12. 
58 See Charles Borgeaud, Histoire du plebiscite…Le plébiscite dans l’antiquite - Grèce et Rome (Geneva: H. Georg, 1887), xiii; 
Francis Lieber, “De la valeur des plebiscites dans le droit international”, Revue de droit international et de legislation compare, 
vol. iii (1871), 140-141. 
59 Mattern, The Employment of the Plebiscite 168-169. 
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In 1901, Henri Bonfils similarly argued that plebiscites set a dangerous precedent for 
other regions to secede from their state, questioning whether that region would then 
change allegiance again. 60 Felix Stoerk argued a similar point in 1879, noting “the principle 
of the plebiscite as hostile to the state and as theoretically untenable - because its first and 
next consequence is the dissolution of all state existence”.61 Criticisms of plebiscites 
essentially outlined the fact that plebiscites represented the voluntary division of the state, 
and should therefore be opposed. Such concerns about plebiscites later re-emerged at the 
Paris Peace Conference.  
Plebiscites had been used on only limited occasions in the nineteenth-century. 
Mattern notes that plebiscites were uncommon prior to the twentieth century, arguing 
that “the prevailing opinion expressed before the [First] World War was to the effect that 
the rules governing the intercourse of states do neither demand nor recognize the 
universal application of the plebiscite in the determination of sovereignty”.62 Sarah 
Wambaugh also argues that the use of plebiscites “has suffered great fluctuations of 
fortune”. Wambaugh traces the use of plebiscites back to the determination of popular 
support for government policies during the French Revolution. Napoleon later 
abandoned the use of plebiscites, but their revival followed the revolutions of 1848. 
Plebiscites remained popular during the following 20 years, supported by important 
political figures such as Count Cavour, Lord Russell, Napoleon III, and Bismarck.63  
During the mid-nineteenth century, European politicians used plebiscites to 
resolve territorial disputes on a number of occasions. Examples include the British cession 
of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863, Article Five of the 1866 Treaty of Prague 
between Austria and Prussia to solve the dispute over Schleswig, and the incorporation of 
Rome into unified Italy in 1870.64 Diplomats had also unsuccessfully sought to use 
plebiscites to resolve the Schleswig question at the Congress of London in 1864.65 
However, after the popularity of plebiscites in the 1860s, their usage notably declined.  
Plebiscites virtually vanished from the political sphere after the mid-nineteenth 
century. During the next fifty years only one plebiscite was held in Europe, in 1905 when 
Norway voted to separate from Sweden. However, although politicians, diplomats, and 
lawyers had rejected the value of plebiscites, the idea of self-determination remained 
                                         
60 Henri Bonfils, Manuel de droit international public, no. 3 (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1901), 570, cited from Mattern, The 
Employment of the Plebiscite, 169-170. 
61 Felix Stoerk, Option und Plebiscit bei Eroberungen und Gebietscessionen (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1879), 67, cited 
from Mattern, The Employment of the Plebiscite, 170. 
62 Mattern, The Employment of the Plebiscite, 171. 
63 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War: With a Collection of Official Documents, vol. I (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1933), 3. 
64 Martin Collier, Italian Unification, 1820-71 (Oxford: Heinemann, 2003), 83; Wesley J. Reisser, The Black Book: Woodrow 
Wilson’s Secret Plan for Peace (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 53. 
65 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, 3. 
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popular among many national groups. Wambaugh argues that the term self-determination 
entered the English language during the First World War from German, where it had first 
appeared in radical philosophical writings in 1848.66 Wilson revived the popularity of self-
determination in a 1916 speech, and was subsequently “looked to as their leader by those 
who believed that the new frontiers drawn at the Peace Conference should be based on 
self-determination”.67  
Wilson gave his famous Fourteen Points speech on 8 January 1918, re-
popularising the concept of self-determination. Point Ten of Wilson’s Fourteen Points 
directly addressed Austria-Hungary, stating that all peoples of the empire “should be 
accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development”.68 Although Wilson did not 
specifically mention the phrase “self-determination” in this speech, it featured in a speech 
he gave on 11 February, in which he argued: “[n]ational aspirations must be respected; 
peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their consent. ‘Self-determination’ 
is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will 
henceforth ignore at their peril”.69 Thomas Bailey argues that self-determination appealed 
to Wilson because it “was so closely in harmony with American tradition as embodied in 
the Virginia Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence”.70  
Although Wilson is popularly associated with the proposal during the war to 
implement self-determination, the method in which self-determination would be 
implemented came from a different source. The Decree of Peace, adopted on 8 
November 1917 by the All-Russian Convention of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and 
Peasants’ Deputies, promised plebiscites in the Soviet Union. Leon Trotsky agreed to 
peace with the Central Powers on the basis of this peace announcement, leading to the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which withdrew the Soviet Union from the First World War. 
According to Sarah Wambaugh, “[a]lthough the word ‘plebiscite’ had not been mentioned 
either in the Allied or German statements, it was anticipated by a large body of public 
opinion that the method would have an extensive use at Paris”.71 Meanwhile, John Milton 
Cooper Jr. argues that, in many cases, Wilson had proposed plebiscites to determine local 
loyalties.72 
                                         
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid, 3-4. 
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Mattern spoke of the Paris Peace Conference as a groundbreaking moment in the 
history of plebiscites. Prior to the Conference, “the plebiscite had been employed in 
international affairs only in individual cases and with the consent of or upon pressure 
from the power or powers directly or indirectly interested in each instance as it presented 
itself”. Following the First World War, increasing unhappiness on the European continent 
with the existing system meant that “the Allied and Associated Powers found it expedient 
to offer a settlement of the aspirations of the freedom-seeking peoples on the basis of the 
principle of national self-determination”. The Allied Powers therefore included national 
self-determination among their war aims, and, as a result, the peace treaties ending the war 
included provisions for holding plebiscites.73  
The Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference favoured the use of 
plebiscites to determine local sympathies after the First World War. However, the criteria 
used to allow the implementation of plebiscites varied in each case, and the Allied 
delegations often refused self-determination. In some cases the creation of successor 
states, labelled subsequently by Hobsbawm as “Wilsonian petty states”, limited the 
implementation of self-determination in other regions.74 For example, Johnson argues that 
the Paris Peace Conference quite clearly ignored self-determination in cases where it 
concerned Germans.75 Based on the perceived inconsistency of applied self-determination 
at the Conference, historians differ in opinion as to how successfully Wilsonian ideas were 
implemented. 
 
The Influence of Self-Determination at the Paris Peace Conference 
 
Disagreement exists over the extent to which the principle of self-determination 
influenced peacemakers at the Paris Peace Conference. Delegates themselves were widely 
divided over the importance of self-determination, and this varied in different cases. This 
variation explains why self-determination was implemented only in limited cases. 
Nevertheless, some historians view the implementation of self-determination at the 
conference as a great victory, praising the effectiveness of the Conference, while others 
criticise it, arguing that it was a great failure.  
Supporters of the effectiveness of the Conference argue that Allied delegates 
genuinely sought to apply self-determination. For example, Daniel Smith argues that 
Allied delegations made “a great effort to adhere to principles of nationality, on the 
                                         
73 Johannes Mattern, The Employment of the Plebiscite, 128. 
74 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 130. 
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grounds of justice and of a lasting settlement”. Smith notes that although Wilsons’ plan 
was perhaps overly idealistic, self-determination “was generally honoured in the drawing 
of the boundaries of the new states”.76 Thomas Bailey argues that in many instances 
violating principles of national self-determination was unavoidable, but that “on the whole 
the Paris settlement was a victory for self-determination. This principle was far more 
often honored in the observance than in the breach”.77 Hobsbawm notes “the utter 
impracticability of the Wilsonian principle to make state frontiers coincide with the 
frontiers of nationality and language”. However, he also argues that the peace conference 
“actually translated this principle into practice as far as was feasible”. He argues further 
that “no equally systematic attempt has been made before or since, in Europe or 
anywhere else, to redraw the political map on national lines”.78 Historians defending the 
use of self-determination therefore praise that genuine efforts were made in some 
instances, but that the implementation of self-determination was not possible in every 
case. 
Historians have more often criticised the Paris Peace Conference for failing to 
permit self-determination in more cases, condemning the Conference for failing to live up 
to the expectations politicians like Wilson created for it. Marston argues that despite the 
unique position of dominance the Allied delegates found themselves in, they “were quite 
unprepared to make full and immediate use of the tremendous opportunity presenting 
itself”.79 The sheer number of cases to consider overwhelmed the Allied delegations. 
Shotwell notes that it was “simply impossible for the Fourteen Points to be applied, even 
by those who accepted them theoretically, without creating grievances”.80 According to 
Shotwell, the Allied delegations “made the inevitable mistake of yielding too much to the 
insistence of those able to present their case in Paris”. Shotwell argues instead that the 
Peace Conference was a great failure of self-determination.81 The distinction between the 
two schools of thought, with regards to the effectiveness of the Paris Peace Conference, 
can be explained by the fact that the Allied delegations applied self-determination 
selectively, opening themselves both to praise and criticism. 
The Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference applied self-determination 
where it suited their interests or those of states they supported. Occasionally Allied 
decisions regarding self-determination were pre-empted, such as the Italian occupation of 
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South Tyrol and the Czechoslovak occupation of German Bohemia. However, the Allied 
delegations ultimately supported these actions at the Peace Conference. Allied delegations 
often had limited opportunities to consider the possibility of implementing self-
determination to change borders. When self-determination threatened Allied interests 
delegates opposed its implementation, instead favouring historic, geographic, or strategic 
arguments. In these cases, Allied delegations did not necessarily prevent self-
determination intentionally, but considered other justifications more important. The 
argument of this thesis is therefore not that Allied delegations ignored self-determination 
at the Paris Peace Conference, but that other priorities often superseded their desire to 
implement it. 
… 
 
This thesis examines three regions of political contention along the German-
Austrian frontier after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.82 These regions are 
German Bohemia, Carinthia, and Vorarlberg. Other cases of politically contentious 
regions exist, but these three best represent different approaches taken by German-
Austrians and Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. South Tyrol is the most 
notable omission, because it is the case most frequently cited for abuse of self-
determination. However, South Tyrol shares many similarities with the German 
Bohemian case. In both regions the Allied delegations at the Conference rejected 
plebiscites for German-majority regions, which were subsequently attached to other 
countries. Salzburg, meanwhile, shares a number of similarities with Vorarlberg. These 
regions both held unofficial plebiscites in the post-war period, resulting in overwhelming 
majorities expressing their desire to secede from German-Austria. In both cases the 
international community ignored the results of the plebiscites. Finally, Burgenland shares 
similarities with Carinthia. Both regions contained mixed ethno-linguistic populations, 
subject to claims from competing states. Allied delegations permitted plebiscites in both 
cases, and a majority of people chose to remain with German-Austria. 
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Chapter one examines German Bohemia, a case in which the Allied delegations 
denied local German claims to self-determination and refused a plebiscite. In the Czech 
lands, Czechoslovak independence threatened local German predominance. Germans 
living in the Czech lands therefore sought their self-determination in order to create an 
autonomous German Bohemian province which could be joined to German-Austria. 
However, German Bohemian politicians failed to reach a compromise in negotiations 
with Czechoslovak officials, leading the Czechoslovak military to occupy the province. At 
the Paris Peace Conference, German-Austrian and German Bohemian politicians 
requested that the Allied delegations allow plebiscites in the Czech lands, arguing that 
such plebiscites would legitimise German Bohemia’s right to exist on the basis of self-
determination. However, Allied delegations rejected these requests on the basis of their 
support for the historic borders of the Czech lands, and the German Bohemian province 
subsequently became part of Czechoslovakia. 
Chapter two examines Vorarlberg, a case in which the Allied delegations 
recognised the legitimacy of a local plebiscite, but refused to permit the implementation 
of self-determination. In Vorarlberg, serious economic decline as a result of the First 
World War prompted a search for union to another state. Vorarlbergers subsequently 
sought to leave the German-Austrian Republic, favouring union instead with Switzerland 
as a means of securing their economic future. The Pro-Switzerland movement rallied large 
number of Vorarlbergers to support their campaign, notably receiving support from 
Vorarlberg’s governor, Otto Ender. The movement succeeded in holding a plebiscite in 
Vorarlberg on 11 May 1919, in which 81 percent of Vorarlbergers voted in favour of 
union with Switzerland. However, the German-Austrian government refused to accept 
the results of the plebiscite, and the Pro-Switzerland movement subsequently sought 
international recognition at the Paris Peace Conference in support of Vorarlberg’s 
campaign to become part of Switzerland. Ender attended the Peace Conference as 
Vorarlberg’s representative, seeking to have Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination 
confirmed by the Allied delegations. The Allied delegations, German-Austrian 
government, and the Swiss government ultimately opposed Vorarlberg’s self-
determination for a number of reasons, despite its plebiscite successfully representing the 
self-determination for which Wilson had campaigned.  
Chapter three examines Carinthia, a case in which the Allied delegations 
recognised Carinthian claims to self-determination, culminating in the successful 
implementation of self-determination after a plebiscite was held on 10 October 1920. In 
1918 the province of Carinthia faced competing claims of sovereignty from both the 
German-Austrian and Yugoslav governments. Local sympathies became contested, and 
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Yugoslav troops occupied much of southern Carinthia in 1919. Increasing violence 
influenced both the German-Austrian and Yugoslav governments to petition the Allied 
delegations at the Paris Peace Conference to resolve the dispute. Allied discussions 
concerning Carinthia raised dissenting opinions both between and within the Allied 
delegations. Uniquely amongst the examined cases, both US and Italian delegates offered 
their support to the German-Austrian delegation’s requests for a plebiscite in Carinthia. 
Failure to reach a unanimous decision at the Peace Conference meant the Allied delegates 
agreed to hold a plebiscite in Carinthia. The results of the plebiscite showed 59 percent 
support for union with Austria. The border established after the implementation of self-
determination closely resembled the will of the local population in Carinthia. 
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German Bohemia 
 
This chapter examines the case of Germans in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia 
after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.1 Czechoslovak independence 
threatened local German dominance, resulting in the creation of autonomous German 
provinces in the Czech lands. Although initially willing to compromise over conflicting 
sovereignty, relations between German Bohemian and Czechoslovak politicians became 
openly hostile as neither side felt prepared to concede any of their ambitions, namely the 
establishment of Czechoslovakia for Czechoslovaks, and self-determination in the Czech 
lands for German Bohemians. The chapter explores the German Bohemian declaration of 
autonomy in October 1918, Czechoslovak opposition to this autonomy, German 
Bohemian attempts to have their autonomy recognised, and subsequent opposition from 
Allied delegations to German Bohemian requests at the Paris Peace Conference for a 
plebiscite in the Czech lands. Ultimately the Treaty of St. Germain enshrined the historic 
borders of the Czech lands as the borders of the new Czechoslovak Republic, rejecting 
German Bohemian self-determination. 
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk fostered the idea of an independent Czechoslovak state 
in Allied countries during the First World War, spending time in London, Paris, and the 
United States. Austro-Hungarian officials cracked down strongly on leaders of the Czech 
independence movement during the war, arresting many and charging them with treason.2 
Although the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire may not have come as a 
great surprise to Germans of the Czech lands, these Germans rapidly needed to 
acclimatise themselves to the prospect of no longer holding predominance in Bohemia 
and Moravia. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire created problems relating to 
who held legitimate political power in the Czech lands. Several entities simultaneously 
attempted to fill the power vacuum. Most importantly, this power vacuum allowed the 
Czechoslovak National Committee [Tschechoslowakische Nationalausschuss/Národní výbor 
československý] to declare Czechoslovakia’s independence, based on Point Ten of US 
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President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. However, many Germans in the Czech lands also 
looked to the Fourteen Points with hopeful optimism.  
Despite Allied support for an independent Czechoslovak state based on the 
historic Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, Germans in the Czech lands remained 
confident they could achieve alternative arrangements for the areas they themselves 
inhabited. This confidence largely resulted from Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which 
Germans incorrectly understood applied also to themselves. As Germans understood 
them, the Fourteen Points guaranteed that they would also gain self-determination and 
could therefore avoid integration into the Czechoslovak state. Germans in the Czech 
lands subsequently established four autonomous provinces in territory claimed by 
Czechoslovakia.  
The provisional governments of these four German provinces in the Czech lands 
each set separate goals. Germans in the south, comprising the new provinces of the 
Bohemian Woods [Böhmerwaldgau/Šumavská župa] and German South Moravia 
[Deutschsüdmähren/Německá jižní Morava], assumed they would be able to join the 
neighbouring provinces of Upper Austria and Lower Austria, respectively, as part of the 
new German-Austrian Republic. The Sudeten Mountains lent their name to a third 
province, the Sudetenland [Sudetenland/Sudety], established by Germans in northern 
Moravia and Silesia. It is worth noting that in this period “the Sudetenland” encompassed 
only northern Moravia and Silesia. Caitlin Murdock explains that German Bohemian 
irredentist nationalists only began to use the term to refer to all German-speaking areas of 
Czechoslovakia in the 1930s “in an attempt to create a unified national, territorial, and 
political identity”.3 Meanwhile, Germans in north-western Bohemia declared an 
autonomous province of German Bohemia [Deutschböhmen/Německé Čechy], establishing a 
provisional government and various committees to organise and govern this territory.4 
The governor of the new province of German Bohemian, Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, 
quickly came to represent the interests of all Germans in the Czech lands who opposed 
attempts by Czechoslovak politicians to integrate these German provinces into 
Czechoslovakia. 
From November 1918 the official reactions from Czechoslovak officials to the 
creation of these provinces led to fear and panic amongst Germans in the Czech lands. 
Czechoslovak officials began to target remnants of the imperial power structure, especially 
local German authorities who now represented the new German provinces of the 
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German-Austrian state. Masaryk and other Czechoslovak political leaders emphasised the 
indivisibility of Bohemia and Moravia, stressing that German Bohemians must abandon 
their separatist activities.5 Germans in the Czech lands did not take these declarations 
seriously, using self-determination as justification for their actions. Some Czechoslovak 
leaders, notably František Tomášek, initially encouraged German leaders to join in the 
task of creating a true multinational Czechoslovak state.6 However, German Bohemian 
and Czechoslovak leaders failed to reach any arrangement for compromise.  
The Czechoslovak military eventually occupied the German provinces, which 
resulted in a hardening of attitudes from both Czechoslovak and German political leaders. 
Czechoslovak politicians like Karel Kramář subsequently highlighted the ethnic 
Czechoslovak foundation of the Czechoslovak state, while German leaders voiced their 
opposition to Czechoslovak actions and continued to proclaim their right to national self-
determination, appealing to the Paris Peace Conference in order to have this right 
recognised. Lodgman and other German Bohemian political figures attended the Paris 
Peace Conference with the German-Austrian delegation to seek recognition for German-
Bohemian self-determination. German-Austrian and German Bohemian representatives 
sought a plebiscite to prove that German Bohemians opposed Czechoslovak citizenship. 
Ultimately the Allied delegations favoured the position of the Czechoslovak government 
and rejected German claims to self-determination in the Czech lands. However, the Paris 
Peace Conference succeeded somewhat in softening attitudes amongst Czechs and 
Germans in Czechoslovakia, at least in the 1920s. 
 
The Implementation of Czechoslovak Independence 
 
The Czechoslovak National Committee declared Czechoslovakia’s independence 
in Prague on 28 October 1918.7 Direct motivation for the declaration came from Austro-
Hungary’s defeat to Italy at the battle of Vittorio Veneto, which began on 24 October. 
Eduard Beneš had led a Czechoslovak delegation to Vienna and Geneva several days 
earlier, so the task of issuing the independence declaration fell to the other leaders of the 
Czechoslovak National Committee, namely Antonín Švehla, Alois Rašín, František 
Soukup, and Jiří Stříbrný. These four members issued a number of articles relating to 
Czechoslovak independence, assisted at times by Vavro Šrobár, an important Slovak 
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member of the Committee. The Austro-Hungarian governor of the crown land of 
Bohemia, Maximilian von Coudenhove, strongly opposed the National Committee’s 
declaration.8 Johann Wolfgang Bruegel describes the actions of 28 October as a 
“bloodless revolution”. During this early period the Czechoslovak government concerned 
itself primarily with protecting the indivisibility of the Czech lands, and ensuring the 
incorporation of Slovakia into the new state.9  
Although the First World War complicated the Czechoslovak movement for 
independence by encouraging Austro-Hungarian loyalty, the war fundamentally 
contributed to the achievement of Czechoslovak independence. Czechoslovak nationalists 
such as Karel Kramář faced lengthy jail terms during the war. The Austro-Hungarian 
government initially sentenced Kramář to death in 1916 for high treason, only to later 
grant him amnesty.10 The progression of the war gradually encouraged Czechoslovak 
independence activists to continue progress towards independence. Czech deputies of the 
Austro-Hungarian Imperial Council issued the Epiphany Declaration on 6 January 1918 
calling for Czechoslovak independence. After prolonged inactivity in early 1918 the 
Czechoslovak National Committee reconvened from 13 July, encouraged by Central 
Power military defeats.11 Allied victories gave great hope to activists that Czechoslovak 
independence would be achieved. Czechoslovak independence therefore resulted both 
from the weakness of the Austro-Hungarian government, and the strength of the 
Czechoslovak movement for independence. 
Masaryk had initially declared Czechoslovak independence in Paris on 18 October 
1918. This earlier declaration came as a result of a proposal made on 16 October by 
Austro-Hungarian Emperor Karl to allow further federalisation of the Empire.12 This 
proposal was an attempt to thwart the collapse of the Empire.  Although Masaryk 
described Karl as “a drowning man clutching at a straw”, he feared that Karl’s proposal 
could increase loyalty towards the Empire. Masaryk therefore responded by declaring 
Czechoslovak independence earlier than he had planned, and by establishing a provisional 
Czechoslovak government. Masaryk later explained his declaration as a tactical action, 
“for by the time the Emperor’s manifesto was published, the colors of the free 
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Czechoslovak State were already flying from the house where I lived as President of our 
Provisional Government”.13  
The independence of Czechoslovakia caused drastic changes to local politics in 
the Czech lands. This thesis examines local changes through the lens of a single city, 
Pilsen/Plzeň in western Bohemia. Representatives from Czech political parties established 
a national council for the Pilsen/Plzeň representative district on 27 October. The primary 
focus of the national council concerned the prevention of high food prices, but it also 
sought to maintain peace and order. The Pilsen/Plzeň national council formed its own 
national guard on 28 October, reportedly with “commendable prudence”. Such foresight 
allowed the national council to prevent rioting later that evening, after large groups of 
Czechs massed in the main areas of the city to attack German buildings.14 Such actions 
highlight the importance placed on maintaining law and order during this transition 
period. 
The local Czech population held large rallies in Pilsen/Plzeň on 28 October to 
celebrate Czechoslovakia’s declaration of independence. News also spread of a special 
American peace offer to end the war, which further encouraged the population. The 
celebratory demonstrations continued and intensified throughout 29 October. According 
to the Pilsner Tagblatt, “thousands and thousands were on the streets all day long, and in 
the afternoon the Ringstrasse and nearby lanes resembled a rolling sea”. Some outbreaks of 
violence occurred as demonstrators began to target old symbols of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, particularly anything considered German. Members of the crowd destroyed the 
heads of double-eagle edifices from a number of important buildings in the city, and also 
destroyed the German-language inscriptions on businesses and former government 
offices. Men replaced the imperial rosettes on their caps with Czech tricolours. A number 
of people gave speeches in front of the town hall, which demonstrators responded to with 
the singing of national songs. By the end of 29 October, red-white Czech flag bunting 
adorned all houses and shops and many of the statues and memorials.15  
Czechoslovak officials rapidly achieved control over local law and order in 
Pilsen/Plzeň. The National Guard in Pilsen/Plzeň held a meeting on 29 October to 
discuss and determine the functions of the security services. As a response to the 
demonstrations, the security services decided to arm members of the city council, the 
community committee, the Sokol, and the workers’ sports clubs. The Pilsen/Plzeň 
security services ordered the National Guard to remove all German inscriptions from 
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buildings.16 Through this action Czechoslovak officials therefore supported and aided 
popular anti-German initiatives. 
The Czechoslovak National Committee began to acquire complete control in 
Pilsen/Plzeň, as elsewhere in the Czech lands. The Pilsen/Plzeň branch of the 
Czechoslovak National Committee claimed that, despite assurances from civil and military 
authorities to assist with public affairs and to help maintain order, many imperial 
authorities had passively resisted fulfilling these obligations.  The National Committee 
argued that the imperial authorities in Pilsen/Plzeň had intentionally provoked disorder 
and rumours spread about a possible reactionary coup. The national committee therefore 
demanded that all local authorities immediately fulfil the obligations, or Czechoslovak 
authorities would take action against them.17 Not content with issuing such instructions, 
the national committee decided to take further action against local authorities. 
Czechoslovak authorities in Pilsen/Plzeň stressed their desire for adherence to 
peace and order. Local authorities referred specifically to a speech given on 29 October by 
national committee chairman Matouš Mandl and his secretary, Luděk Pik, in which they 
declared: “Citizens! Brothers! Do not let yourselves be carried away by violence. Preserve 
peace and order, and do not destroy the property of others! Do not tear off or damage 
proclamation signs, and do not bother the citizens of other nationalities!”18 Czechoslovak 
authorities strictly opposed any retaliatory actions against Germans, despite earlier support 
for such action by the local National Guard. 
Local authorities sought to further assert their control and crack down on 
competing organs of power. On 1 November the Pilsen/Plzeň branch of the 
Czechoslovak National Committee issued an order to greatly reduce the number of 
people with the power to issue orders.19  Presumably the order attempted to undermine 
German officials in the city. The national committee centralised all nutrition matters 
under control of district rationing commissions, thereby further solidifying local Czech 
control.20 On 2 November, representatives from the Pilsen/Plzeň Czechoslovak National 
Committee arranged for at least twenty political prisoners to be released from local 
prisons. The overwhelming majority of those freed were Czechs, and most had been 
convicted of high treason and sentenced to heavy imprisonment of ten to twenty years.21  
Czechs in Pilsen/Plzeň greeted Czechoslovak independence enthusiastically. As 
they did elsewhere in the Czech lands. Czech representatives dedicated a 1 November 
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meeting of the Pilsen/Plzeň district to the “historic world events of the last few days, the 
establishment of an independent Czechoslovak state, and all those factors that dedicated 
their efforts to achieving that goal”. The announcement also targeted Germans of the 
Czech lands by requesting that all people, regardless of nationality, should fulfil their 
obligations and duties as citizens of the new state. Representatives proposed renaming the 
ring road and nearby streets with names of prominent people associated with 
Czechoslovakia’s independence, such as Wilson, Masaryk, and Kramář.22 Such actions in 
Pilsen/Plzeň occurred elsewhere across the Czech lands, which demonstrated that local 
Czech authorities had taken control from the Austro-Hungarian administration and had 
established themselves in the dominant position. 
 
The Development of German Bohemian Self-Determination 
 
Official and unofficial Czechoslovak actions in the Czech lands triggered a 
response from the new German-Austrian government. German politicians in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire initially responded to Czechoslovak independence by establishing a 
provisional National Assembly for German-Austria on 21 October.23 The National 
Assembly established a German-Austrian government, and claimed sovereignty over all 
German-speaking territory of the Empire. The German-Austrian government remained 
especially eager to include southern Bohemia and southern Moravia as part of Upper 
Austria and Lower Austria, respectively. The German-Austrian government almost 
immediately renounced its claims on the Sudetenland province as well as so-called 
language islands like Brünn/Brno and Iglau/Jihlava, despite retaining a demand for their 
right to self-determination.24 The government hoped that such actions would increase the 
chances of retaining other territory. 
Czechoslovak independence failed to trigger universal acclaim in the Czech lands, 
prompting a response from local German representatives as well. Germans in the Czech 
lands had foreseen the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by late-1918, and had 
begun their own self-organisation. On 25 October, the German Bohemian Association 
established a committee to hold the first convention of its assembly.25 The German 
Peoples’ Council for Bohemia held its own conference in Aussig/Ústí nad Labem on 27 
October. This conference determined the steps towards realizing an “independent and 
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free German Bohemia”.26 The Executive Committee of the Middle Bohemian Woods also 
convened a meeting on 27 October, at which members spoke in favour of a German state 
in Bohemia. The committee planned mass rallies to show support for such a state, and 
formed committees to organise local businesses and to ensure the distribution of food 
supplies to its districts.27 
In response to Czechoslovak independence, German Bohemian deputies of the 
Austro-Hungarian Imperial Council organised a meeting on 29 October at which they 
officially declared themselves the German Bohemian Provincial Assembly. The Assembly 
loosely defined itself as “an autonomous province of the German-Austrian State”.28 It is 
important to note that this German Bohemian Provincial Assembly only included 
delegates from northern and western Bohemia.29 On the evening of 29 October, the 
Lower Austrian Provincial Parliament constituted German Bohemia as an independent 
and inseparable part of the German-Austrian state.30 Even at such an early stage German 
Bohemians had expressed their self-determination as part of German-Austria. 
Following German Bohemia’s lead, Germans in other regions of the Czech lands 
established their own autonomous provinces. In early November, Germans in districts of 
southern Bohemia established a separate province known as the Bohemian Woods, with 
its capital at Prachatitz/Prachatice. The leaders of the Bohemian Woods province 
immediately made clear their intention to join German-Austria as part of the province of 
Upper Austria. Germans in northern Moravia and Silesia established the province of 
Sudetenland on 30 October, with its capital at Troppau/Opava.  Local German officials 
established a separate province of German South Moravia in southern Moravia on 3 
November, with its capital at Znaim/Znojmo. German South Moravian officials made 
clear their intention to join the German-Austrian province of Lower Austria.31 By early 
November four autonomous German provinces existed in territory claimed by the 
Czechoslovak government. 
Of the four newly established German provinces in the Czech lands, only German 
Bohemia established a proper functioning administration. On 2 November, German 
representatives from north-western Bohemia met in the Pilsen/Plzeň town hall to discuss 
questions of governance and finance, and the supply of food and coal to the German 
Bohemian province.32 The German Bohemian Provincial Assembly initially selected as 
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governor the leader of the German National Party, Raphael Pacher.33 However, Pacher 
fell seriously ill on 5 November, and asked Rudolf Lodgman to travel to 
Reichenberg/Liberec to assume his duties.34 Lodgman therefore became the first 
governor of the German Bohemian province, with Josef Seliger as his deputy-governor.35  
Despite its long-term planning, the German Bohemian Provincial Assembly 
existed for a short time, only holding two meetings in its capital, Reichenberg/Liberec. At 
its opening meeting on 29 October the assembly made a declaration expressing itself 
“anxious to preserve the right of German-Bohemia to self-determination without 
rejecting any justified Czech demands”, and instructed Lodgman “to take up contacts with 
the representatives of the Czech people with a view to creating a special provisional 
administration in those communities which are clearly of a mixed national character until 
such time as conditions are finally settled”.36 Despite later criticism of Lodgman because 
of his failure to negotiate with Czechoslovak officials, Robert Kann describes Lodgman as 
a “moderate” who “strove honestly and vainly for a German-Czech compromise making 
no claims for German cultural superiority”.37 German Bohemian officials immediately 
recognised Czechoslovak sovereignty over Czechoslovak-majority regions, realising that it 
would be impossible to govern without consultations with local Czech representatives. 
The political power vacuum left in Cisleithania gave way to the German-Austrian 
State Council, which the German-Austrian National Assembly established in Vienna on 
30 October 1918. The State Council passed a constitution which gave it executive power 
for the entirety of German-Austria, including the four German provinces of the Czech 
lands.38 The German Bohemian Provincial Assembly accepted the provisional constitution 
of German-Austria, which required the German-Austrian State Council to take over 
administration of all German regions. With this in mind, representatives of the German 
Bohemian Provincial Assembly declared that “it is unanimously the will of the German 
people for the German-Austrian state to become a living reality, and that this state will 
henceforth be self-governed by freely elected and trustworthy German men”.39 The 
official German-Austrian constitution of 22 November also included the German 
Bohemian territory of the Czech lands as part of German-Austria.40 German Bohemian 
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officials therefore declared the province of German Bohemia a part of German-Austria 
on the basis of self-determination. 
Once in de facto control of the four German provinces in the Czech lands, the 
German-Austrian State Council sought to acquire international support for their 
continued existence. As Suppan explains, the Czechoslovak and German-Austrian 
governments “faced each other from the beginning with mostly antagonism and 
distrust”.41 The State Council therefore sent a note to President Wilson on 30 October 
asking for arbitration to solve the border disputes between German-Austria and 
Czechoslovakia. The note outlined German-Austrian claims to the German provinces as 
well as Czechoslovak counter-claims, requesting that a plebiscite be held under the 
observation of neutral powers in order to resolve the issue. The note concluded with a 
direct appeal to President Wilson on the basis of his Fourteen Points: “Under the 
impression that the President is against the governments of the Central Powers, but did 
not lead a war against the German people, the appeal is addressed to him to use his 
authority to grant the right of self-determination for the German nation.”42 Given their 
precarious control, Germans in the Czech lands hoped to further secure their right to self-
determination.  
 
The Failure of German Bohemian-Czechoslovak Negotiations 
 
The Czechoslovak National Committee’s claims to sovereignty in the Czech lands 
created difficulties for German Bohemian self-determination. The National Committee 
subordinated or replaced local German authorities and implemented new laws which 
threatened the political legitimacy of the new German provinces. Germans in the Czech 
lands realised that a final settlement regarding their provinces and the new frontier 
between German-Austria and Czechoslovakia would only be reached at the Paris Peace 
Conference. Germans therefore realised that in the meantime they would have to adapt to 
the changing situation.43  
Despite a shift in the balance of power, German Bohemian and Czechoslovak 
officials attempted communication only twice in late-1918. On 30 October, Lodgman 
entered into negotiations in Prague with the Czechoslovak National Committee. The two 
sides made little progress as neither could concede their overlapping core objectives: the 
Czechoslovaks that German Bohemia must be part of the Czechoslovak state, and 
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Lodgman that German Bohemia must achieve autonomy from Czechoslovakia.44 Given 
their differences, further discussions between German Bohemian and Czechoslovak 
authorities failed.  
Discussions between German and Czechoslovak representatives fared better in 
Moravia however. On 29 October, local Moravian members of the Czechoslovak 
National Committee entered into discussions with the Austro-Hungarian Governor, Karl 
von Heinold-Udynski. After negotiations with German-Austrian officials in Vienna, 
Heinold-Udynski accepted Czechoslovak demands to relinquish control over provincial 
administration, but insisted the National Committee include Moravian Germans in the 
new provincial government. The negotiations resulted in the establishment of an 
Executive Committee comprising six members: four Czechs and two Germans. This 
division represented a decline in German influence in Moravia, although Germans still 
retained more representation than their share of the population warranted. Czechoslovak 
negotiators also demanded that Moravian Germans recognise “the constitutional union of 
Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia”. Moravian German authorities refused this last point, and 
the new provincial administration therefore retaliated by excluding German representation 
in the Moravian Executive Committee.45 German exclusion from power in the new 
Czechoslovak state again resulted largely from the unwillingness of local German officials 
to compromise with Czechoslovak officials. 
The German Bohemian National Assembly recognised Czechoslovakia’s right to 
self-determination, but simultaneously asserted that German Bohemians had a similar 
right. German Bohemia’s Assembly strongly opposed incorporation of any part of 
German Bohemia into Czechoslovakia. Highlighting the hypocrisy of Czechoslovak 
claims on German Bohemia, the Pilsner Tagblatt declared:  
 
The Czechs refer to the fact that German Bohemia historically belongs to 
their state. But yellowed parchments cannot cancel out the living rights of the 
German people in Bohemia. The Czechs themselves demand Slovakia on the 
basis of the Hungarian nationalities principle, although it has not historically 
belonged to their state, and have no right to violate the same nationalities 
principle to the detriment of the German people in Bohemia… But no people 
have the right to violate another people to give themselves economic benefits 
or to secure favourable borders.46 
 
The Pilsner Tagblatt therefore argued that self-determination outweighed historic rights, an 
argument similar to one later made by German-Austrian representatives in Paris. 
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The Czechoslovak National Committee took further opportunities to assert its 
control in the Czech lands through the formation of an official government. On 1 
November, Antonín Švehla declared that the Czechoslovak National Committee would 
assume control over all local government in the Czech lands.47 The Czechoslovak 
National Committee adopted a provisional constitution on 13 November, formally 
establishing a Czechoslovak National Council. This National Council elected Masaryk as 
the first President of Czechoslovakia on 14 November. The Council also officially 
recognised Kramář as the first Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, and accepted the 
legitimacy of his government.48  With an official government established, Czechoslovak 
representatives sought to encourage German Bohemian participation in the Czechoslovak 
state.  
The absence of German Bohemian representation at the first session of the 
provisional Czechoslovak parliament on 14 November 1918 drew much commentary. 
The President of the Assembly, František Tomášek, opened the session by commenting 
on the lack of Germans:  
 
I cannot fail to note that the representatives of our German fellow-citizens 
are still absent from our midst. It would be pointless to invite or lure them 
here. Not our words, but our actions will persuade them that they have no 
cause to fear the future… I am convinced that the time is not far distant 
when they too will find the way to join us in the common task.49 
 
Czechoslovakia’s first Prime Minister, Karel Kramář, speaking after Tomášek, also 
commented on the German question:  
 
In the name of the first Government of the free Czechoslovak Republic I am 
able to declare here that the German people living within the borders of our 
State need not harbour the least fear for their national development. Faithful 
to our own past and our democratic traditions we shall put no obstacle in our 
fellow-citizens’ path towards the fulfilment of their cultural and linguistic 
aspirations, provided they loyally recognise the State. It is true that our State 
will be a Czech one, because we have achieved our aim by our blood and 
suffering. But it would be our wish and pride to know that nobody here, who 
is not a Czech, need feel oppressed.50 
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Czechoslovak politicians therefore continued to hope that Germans living in the Czech 
lands would agree to compromise and participate as equal members of the Czechoslovak 
state. 
German and Czechoslovak officials continued their efforts to negotiate and reach 
a compromise regarding political power and legitimacy. Josef Seliger, the deputy governor 
of German Bohemia, travelled to Prague on 4 November to arrange with the 
Czechoslovak National Committee to supply German Bohemia with food. The 
Czechoslovak representatives warmly welcomed Seliger and promised that Germans 
would be treated the same as Czechs with regards to the supply of food.51 On 7 
November, trade and industry representatives from Reichenberg/Liberec met to discuss 
the relationship between German Bohemia and Czechoslovakia, noting the importance of 
food in this difficult period. These representatives agreed that, given the food shortages in 
German Bohemia, the German Bohemian government should reach an immediate 
understanding with the Czechoslovak National Committee.52 However, Czechoslovak 
officials refused to continue negotiations, based on the refusal of German leaders in the 
Czech lands to agree to Czechoslovak demands about ceding political control to 
Czechoslovakia. German Bohemian representatives responded that Czechoslovak leaders 
had refused to recognise the legitimacy of their autonomous provinces. After failed 
negotiations, the Czechoslovak National Committee decided to use military force to 
occupy the four autonomous provinces created by Germans in the Czech lands between 
October and December 1918.  
 
Decline and Opposition in German Bohemia 
 
Many Germans in the Czech lands expressed outrage at the Czechoslovak 
decision to occupy their provinces. According to Rudolf Laun, German Bohemians held 
large public demonstrations across German Bohemia on 8 December. These 
demonstrations unanimously adopted the following resolution:  
 
A people in distress, we vow to bear our distress together, freely and proudly 
and of one accord, and to defend man by man our home and native 
country… We want to direct our schools, our culture and out administration 
ourselves and to become a united and happy people without alien influence, 
without further dismemberment and without national hatred… we will leave 
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nothing undone to obtain by right or might a free country for our children - a 
country of rest, peace and independence. This we vow.53  
 
The vow made by German Bohemians on 8 December represented their strong desire to 
achieve national self-determination in the Czech lands. 
On 8 December 1918, prominent German Bohemians also rallied in 
Reichenberg/Liberec to protest against Czechoslovak government actions. At the rally 
Lodgman directed a defiant speech at the Czechoslovak government, declaring that “we 
will never submit to the Czech knout”. Karl Kreibich, a German Bohemian Social 
Democrat, also spoke defiantly at the rally, threatening strikes and possible armed 
resistance. Kreibich’s appearance symbolised the bipartisan approach taken by German 
Bohemians towards support for their national self-determination.54 
German Bohemians sent a resolution to President Wilson appealing for self-
determination, outlining that the vast majority of German Bohemians opposed joining the 
Czechoslovak state. According to the resolution, German Bohemian leaders would agree 
to reconciliation if Czechoslovak leaders granted self-determination to German Bohemia. 
The resolution concluded: “By an objective study of these facts every friend of humanity, 
whatever his nationality be, must be induced to hope that the principles of national 
freedom and not national imperialism may triumph”.55 By this resolution, German 
Bohemian representatives first expressed their desire for self-determination to 
international audiences. 
Despite diplomatic efforts, Czechoslovak troops continued to occupy the German 
provinces in the Czech lands. As Czechoslovak troops neared Reichenberg/Liberec, the 
German Bohemian capital, the government of the German Bohemian province fled to 
Vienna via Saxony. Robert Freissler, the governor of the Sudetenland province, 
surrendered his province voluntarily even before Czechoslovak troops entered 
Opava/Troppau.56 Reichenberg/Liberec finally fell to Czechoslovak troops on 16 
December and the Czechoslovak military occupied Eger/Cheb on 17 December. 57 With 
the fall of Reichenberg/Liberec and Eger/Cheb, German Bohemian self-determination in 
the Czech lands essentially ceased. The Czechoslovak military occupation occurred rapidly 
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and largely without incident.58 Not all German Bohemians originally supported German 
separation from Czechoslovakia, however. 
Indeed, some German Bohemians enthusiastically supported the Czechoslovak 
occupation of the German Bohemian province. Bruegel argues that when rioting occurred 
in the predominately German-speaking towns of Leitmeritz/Litoměřice, 
Komotau/Chomutov, and Aussig/Ústí nad Labem, the German mayors of these towns 
appealed to Czechoslovak officials for help in suppressing the riots.59 German Bohemian 
industrialists also appealed directly to Czechoslovak officials to complain about the 
conduct of the local German Bohemian administration.60 Based on this evidence, the 
Czechoslovak occupation represented a legitimate response to German Bohemian pleas 
for help, rather than an invasion. 
Many politicians also noted German Bohemian opposition to separation from 
Czechoslovakia. Botho von Wedel, the German ambassador in Vienna, argued that 
German Bohemians lacked both unity and any real enthusiasm for separation from 
Czechoslovakia. Von Wedel also reported that a number of German Bohemians argued 
instead that “one would just have to make the best of things, get on with the Czechs and 
learn Czech”.61 According to a note sent on 12 December 1918 from Karl Renner, the 
German-Austrian Chancellor, to Otto Bauer, the German-Austrian Foreign Minister: “if 
the Czechs offered autonomy to the Germans, 99% of them including the workers would 
opt for Czechoslovakia. Since similar views reach us from German-Bohemia in large 
numbers, I am anyway worried that we may suffer shipwreck”.62 Such fears provide an 
insight as to how the German-Austrian government would later approach the Peace 
Conference. Renner later wrote that most Germans in the Czech lands accepted 
Czechoslovak sovereignty shortly after its independence and they “sincerely collaborated 
not only in its economic development but in the central and local government”.63 
Among German Bohemian industrialists, economic concerns greatly contributed 
to fears of separation from Czechoslovakia.64 According to Suppan, the Czechoslovak 
government had an immediate advantage over the German-Austrian government and the 
German provinces in the Czech lands because it controlled sugar and coal production.65 
Opposition from industrialists to German Bohemia’s separation became clear at a 17 
                                         
58 Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian, 176. 
59 Bruegel, Czechoslovakia before Munich, 27. 
60 Ibid, 32. 
61 Ibid, 26. 
62 Ibid, 33. 
63 Karl Renner, Österreich von der ersten zur zweiten Republik (Vienna, 1953), 211-212, cited from Bruegel, Czechoslovakia before 
Munich, 52-53. 
64 See: Paul Molisch, Die sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung in den Jahren 1918-1919 (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1932). 
65 Suppan, “Austrians, Czechs, and Sudeten Germans as a Community of Conflict in the Twentieth Century”, 8. 
32 
 
November 1918 meeting in Krummau/Krumlov to celebrate the incorporation of the 
Bohemians Woods into Upper Austria. Despite the celebratory atmosphere of the 
meeting, Bruegel reports that: 
 
No industrialists or farmers spoke at the meeting. Industry, fearful for its 
supply of coal, was not anxious to see the province attached to German-
Austria and certainly did not support the liberation struggle, while the farmers 
disliked the more stringent food supply regulations in force in Upper Austria. 
 
Although the German Bohemian Chambers of Commerce supported the movement for 
self-determination, the industrialists they represented generally agreed that economic 
arguments favoured union with Czechoslovakia.66  
German Bohemian support for Czechoslovak sovereignty steadily increased, 
although not without difficulties. On 4 March 1919 the newly elected German-Austrian 
National Assembly held its first meeting in Vienna. The national assembly lacked German 
Bohemian representation because Czechoslovak officials had prevented German 
Bohemian officials from holding local elections. Supporters of German Bohemian self-
determination therefore held a number of demonstrations across German Bohemia on 4 
March to protest the Czechoslovak actions. In their efforts to disperse the demonstrators, 
Czechoslovak military and police killed 54 people and wounded 84.67 Despite this 
bloodshed, von Wedel reported on 29 April 1919 that German Bohemian industrialists 
almost universally supported integration into Czechoslovakia, and most other German 
Bohemians at least accepted Czechoslovak sovereignty.68 Suppan argues that Germans in 
the Czech lands increasingly came to accept Czechoslovak occupation of their provinces 
during the winter of 1918-1919, noting that, as part of Czechoslovakia, Germans avoided 
the hyperinflation suffered by Germans living in German-Austria.69  
Czechoslovaks naturally viewed the occupation of German Bohemia more 
positively than German Bohemians. The French, British, Italian, and American 
governments gave complete support to the Czechoslovak government in restoring the 
historic borders of the Czech lands, which gave Czechoslovak authorities a great deal of 
confidence in their actions. Not only did the Czechoslovak military face little resistance to 
their occupation from the local population, many local German Bohemian authorities had 
requested Czechoslovak military support and therefore welcomed such actions. Friedrich 
von Gebsattel, the German Consul-General in Prague, argued that despite the “obstinate” 
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Czech view of the indivisibility of the Czech lands, the Czechoslovak National Committee 
felt some loyalty towards Germans of the Czech lands. Gebsattel therefore opposed 
German Bohemian separation, arguing that “if German towns such as Komotau and 
Leitmeritz can turn to the Národní výbor, there is no reason why other places should not do 
so”.70  
Czechoslovak opposition towards German Bohemian self-determination hardened 
after the completion of the occupation. Kramář gave a speech on 20 December in which 
he emphasised that the Czechoslovak government no longer encouraged support or 
political involvement from local Germans. This attitude represented a massive shift from 
his speech on 14 November. Instead, Kramář emphasised that the Czechoslovak 
government would make all the decisions and would dictate these to the Germans of the 
Czech lands. Kramář specifically emphasised the indivisibility of the Czech lands, arguing 
that “the indivisibility of geographical Bohemia is regarded as a palladium and the 
Germans must accustom themselves to the idea that it is Czech policy which decides in 
this case”.71 Kramář emphasised that that the Czechoslovak government and Allied 
Powers considered the matter already settled by early 1919, describing German Bohemia 
as “an unconditional part of the historical kingdom of Bohemia and the Sudetenland a 
part of the historical margravate of Moravia”.72 
Official German Bohemian reactions to Czechoslovak actions in German 
Bohemia also intensified after the Czechoslovak occupation. Governor Lodgman replied 
specifically to Kramář’s speech on 28 December, arguing that:  
 
The only palladium, by which the Germans of Bohemia are bound to be 
guided in upholding their political attitude, is the free, unfettered will of the 
nation! … The only safe basis for the foundation of modern states is the free 
determination of a nation: It will be the task of modern policy to organise and 
bring this about after the war.73 
 
Lodgman emphasised that although German Bohemian claims to national self-
determination in the Czech lands had been temporarily defeated, they had not been 
permanently destroyed. 
Lodgman’s speech of 28 December represented one of the major criticisms of 
Czechoslovak actions against German Bohemians in the Czech lands. Having been forced 
to flee by the Czechoslovak occupation of German Bohemia, Lodgman gave this speech 
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to the German-Austrian National Assembly in Vienna. Lodgman’s key arguments 
reflected his belief that the province of German Bohemia had the right to self-
determination and that Czechoslovak actions could not be justified. Lodgman heavily 
criticised the approach taken by Czechoslovak politicians towards the formation of the 
Czechoslovak state. He felt that Czechoslovak politicians had failed to negotiate with 
German Bohemian politicians as equals, and had instead presumed they would concede to 
overwhelming force and join the new state willingly.74 Lodgman therefore rejected the 
arguments made by Czechoslovak politicians who blamed the occupation on German 
Bohemian refusals to recognise Czechoslovak sovereignty. 
Lodgman ended his speech by attacking Masaryk, specifically in labelling him an 
imperialist. Lodgman also attacked Masaryk’s promise since the occupation to grant rights 
to German Bohemians in Czechoslovakia. Lodgman viewed anything less than complete 
freedom of self-determination worthless. Lodgman concluded on a note of optimism, 
stressing the importance of national self-determination. He argued that “the future destiny 
of German-Bohemia is not yet decided”, also stressing that “the ultimate fate of a people 
depends solely upon its own doing”.75 Although the Czechoslovak government invited 
Lodgman and other German Bohemian representatives to join the National Assembly in 
Prague, Lodgman refused. Lodgman sought instead to maintain German Bohemia’s 
separateness from Czechoslovakia, and was convinced that the Paris Peace Conference 
would grant German Bohemia its right to self-determination.76 
 
German Bohemian Self-Determination at the Paris Peace Conference 
 
After earlier failures to secure German self-determination in the Czech lands, 
German Bohemian and German-Austrian representatives placed their hopes on the Paris 
Peace Conference to achieve this goal. Karl Renner led the German-Austrian delegation 
to the Conference, which included a number of Germans from the Czech lands. 
Hieronymus Oldofredi joined the delegation as an expert on South Moravia, Anton 
Klement as an expert on the Bohemian Woods, Lodgman and Seliger as governor and 
vice-governor of German Bohemia, and Freissler as governor of the Sudetenland.77 Each 
of these representatives went to the conference assuming they had the support of the 
German-Austrian government in seeking a plebiscite for their respective province. 
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However, the German-Austrian government gave only selective support with 
regards to German self-determination in the Czech lands. Renner had earlier described 
“[s]elf-determination as autonomy, not as sovereignty”, perhaps emphasising that the 
German-Austrian government did not seek sovereignty over German provinces in the 
Czech lands after all.78 Renner later revealed the goals of the German-Austrian delegation 
in his autobiography: 
 
Hardly anybody expected that the newly constituted provinces of German-
Bohemia and Sudetenland, which were so far removed from the Alpine lands 
of Austria, could in the long run remain politically joined to them. It was 
intended, with the assistance of local representatives, to ensure that these 
areas received a measure of autonomy acceptable to both sides.79  
 
Oldofredi, the representative for southern Moravia, outlined selective support even more 
clearly when he wrote of the experts: “[t]o Lodgman, Seliger and Freissler [Renner] has 
not got much to say. Their Provinces - German-Bohemia and Sudetenland - are bound in 
his opinion to Czechoslovakia. He was not quite so pessimistic about Southern Bohemia 
and Southern Moravia but warned his colleagues not to hope too much”.80 Renner 
therefore realised that initial German-Austrian demands on Czech lands had been 
unrealistic, but continued to support plebiscites in southern Bohemia and southern 
Moravia so that these regions could still be assigned to German-Austria.  
The first actions of the Paris Peace Conference regarding the Czech lands 
involved the formation of specific committees which would be responsible for decision-
making. On 5 February 1919, the Council of Ten established a Committee on 
Czechoslovak Questions, also known as the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs. The 
Committee contained two representatives each from Britain, France, Italy, and the US, 
whose role involved making recommendations for solutions to issues concerning 
Czechoslovakia.81 On 27 February the Committee decided that the Czechoslovak 
delegation should be consulted if the Committee had specific questions, but decided 
against consultations with the Germans of the Czech lands.82 From the outset the 
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Committee members agreed that apart from minor strategic adjustments, the 1914 
boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia would be maintained.83   
The first ruling of the Committee on Czechoslovak Questions occurred when it 
submitted a report on Czechoslovakia’s borders on 12 March 1919. The Committee 
decided unanimously that the German-Austrian border with Czechoslovakia should 
“coincide with the administrative boundaries which formerly separated Bohemia and 
Moravia from the Austrian provinces”, thereby agreeing that the historic borders of 
Bohemia and Moravia should be maintained. The Committee also ruled that a Boundary 
Commission should decide Czechoslovak claims for minor adjustments of this border.84 
In draft clauses for the peace treaty, the 12 March report also tentatively proposed 
awarding to Czechoslovak the northern half of Gmünd/České Velenice, part of Lower 
Austria, and the entirety of the March/Morava River. The Committee established a 
Boundary Commission comprising the five principal powers, plus German-Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, to discuss the proposed frontier.85 
Discussions concerning the border between German-Austria and Czechoslovakia 
continued on 9 May in a meeting of the Council of Five. The Council reiterated the 
Committee on Czechoslovak Questions’ unanimous ruling that the historic borders of 
Bohemia and Moravia should be maintained. The Council also noted the 
recommendations made by the Czechoslovak Committee concerning Gmünd/České 
Velenice and the March/Morava River. In a 12 May meeting the Council of Ten 
confirmed the findings of the Council of Five, highlighting once more that only two small 
changes to the historic border would be made.86 Neither Council acknowledged receipt of 
German-Austrian complaints to the proposal. 
The German-Austrian delegation issued its first complaint about Czechoslovak 
actions in German Bohemia on 2 April 1919. The German-Austrian Foreign Ministry sent 
a letter to the French Foreign Minister containing a note protesting against the 
Czechoslovak government, which had “occupied not only the German enclaves in the 
country of the Sudetians [sic], but also the coherent domains of the German race in 
Bohemia and Moravia”. The German-Austrian Foreign Ministry argued that the 
Czechoslovak military occupation of German provinces in the Czech lands represented a 
“flagrant violation of the principles formulated by Mr. Wilson”, which until that point had 
                                         
83 “Committee on Tchecho-Slovak Questions (b) Organization and Procedure of the Committee as agreed upon at its 
meeting on February 27, 1919”, in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. Germain, 438-439. 
84 “Reports of the Committee on Tchecho-Slovak Questions (a) Report on the Austro-Czechoslovak Boundary (e) 
Frontier with Austria”, in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. Germain,  439-440. 
85 “Reports of the Committee on Tchecho-Slovak Questions (b) Draft clauses concerning Czechoslovakia to be inserted 
in a preliminary treaty of peace with Austria”, in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. Germain, 440-441. 
86 “Discussion by the Council of Ten of the Austro-Czechoslovak frontier”, in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. 
Germain, 445-446. 
37 
 
been upheld by German-Austrian officials. The note also criticised the Czechoslovak 
treatment of these German-Austrian officials, forcing them to swear an oath and submit 
themselves to Czechoslovak authorities.87  
Renner and the German-Austrian delegation submitted a further complaint to the 
Peace Conference on 12 June after hearing that the Peace Conference sought to maintain 
the historic borders of the Czech lands. Renner argued strongly against the proposed 
frontier, viewing it as a great injustice that three and a half million German-Austrians 
would be separated from Austria: “The Allied and Associated Powers are in the course of 
committing a flagrant injustice towards the population of the above-mentioned territories 
and towards all German Austrians and to drag the Czecho-Slovak people itself into an 
adventurous and disastrous policy”. Renner felt instead that Czech and Slovak-speaking 
districts would be sufficient to comprise the new Czechoslovak state. Renner argued that 
the existing proposal would prove to be disastrous: “if these German regions are united to 
Czecho-Slovak territory against the wishes of their inhabitants, the former Austria would 
be replaced, in so far as the Germans and the Czecho-Slovaks are concerned, by two small 
states continually struggling with one another”. Instead, Renner summed up the view of 
German-Austrians as: “Let us leave this house which is burning, and let us join our 
country of origin”.88 
The German-Austrian delegation continued its attack against opposition to 
German Bohemian self-determination. The delegation compared the situation of German 
Bohemia to that of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. The German-Austrian delegation argued that 
the Czechoslovak government acted against the principles of self-determination in 
occupying German Bohemia and replacing its elected representatives. The German-
Austrian delegation therefore requested that self-determination be restored in German 
Bohemia to allow free elections to re-establish provincial assemblies.89 German 
representatives from the Czech lands also outlined their official view of the situation, 
issuing a memorandum to the Allied and Associated Powers. The 15 June memo 
concluded with the following proposal: “The question as to which State the German 
population wishes to belong shall be decided by a Plebiscite to take place in the German 
Districts of the Sudetians [sic] by Communes under neutral control, in the absence of 
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Czech troops and in accordance with a procedure to be settled”.90 Such a proposal 
represented one of many attempts by Germans to have a plebiscite permitted in German 
Bohemia. 
On 16 June, the German-Austrian delegation complained that the proposed 
frontier between German-Austria and Czechoslovakia failed to conform to the linguistic 
frontier. The German-Austrian delegation claimed that arguments used to justify historic 
frontiers were imperialistic and that local people should be granted the right to self-
determination. The German-Austrian delegation accepted it would be unfeasible for 
German-Austria to claim all Germans in the Czech lands, but argued that the two 
provinces of the Bohemian Woods and German South Moravia should be assigned to 
German-Austria.91 On 13 June, Bauer argued that claims on German Bohemia should be 
withdrawn due to “geographic impossibility”. Continuing German-Austrian claims on 
German Bohemia weakened their other, more feasible claims. Bauer instead sought only 
the Bohemian Woods and German South Moravia, asking the Peace Conference for 
plebiscites in these regions.92 
Beneš responded to German-Austrian complaints about the proposed border by 
submitting a memo to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference. Contained within 
this memo included a new clause concerning the importance placed on railroads by the 
Czechoslovak delegation.93 Interestingly Beneš submitted his memo some two months 
after the Committee on Czechoslovakia Questions had proposed awarding the railway 
along the March/Morava River to German-Austria. The Czechoslovak delegation 
submitted a proposed amendment to the frontier clauses of the treaty, which attempted to 
guarantee Czechoslovak control of the railway in Gmünd/České Velenice.94 Although the 
Allied delegations refused German claims to self-determination in the Czech lands, they 
were happy to reverse decisions in favour of Czechoslovakia when requested by the 
Czechoslovak delegation. On 19 June, Beneš and Masaryk disputed the earlier claims 
made by the Austrian delegation. In their view, German Bohemian opposition to 
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Czechoslovakia had lessened, many German Bohemians had abandoned the idea of 
achieving independence, and many had come to support the Czechoslovak state.95 
The German-Austrian delegation submitted additional counter-proposals on 10 
July to the proposed peace treaty section concerning Czechoslovakia. The German-
Austrian counter-proposals rejected the proposed border, instead requesting all decisions 
concerning frontiers be based instead on the results of plebiscites. In the event that the 
Conference upheld Czechoslovak claims, the German-Austrian delegation emphasised the 
importance of granting the German population of Czechoslovakia additional political 
rights.96 Such a proposal indicated that the German-Austrian delegation viewed their 
chances for claiming German Bohemia pessimistically.  
 The German-Austrian delegation’s primary counter-proposal to the draft peace 
treaty involved the establishment of a so-called “cantonal regime”. According to the 
proposal, each nation in Czechoslovakia would have self-autonomy: “The domain of each 
of the nationalities inhabiting the Czecho-Slovak State will be subdivided into cantons. 
The inhabitants of all the cantons forming the domain of the same nationality, may 
constitute themselves into corporate bodies called upon to represent them in all questions 
concerning their national interests”. Under the German-Austrian proposal, the 
Czechoslovak government would retain responsibility for defence, foreign affairs, and all 
matters of state importance, while the domains and cantons would retain control over all 
other matters, such as local administration and education.97 
Federalisation certainly had practical historical precedents during Austro-
Hungarian rule, as many Cisleithanian Minister-Presidents sought to achieve political 
consensus in the Czech lands. For example, the German-Austrian delegation’s canton 
regime proposal somewhat resembled Eduard Taaffe’s proposed Point of Agreement plan 
of 1888, Ernest von Koerber’s temporary reforms of 1900-1904, and Paul Gautsch’s 
proposed reforms of 1905, all of which essentially sought to grant self-autonomy to 
Czechs and Germans in the Czechs lands.98 Furthermore, Moravia had functioned for 
some time under a federalist system after the Moravian Compromise of 1905, 
orchestrated by the governor of Moravia, Karl Emanuel von Zierotin-Lilgenau, in which 
the government established dual parallel systems of Czechs and Germans within 
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Moravia.99 Federalisation of the Empire had earlier origins of course. Aurel Popovici 
notably proposed a United States of Greater Austria in 1906.100 Popovici based aspects of 
his proposal on Swiss politician Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s work of 1878. Czech politician 
František Palacký also notably advocated further federalisation of the empire in the 1860s, 
seeking to establish a three-way division of the empire rather than the dualist system 
established by the Compromise of 1867.101 
Another key point of the German-Austrian delegation’s counter-proposal 
concerned the town of Ostrau/Ostrava, located in the Sudetenland province near the 
border with Austrian Silesia. The German-Austrian delegation first made a case for a 
neutral, internationalised territory to be established in the Ostrau/Ostrava region under 
the control of the Council of the League of Nations on 15 June.102 The German-Austrian 
delegation proposed again on July 10 that, given its economic importance to nearby 
countries and its mixed population, the Ostrau/Ostrava region should form a “perpetually 
neutral territory”, self-governed by the people who lived there. The German-Austrian 
delegation also suggested that, given its importance as a Danube port, 
Pressburg/Bratislava also form a multi-national neutral canton.103 
The justification used to support the German-Austrian delegation’s claims on 
German Bohemia relied on a plebiscite held on 10 July 1919. The Austrian delegation 
claimed that the results of this plebiscite clearly showed that “the inhabitants of all the 
territories… have professed with every desired clearness their German nationality”. The 
official plebiscite results released by the Czechoslovak government indicated that 
Germans comprised 33 percent of Bohemians, 21 percent of Moravians, and 67 percent 
of Silesians, amounting to 31 percent of the total population of the Czech lands. As a 
response to these results, the German-Austrian delegation argued “it must thus evidently 
be recognized that, even under the present regime, a third of the territory of the three 
countries, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, claimed in their extent by the Czecho-Slovaks, is 
really inhabited by German electors”. Using this justification, the German-Austrian 
delegation argued that German Bohemia should be consulted by a plebiscite to show they 
supported becoming part of German-Austria.104 
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Ultimately the Allied delegations rejected German self-determination in the Czech 
lands. On 25 August, the Allied delegations sent a final message to the German-Austrian 
delegation which read:  
 
The Allied and Associated Powers…believe that the German-speaking people 
living on the borders of these provinces (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia) ought to 
remain connected with the Czech people in order to co-operate with them in 
the development of that national unity in which history has associated 
them”.105  
 
The German-Austrian delegation protested against the decision of the Allied delegations. 
In particular, the German-Austrian delegation protested against the decision to exclude 
German Bohemians from the German-Austrian state, “with whom they have formed for 
centuries a political and economic unity”. Instead, the Allied decision meant German 
Bohemians would be “deprived of their national liberty and subjected to the foreign 
domination of a nation which in this very Peace Treaty recognizes itself as their 
enemy”.106 Despite all efforts and arguments used by the German-Austrian delegation, the 
Allied delegations did not change their original opinion and refused a plebiscite. 
During the Peace Conference, the Czechoslovak delegation submitted eleven 
documents outlining its territorial claims on the Czech lands, but Bruegel suggests that 
these had little impact on negotiations. Bruegel argues instead that the Peace Conference 
even ignored many of the Czechoslovak proposals, including those concerning the 
Czechoslovak-Yugoslav corridor, expansion of Slovak borders, and several changes to the 
border with Germany. Fortunately for the Czechoslovak delegation, its claims to the 
indivisibility of the Czech lands received almost universal support from the Allied 
delegations. The Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs recognised that the inclusion of 
such a large number of Germans would prove problematic for Czechoslovakia, but 
unanimously agreed that the separation of Germans from Czechoslovakia would “not 
only expose Czechoslovakia to great dangers but equally create great difficulties for the 
Germans themselves”. The Commissions ruled therefore that “[t]he only practicable 
solution was to incorporate these Germans into Czechoslovakia”.107  
In March 1919, Archibald Cary Coolidge, who led the US team to survey areas 
with disputed borders, suggested that many German-Austrian proposals at the Paris Peace 
Conference concerning the Czech lands could have been accepted. Coolidge heavily 
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criticised Czechoslovak hypocrisy for demanding historic frontiers for the Czech lands 
but rejecting historic frontiers in favour of nationality rights in Slovakia. Coolidge 
personally favoured nationality rights, arguing that “[t]o grant the Czechoslovaks all the 
territory they demand would be not only an injustice to millions of people unwilling to 
come under Czech rule, but it would also be dangerous and perhaps fatal to the future of 
the new state”. Coolidge predicted that even if the Peace Treaty did include German 
Bohemia within Czechoslovakia, the League of Nations would eventually overrule this 
decision, stating “such a League is not intended to perpetuate the existence of Alsace-
Lorraines”.108  
Coolidge rejected Czechoslovak justifications for retaining German Bohemia, 
arguing that most German territory should be removed despite its traditional historic and 
geographic unity. Coolidge proposed that Lower and Upper Austria should be extended 
northwards into southern Bohemia and Moravia until they reach the ethnic border, the 
region around Eger/Cheb should be permitted to join Bavaria, northern Bohemia could 
be joined to Saxony if the population favoured it, and autonomy could be granted to the 
Sudetenland region.109 In all these cases Coolidge supported the use of plebiscites to gauge 
popular support. However, Bruegel argues that Coolidge insisted that the comprising the 
province of German Bohemia should remain part of Czechoslovakia due to its industrial 
significance. Regardless, despite Coolidge’s status as an expert on the subject, the US 
delegation ignored his recommendations and proposed entirely different modifications.110 
German Bohemian representatives continued to vow that they would never 
surrender their right to self-determination. Much of the local population did not feel this 
way however. Many Germans in the Czech lands took the opportunity to vote in elections 
on 15 June 1919 as Czechoslovak citizens. It is important to remember that this election 
represented the first democratic elections for Germans as well as for Czechs. The German 
Social Democratic Party won 44 percent of German votes in the Czech lands, and 
declared its willingness to work with the new Czechoslovak state. However, the party 
refused to give up its demand for German territorial autonomy, angering the Czechs.111 
Such disagreements hint at the future of Czech-German relationships, which would 
deteriorate further still in the 1930s. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Allied delegations ultimately refused self-determination for Germans in the 
Czech lands. Wilson later claimed that Masaryk had never informed him that the large 
German population in Bohemia sought to be exempt from joining the Czechoslovak 
state.112 Gullberg claims that French opposition was the decisive factor for the decision 
ultimately reached at the Peace Conference. The Italian delegation supported the French 
position because it set a precedent for Italian claims in South Tyrol.113 The British 
delegation never considered the option of applying self-determination for Germans in the 
Czech lands, largely because it saw the value of a powerful Czechoslovakia.114 The Allied 
delegations unanimously favoured the independence of Czechoslovakia using the historic 
borders of the Czech lands. 
The failure of German Bohemians to achieve self-determination does not lie 
solely with Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. German Bohemian 
politicians could have achieved more autonomy had they been willing to negotiate and 
reach a compromise with the Czechoslovak government. Given Allied support for 
Czechoslovakia, German Bohemian autonomy and limited self-government perhaps 
represented the most they could have hoped to achieve. Evidence also suggests that many 
German Bohemians felt ambivalent or indifferent about German Bohemian autonomy, 
and some opposed it outright for fear of German or Austrian economic competition. 
Some German Bohemians even accepted the positives that local German co-operation 
with Czechoslovakia could bring. As Victor Mamatey explains, “Bohemia, Moravia, and 
Silesia constituted one of the most natural and best-integrated economic units in 
Europe”.115 Renner later wrote that most Germans in the Czech lands accepted 
Czechoslovak sovereignty shortly after its independence and they “sincerely collaborated 
not only in its economic development but in the central and local government”.116  
Despite viewing the Paris Peace Conference with optimism, the German-Austrian 
and German Bohemian governments had little hope of achieving self-determination for 
Germans in the Czech lands. German-Austrian officials failed to accept the reality of the 
situation. Even though the German-Austrian delegation made no serious claims to 
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northern areas of the Czech lands, it had hoped for southern areas which bordered Upper 
and Lower Austria. However, as Bruegel argues, “at no stage during the Peace 
negotiations was the question of maintaining the unity of the ‘Czech lands’ (Bohemia, 
Moravia and Silesia) a subject for discussion. The only point at issue… was whether 
certain fringes of territory could be ceded to Germany”.117 The Allied delegations 
ultimately rejected these proposals as well. According to Gullberg, Wilson argued that 
“historic Bohemia was best preserved and recognized as an indivisible structure, thereby 
implying that Wilsonian principles should not be interpreted in ethnic terms”.118 The 
Allied Powers and Czechoslovak government maintained the indivisibility of the Czech 
lands immediately, and would never have relented on this demand. Strategic interests 
concerning the importance of Czechoslovakia in the post-war period proved more 
important than self-determination. Although German Bohemians failed to achieve self-
determination, and failed in their attempt to hold plebiscites in German Bohemia, 
Vorarlbergers took the initiative themselves in holding their own plebiscite before the 
Peace Conference met.  
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Vorarlberg 
 
This chapter examines Vorarlberg in the period 1918-1919, in which Vorarlbergers 
established a large movement advocating for political union with Switzerland.1 The early 
success of the movement advocating Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland allowed a 
plebiscite to be held on 11 May 1919, in which 81 percent voted in favour of such a 
union. Otto Ender, the governor of Vorarlberg, personally travelled to the Paris Peace 
Conference to advocate for international recognition of the union, but the German-
Austrian delegation and strategic debates outside Vorarlberg’s control prevented any 
further progress. The Allied delegations eventually opposed Vorarlberg’s self-
determination, expressed through their plebiscite for union with Switzerland, deciding 
instead to support the territorial integrity of German-Austria.  
Vorarlberg provides an interesting case of the practice of self-determination in 
German-Austria after the First World War for a number of reasons. Vorarlbergers 
represented a major local population which wanted to leave the German-Austrian state. 
While German Bohemians and Carinthians fought for national self-determination in order 
to secure their right to exist as part of the German-Austrian state, Vorarlbergers had been 
assured of their inclusion in the German-Austrian state and yet sought to leave. 
Vorarlberg fits between the other two cases in the continuum of self-determination at the 
Paris Peace Conference. Vorarlbergers held a plebiscite but Allied delegations rejected its 
self-determination. Vorarlberg is also the least researched of the three cases. The 
Vorarlberg plebiscite remains largely the subject of research by German-language 
historians, as few English-language historians have shown interest.2  
Until the end of the First World War, Vorarlberg had been administered by a 
governor in Innsbruck as part of the province of Tyrol.3 On 3 November 1918, 
Vorarlberg’s Provincial Assembly declared independence from Tyrol to become a separate 
province, maintaining only a “temporary union” with German-Austria.4 Therefore, 
although Vorarlberg had declared independence from Tyrol it remained officially part of 
German-Austria. After provincial independence, Vorarlberg’s pre-existing Provincial 
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Assembly gained real decision-making power. Vorarlberg’s Provincial Government, also 
known as the Provincial Council, consisted of the Provincial Assembly, a President, and 
two Vice Presidents. Vorarlberg’s political leaders began to seek union with Switzerland 
almost as soon as they had declared independence.5 
Although now a separate province of German-Austria, Vorarlberg retained its 
oath of loyalty to Austro-Hungarian Emperor Karl. However, Karl revoked his subjects 
from this oath on 11 November, which freed Vorarlbergers from their allegiance to him. 
As historian Harlan Curtz Cohen explains: “The individual Länder [provinces] of Austria 
were united constitutionally only by their common allegiance to the Emperor. Once the 
Emperor no longer stood as the Head of State, the Länder could claim with justice that 
they reverted to a state of full independence”.6 In the absence of a Head of State, 
therefore, Vorarlbergers felt they had the right of self-determination to secede from 
German-Austria. 
A grim post-war economic situation motivated Vorarlbergers in their decision to 
secede from German-Austria. The suspension of cotton supplies all but caused the 
closure of Vorarlberg’s textile industry, one of the most important employers in the 
region.7 Rapid currency inflation resulted in a decision by the German-Austrian 
government to institute emergency money.8 Lack of coal meant the railways ran only 
sporadically, and shortages in the gas supply also created numerous difficulties.9 The 
return of prisoners of war further exacerbated problems in Vorarlberg, worsening food 
shortages and unemployment.10 Food shortages represented the worst aspect of the post-
war situation in Vorarlberg, and the threat of starvation hung over the population in the 
winter of 1918. The primary agriculture in Vorarlberg comprised cattle and dairy farming, 
with 43 percent of land made up of pastures and mountains and only one percent arable 
land.11 Vorarlbergers therefore had only a limited ability to feed themselves. An 
advertisement in the Vorarlberger Volksblatt, in which a Vorarlberger offered to buy dogs to 
be slaughtered for meat, highlighted the desperate situation in which Vorarlbergers found 
themselves.12   
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The economic decline gave increasing strength to those who advocated for a 
change in Vorarlberg’s political situation. Originally Switzerland provided a substantial 
amount of Vorarlberg’s food deliveries, but the German-Austrian government promised 
to take over responsibility for the supply of food to Vorarlberg, resulting in the Swiss 
government halting these shipments. The German-Austrian government proved unable to 
fulfil its promise, however, resulting in immediate bread and meat shortages in 
Vorarlberg.13 The organisation and distribution system between the German-Austrian 
provinces had broken down when the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed, which meant 
the German-Austrian government could not support Vorarlberg itself.14 The failure of the 
German-Austrian government to relieve food shortages in Vorarlberg provoked a feeling 
of abandonment amongst Vorarlbergers. As Vorarlbergers had no way of relieving the 
food shortages themselves, they proved willing to entertain new political options.  
 
Growth of the Anti-Austrian Movement 
 
Many Vorarlbergers felt that invoking the right to self-determination offered them 
more hope for the immediate future. Vorarlbergers initially hoped to purchase food from 
Switzerland, but the collapse of the German-Austrian currency made this impossible. In 
Switzerland, however, nearly all foods were freely available.15 Vorarlbergers could only 
gain access to this food if they became part of Switzerland. Advocates for union with 
Switzerland argued therefore, that Vorarlberg needed to join Switzerland in order to avoid 
famine.16 
Switzerland had long been viewed favourably in Vorarlberg, and this affection 
rapidly transformed into a desire for political union. In 1918, supporters of Vorarlberg’s 
union with Switzerland organised an advertising committee to campaign on their behalf. 
The advertising committee organised meetings throughout Vorarlberg to promote union 
with Switzerland.17 Ferdinand Riedmann, a school teacher from Lustenau, helped to 
establish this committee. Although the pro-Switzerland movement failed to achieve 
universal sympathy from Vorarlbergers, it also lacked any serious opponents. Even 
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criticism against union, such as that from the Vorarlberger Tagblatt, did not fundamentally 
oppose the movement.18  
Some Vorarlbergers opposed union with Switzerland, instead favouring union 
with Germany based on economic arguments. Although much smaller than the pro-
Switzerland movement, the anti-Switzerland movement received extensive support from 
traders and the business community who used their large financial resources to ensure its 
participation in the plebiscite campaign. Like Vorarlberg, Switzerland possessed few raw 
materials and relied on imports whereas Germany possessed its own raw materials and 
offered a large market for Vorarlberg’s industrial products.19 One Vorarlberger who 
advocated union with Germany even argued that “[a]ll the interests of our agriculture 
speak against the Anschluss with Switzerland”.20 Economic arguments therefore clearly 
influenced pro-Germany sentiment, a trend which would also prove important in pro-
Switzerland circles. 
Vorarlbergers’ desire for secession also led to an increase in support for another 
option. Some Vorarlbergers suggested incorporation into one of the federal German 
states, such as Württemberg or Bavaria, if union with Germany as part of German-Austria 
proved impossible.21 The Swabian Chapter advocated for Vorarlberg’s union with a 
proposed Greater-Swabian state. The Greater-Swabia campaign provided an important 
counterweight against those who supported union with Switzerland by giving support to 
its opponents and providing a target they could work towards.22 Karl Magirus, an Ulm 
resident, suggested in early February 1919 that Baden, Württemberg, and Bavarian Swabia 
should unite to form a Greater-Swabian state. Magirus created his proposal on the basis 
of the historic Duchy of Swabia, which also included parts of Alsace, north-east 
Switzerland, and Vorarlberg.23 The Swabian Chapter became the main movement 
opposing Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland. 
The Swabian Chapter’s first meeting, held in Bregenz on 3 May 1919, attracted a 
large audience. The audience comprised industry representatives, local citizens groups, so-
called “friends of Greater-Swabia”, and surprisingly also many supporters of union with 
Switzerland.24 Bruno Karrer, Secretary of the Vorarlberg Chamber of Commerce, opened 
the meeting, and the audience quickly acclaimed him Chairman of the Swabian Chapter. 
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The Swabian Chapter received written support from many local organisations, including 
schools, the railway organisation, and a local newspaper.25 Although the Swabian Chapter 
lacked the strength of the pro-Switzerland committee, it nevertheless had many 
supporters. 
Like supporters of the pro-Switzerland movement, supporters of the Swabian 
Chapter also favoured economic arguments. An industrialist named Julius Rhomberg 
emphasized the unnatural organisation and the economic evils of German-Austria at the 
Swabian Chapter meeting held on 3 May. Rhomberg also championed the Swabian 
Chapter slogan “here Switzerland, here Swabia” [hie Schweiz, hie Schwaben], which indicated 
that members of the Swabian Chapter favoured union with Switzerland or Swabia over 
German-Austria. Vorarlberg industrialists had brought their declaration expressing such 
sentiment to the attention of both the Swiss Federal Council in Bern and the Vorarlberg 
provincial government.26 Rhomberg’s discussion of the Swabian Chapter’s slogan suggests 
that many of those advocating for Vorarlberg’s union with a foreign territory, whether 
Switzerland, Germany, or indeed with Greater-Swabia, had no strong preference for one 
over the other. Instead, many simply sought to leave German-Austria by joining 
whichever political entity they could. Therefore, some members of the Swabian Chapter 
simply preferred union with Swabia rather than necessarily opposing union with 
Switzerland. 
In March 1919, Vorarlberg’s Provincial Assembly attempted negotiations with the 
Swiss Federal Council regarding a possible union between Vorarlberg and Switzerland. 
Governor Ender claimed that the Swiss government had refused to receive Vorarlberg’s 
representatives on this occasion. Ender refused to negotiate with the German-Austrian 
government because official German-Austrian opposition to Vorarlberg’s union with 
Switzerland meant that Ender viewed further negotiations as pointless. Equally, however, 
Ender realised that opening negotiations with Swabia would only be possible if a Swabian 
government already existed. Vorarlberg could not negotiate for a potential union with 
Swabia in the absence of a Swabian state.27 Such difficulties greatly complicated and 
frustrated Ender and the Provincial Assembly in their efforts to seek secession. 
Ender proposed that Vorarlberg should hold a plebiscite on the union with 
Switzerland in order to assure the Swiss government that a majority of Vorarlbergers 
supported it.  The rise of the Swabian Chapter highlighted that the nature of the 
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Vorarlberg question had begun to change, representing an important reason for the early 
failures to make progress towards union with Switzerland. Ender reported that Swiss 
newspapers like the Neue Zürcher Zeitung had alleged that the debate in Vorarlberg had 
been reduced to a competition between different groups. Although the Swiss government 
still recognised unconditionally that Vorarlbergers had the right to self-determination, it 
had therefore moved towards a position of non-interference. Ender felt that a plebiscite 
would provide Vorarlberg’s representatives with the authorisation to advance the question 
of union with Switzerland.28 Ender therefore framed the plebiscite as an important step 
towards achieving union with Switzerland. 
Not all Vorarlbergers supported Ender’s position on the importance of 
plebiscites. Vorarlberg’s Provincial Council initially viewed the proposed plebiscite with 
scepticism. On 15 March the Provincial Council maintained that despite the popular 
support for union with Switzerland, the decision whether to leave German-Austria lay 
instead with the newly elected Provincial Government. Ender countered that any decision 
reached must first be written into the constitution, arguing that “[c]hanges to the 
constitution should only be possible with a plebiscite”.29 Ender therefore argued that 
despite what the Provincial Council maintained, they must agree to hold a plebiscite in any 
case. 
Members of the Swabian Chapter also opposed the plebiscite, viewing it as an 
insult to Vorarlbergers. Karrer criticised the plebiscite question because it failed to grant 
alternative options regarding preferences for union. The plebiscite simply asked opinions 
regarding union with Switzerland. Karrer argued that many Vorarlbergers would vote in 
favour of union with Switzerland in the plebiscite simply because they wanted to leave 
German-Austria, despite holding a preference for union with Germany. Karrer therefore 
presented a motion to delay the plebiscite in order to prevent people from rushing into a 
decision. Despite Karrer’s efforts, the Provincial Council accepted Ender’s application for 
a plebiscite.30 On 25 April 1919 the Provincial Assembly passed a resolution agreeing to 
hold a plebiscite on 11 May 1919.31 Karrer therefore failed in his attempt to prevent the 
plebiscite for union with Switzerland from proceeding. 
With news of an impending plebiscite, Ender attempted once more to make 
contact with the Swiss government. Ender reported on 8 May that he had finally held a 
successful meeting with the Swiss Federal Council. The Swiss Political Department 
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informed Ender that the Swiss Federal Council would undergo an assessment of union 
with Vorarlberg if Vorarlbergers voted in favour in the plebiscite. The Federal Council 
made this promise despite already knowing that the majority of Vorarlbergers supported 
union with Switzerland. 32 In this act, the Swiss Federal Council thereby gave implicit 
support for union.  
Ender sought to persuade Vorarlbergers to support the legitimacy of the 
plebiscite. On 5 May 1919, Ender publically issued the plebiscite question, outlined how 
the plebiscite would work, and what would happen if the plebiscite succeeded.33 Ender 
emphasised that the result of the plebiscite would not obligate Vorarlbergers to that 
decision, nor would it obligate the Swiss government into negotiations. Vorarlberg and 
Switzerland would both hold additional plebiscites before any final decisions. Ender also 
squashed a circulating rumour which argued that union with Switzerland would force the 
division of Vorarlberg between the Swiss cantons of Graubünden and St. Gallen. Instead, 
Ender assured Vorarlbergers that union with Switzerland would allow Vorarlberg to 
become a “fully entitled, independent, and undivided canton”.34 Presumably Ender 
intended to allay peoples’ fears about rushing into a decision, and to ensure that 
Vorarlberg would retain its right to self-determination if the plebiscite went ahead. 
 
Disagreement over Vorarlberg’s Future 
 
Debates in the media among pro-Swiss and pro-German Vorarlbergers intensified 
as the date of the plebiscite neared. Pro-Switzerland groups solidified support for the 
union, while those who opposed the union attempted to rally further opposition. Both 
sides appealed to a number of different arguments, stressing economic and linguistic 
justifications while also portraying the arguments used by the other side as unrealistic. 
Both sides realised that most Vorarlbergers favoured union with Switzerland, but vowed 
to continue their campaigns nevertheless. 
In the days immediately prior to the plebiscite, the Swabian Chapter continued to 
promote opposition to the pro-Switzerland movement. In a campaign organised by 
Chairman Karrer the Swabian Chapter published advertisements in a number of 
Vorarlberg newspapers promoting public meetings across Vorarlberg to oppose the 
plebiscite. The advertisements also stated that opposition to union with Switzerland 
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would continue after the plebiscite. 35  This statement suggests that Karrer and the 
Swabian Chapter knew the plebiscite would prove overwhelming support existed for 
union with Switzerland, but remained determined to continue campaigning for Germany 
regardless. 
Opponents were also concerned with the treatment of veterans and war casualties 
if the union proceeded. An unnamed journalist, himself wounded in the war, feared that 
Switzerland would not support Vorarlberg’s wounded soldiers if Vorarlberg became part 
of Switzerland. The journalist dismissed the Swabian Chapter slogan, instead proposing 
one preferred by those disabled in the war: “here German-Austria, here Swabia” [hie 
Deutsch-Österreich, hie Schwaben]. This slogan instead suggested that veterans felt only 
countries which fought in the war would feel obliged to support veterans. The journalist 
continued: “For us invalids, there is only one question: ‘either Austria or Swabia’.  Paris 
has yet to utter a word. If Tyrol is split from Austria only one solution remains and that is 
Swabia”.36 This veteran therefore preferred to remain with German-Austria, but favoured 
Swabia if German-Austria’s survival as a state became unlikely. 
Another editorial by “a disabled war veteran” raised concerns about the economic 
benefits of union with Switzerland. The veteran argued that it was Vorarlberg’s economic 
plight which had forced the plebiscite rather than a genuine desire to join Switzerland. 
The economic situation in Vorarlberg gave Vorarlbergers no other option but to join a 
larger political system. However, the disabled veteran doubted that Switzerland could 
provide the economic benefits which Vorarlbergers hoped. The veteran felt Switzerland 
would be unsympathetic and unwilling to help widows, orphans, and those disabled in the 
war, asking whether Switzerland would have a statutory obligation to provide for invalids 
and veterans. Ultimately the veteran argued Switzerland would not provide for veterans, 
but Germany would, writing “the choice from this point is not difficult”.37 Clearly a 
number of veterans remained suspicious about union with Switzerland and continued to 
oppose the plebiscite.   
The Vorarlberger Tagblatt put economic arguments for Vorarlberg’s union with 
Switzerland to the test on 8 May. The Vorarlberger Tagblatt conducted a comparison of the 
prices of various staple foods in one nearby town in Switzerland and one in Germany. 
The newspaper assumed that everything would be cheap and abundant in Switzerland, 
while the prices would be more expensive in Germany, given the widespread food 
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shortages caused by the war. However, the newspaper found that, even after four years of 
war and blockade, basic living essentials remained cheaper in Germany than in 
Switzerland. The article concluded: “I for one now know where my stomach longs to 
be”.38 The evidence suggests that those who favoured union with Germany also relied on 
economic factors, although German-Austria’s economic difficulties in 1919 meant most 
countries would have appealed to Vorarlbergers. 
Others argued that the plebiscite served no purpose as it would have no effect. 
The Vorarlberger Tagblatt noted the preliminary nature of the plebiscite, and that the final 
decision could only occur once the Swiss Federal Council had communicated their 
conditions for union. The newspaper argued that, regardless of the outcome of the 
plebiscite, the final decision over Vorarlberg’s future would ultimately be made by officials 
at the Paris Peace Conference without consulting Vorarlbergers. The Vorarlberger Tagblatt 
concluded by urging Vorarlbergers to vote no in the upcoming plebiscite.39  
Despite the vocal opposition to the plebiscite in newspapers, Vorarlbergers 
continued to overwhelmingly support union with Switzerland. The Vorarlberg plebiscite 
took place on 11 May 1919, asking Vorarlbergers if they wanted their provincial 
government to begin negotiations with the Swiss Federal Council in order to make 
arrangements for political union.40 The Vorarlberger Tagblatt published official results of the 
plebiscite on 14 May 1919. Of 59,106 votes cast, roughly 81 percent voted in favour of 
union with Switzerland.41  However, Vorarlberg’s political leaders realised that they 
required international recognition of the plebiscite results if they hoped to achieve union 
with Switzerland, and they therefore looked to the Paris Peace Conference to grant their 
self-determination. 
 
Vorarlberg’s Self-Determination at the Paris Peace Conference 
 
Despite the earlier events in Vorarlberg, the Paris Peace Conference ultimately 
decided the fate of Vorarlberg’s self-determination, as it did in German Bohemia. 
Vorarlberg’s Provincial Assembly strove to follow through on the outcome of the 
plebiscite, sending notes to both the German-Austrian government and to the Swiss 
Federal Council. The note to Vienna contended that the German-Austrian delegation to 
Paris should raise the question of Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland at the Conference. 
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However, the German-Austrian government responded that such a request would 
complicate negotiations, instead suggesting that Vorarlberg’s fate might better be settled 
by an agreement between Vorarlberg, Switzerland, and German-Austria at the League of 
Nations. The note to Bern asked for a discussion of the terms on which Vorarlberg would 
be accepted into the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss government responded that 
Vorarlberg had no legal right to make such a request.42  
After the failure of the two notes to Vienna and Bern, Ender personally sought to 
have Vorarlberg’s plebiscite results accepted internationally. Ender therefore attended the 
Paris Peace Conference with the German-Austrian delegation as the representative for 
Vorarlberg.43 Ender travelled to Paris on 13 May 1919 where he asked Renner to support 
Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination. Renner responded that it would beneficial for 
Vorarlberg to remain in German-Austria, refused to agree to Ender’s demands, and stated 
that the issue would be handled between the governments of German-Austria and 
Switzerland at a later date.44 Wambaugh argues that Renner opposed Ender’s presence at 
the conference, “promising that after the peace treaty had been signed the Austrian 
Government would itself open negotiations with the Swiss authorities”.45 After the failure 
of discussions with Renner, Ender put his faith in the Allied delegations. 
The desire of Vorarlbergers for union with Switzerland first became apparent to 
the Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference on 8 May 1919. In discussions held 
by the Council of Five on the new frontiers of German-Austria, Allied officials, initially 
unsure whether Vorarlberg deserved self-determination, held lengthy debates over its 
future.46 Considering unrest in other former Austro-Hungarian provinces, the British 
Foreign Minister, Arthur Balfour, feared that Vorarlberg joining Switzerland would set a 
dangerous precedent. Baron Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, argued that Vorarlberg 
should remain part of German-Austria because he had no knowledge of it historically as 
separate from Austria. According to Stéphen Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, 
members of the Swiss Federal Council had informed the French government on several 
occasions that they did not desire union with Vorarlberg. Instead, the Swiss Federal 
Council would only consider union with Vorarlberg if the plebiscite result practically 
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forced their hand.47 Ultimately the Council decided to leave the question of Vorarlberg to 
be resolved later. 
Further discussions about Vorarlberg were held by the Council of the Heads of 
Delegations on 19 August 1919. The Council invited the Central Committee on Territorial 
Questions to consider the possibility of allowing Vorarlberg to join the Swiss 
Confederation.48 Elfriede Auguste Zuderall argues that Ender was primarily responsible 
for raising Vorarlberg’s profile enough to be included in discussions by the Territorial 
Commission.49 On 23 August 1919, the Territorial Committee issued a resolution 
concerning Vorarlberg, finding that “in view of the manifestation of the inhabitants of 
Vorarlberg in favour of the union of their territory to Switzerland, the Republic of 
Austria, in case Switzerland should formally declare that she accepts such a union, engages 
to recognize the decision of the Council of the League of Nations to which the case 
should be presented”.50 The resolution essentially forced German-Austrian to accept the 
secession of Vorarlberg if Switzerland agreed to the union. However, the French 
government was reluctant to accept this suggestion, recommending that a decision be 
delayed until clear expressions had come from Switzerland. Balfour supported the French 
recommendation to delay a decision on Vorarlberg’s self-determination, which the 
Conference subsequently adopted.51  
As a result of this recommendation, some Vorarlbergers felt that the German 
Austrian government and Allied delegations had undermined Vorarlberg’s right to self-
determination. Two self-declared representatives of Vorarlberg subsequently wrote to 
Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, annoyed that the Allied delegations at 
the Peace Conference had made decisions about Vorarlberg’s future without input from 
Vorarlbergers themselves. Paul Pirker and Gustav Neubner, leaders of Vorarlberg’s 
advertising committee with Ferdinand Riedmann, argued that the results of the earlier 
plebiscite proved that an overwhelming majority of Vorarlbergers favoured admission to 
the Swiss Confederation, “to which the people of the Vorarlberg feel themselves closely 
allied by geography, race, historical memories and the common love of liberty”.52 Pirker 
and Neubner also claimed that Renner had forbidden Ender, as Vorarlberg’s 
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representative, from raising the Vorarlberg question at the Conference. In doing so, the 
German-Austrian government had denied Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination. Pirker 
and Neubner noted that Vorarlbergers reaffirmed unanimously in public meetings on 10 
August their will to secede from German-Austria and unite with Switzerland, “which 
[Vorarlbergers] regard as our true chosen country.” Pirker and Neubner therefore asked 
the Peace Conference to recognise the right of Vorarlbergers to self-determination.53  
Pirker and Neubner continued to petition Clemenceau for the right to self-
determination. In a later, undated message, Pirker and Neubner asked Clemenceau for 
permission to present the Vorarlberg question to the League of Nations. They also asked 
for a passage to be inserted into the peace treaty which recognised Vorarlberg’s 
independence, guaranteed Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination, and established a 
future conference to settle Vorarlberg’s relations with German-Austria. Pirker and 
Neubner argued that the German-Austrian government, although initially sympathetic to 
the Pro-Switzerland movement in Vorarlberg, was now obstructing the self-determination 
of Vorarlbergers.54 
The German-Austrian delegation sent their own note to Clemenceau on 26 
August to counter the notes sent by Pirker and Neubner. The German-Austrian 
delegation claimed that Neubner and Pirker were only “pretending to act in the name of 
the people of the Vorarlberg,” were “not even natives of the country,” were “in no way in 
touch with the aspirations and the true will of the people,” and could not therefore “claim 
any right whatsoever to wish to represent the Vorarlberg or to address the Great Powers 
in its name”.55 The German-Austrian delegation’s argument contained some truth. 
Although Neubner and Pirker lived in Vorarlberg, Neubner had actually been born in 
German Bohemia and Pirker’s father came from Carinthia. The Allied delegations largely 
dismissed the self-declared “Delegates of the Vorarlberg”, as exemplified by Swiss 
professor and journalist Gonzague de Reynold, who described Neubner simply as “a fat 
Austrian with sideburns”.56 None of Vorarlberg’s representatives, therefore, had much 
influence at the Paris Peace Conference. 
The Allied delegations eventually omitted Vorarlberg’s request for union with 
Switzerland from the peace treaty. The Treaty of St. Germain, signed on 10 September 
1919, fixed in law the existing border between Switzerland and German-Austria, ignoring 
Vorarlberg’s request for self-determination. The German-Austrian delegation successfully 
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argued that the loss of one province would lead inevitably to the complete dissolution of 
the German-Austrian state.57 Wambaugh argues that the German-Austrian government 
successfully convinced Allied delegations of the importance of Vorarlberg to the 
continuing existence of the state.58 The Treaty of St. Germain therefore represented the 
loss of official international support for Vorarlberg’s proposed union with Switzerland. 
The treaty contained no indication that Vorarlberg’s status would be reviewed in the 
future. 
 
Swiss Responses to Union with Vorarlberg 
 
The Swiss government approached Vorarlberg’s request for union in a very 
inconsistent manner. It feared a union between Austria and Germany because it meant a 
longer border between Germany and Switzerland. For this reason the Swiss government 
therefore did not initially discourage Vorarlberg’s pro-Switzerland movement.59 Lord 
Acton, the British representative in Switzerland, reported to the British Foreign Office on 
14 April 1919 that Switzerland would first consult the Paris Peace Conference before 
making any decisions about admitting Vorarlberg to the Confederation. Lord Acton noted 
that the Swiss Foreign Minister personally preferred an independent German-Austrian 
state, but thought it might be necessary to allow Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland in 
order to prevent its union with Germany.60 The Swiss government therefore considered 
union with Vorarlberg as an option largely because it viewed the alternative, Vorarlberg’s 
union with Germany, as a threat to its own national security. Additionally, division within 
the government prevented strong action either way on the issue of Vorarlberg’s self-
determination. For example, while the Swiss Foreign Minister supported Vorarlberg’s 
union with Switzerland, the Swiss President opposed such a union.61 
Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland attracted some important supporters inside 
the Swiss government. Felix Calonder, the head of the Swiss Political Department, 
strongly supported union between Vorarlberg and Switzerland. Calonder had proposed as 
early as 2 April 1919 that the Swiss Federal Council accept Vorarlberg’s request for a 
union, based on the fact that most Vorarlbergers supported the plan. Calonder also 
proposed that the Allied delegations at the Peace Conference insert a clause into the peace 
treaty which gave Vorarlberg permission for union with Switzerland if the Swiss people 
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also wanted this. However, many of Calonder’s colleagues rejected his proposal.62 Ender 
approached Calonder in Bern on 10 June to discuss the possibility of the Swiss 
government accepting negotiations for union.63 Evidently Calonder endorsed Ender’s plan 
for union. In a speech to the Swiss Federal Council on 28 June 1919, Calonder asked 
whether Switzerland had “enough power and sap to be able to graft on a fresh and 
flourishing branch”, arguing that in time Vorarlbergers could become “blood from our 
blood, flesh from our flesh, spirit from our spirit”.64 Given his enthusiasm, Calonder 
became the figurehead for Swiss supporters of union with Vorarlberg. 
A large Swiss popular movement also developed which supported the proposed 
union between Vorarlberg and Switzerland. Beginning in August 1919, this movement 
received support from a number of well-organised committees and press institutions in 
Switzerland, especially the “Bund” in Bern.65 On 10 and 11 August 1919, thousands of 
Swiss rallied across the country to advocate for Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination.66 
Some Swiss complained that the Allied delegations had made a decision to forbid union 
without consulting them first.67  On 18 November, union advocates in Switzerland 
established a Pro Vorarlberg committee in Rorschach, St. Gallen, near the border with 
Vorarlberg. This committee worked closely with Vorarlberg’s Pro-Switzerland advertising 
committee in order to promote the union and gather support.68 The Pro Vorarlberg 
committee had considerable success in advocating for union between Vorarlberg and 
Switzerland. Many Swiss hoped that the addition of the rural and conservative 
Vorarlbergers to Switzerland would help to “form a counterpoise to the Bolshevik 
element in Switzerland”.69 The Vorarlberger Volksblatt argued that Swiss supporters of 
union with Vorarlberg did not seek Vorarlberg’s annexation outright, but instead sought 
to defend Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination and independence. Once achieved, 
Vorarlberg would be free to join Switzerland at another date. However, failure to take 
action to support Vorarlberg now would prevent the possibility of a future union between 
Switzerland and Vorarlberg.70  
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 Economic factors motivated Swiss opposition to union with Vorarlberg. Edmund 
Schulthess, head of the Department of Economic Affairs, represented those in the Swiss 
Federal Council who opposed union with Switzerland.71 In an interview with the French 
ambassador, Schulthess estimated that union would cost Switzerland thirty million francs 
a year. Schulthess assumed that Switzerland would have to take responsibility for 
Vorarlberg’s share of the Austro-Hungarian war debt, as well as pay Vorarlberg’s pensions 
to war widows and the disabled. Schulthess added: “[u]nder present social conditions, you 
must realize that the [Swiss] Federal Council could not explain its refusal to take measures 
intended to improve the conditions of working classes, by arguing the necessity of 
supporting the charges which the war imposed on the budget of the Vorarlberg”.72 
Schulthess’s arguments appealed to many Swiss who opposed union with Vorarlberg. 
In November, Calonder sought to counter Swiss government opposition by 
highlighting the financial risks of opposing union with Vorarlberg. Calonder argued that 
Germany’s increasing efforts to influence Vorarlberg, Vorarlberg’s worsening economic 
plight, and the imminent collapse of Austria, all necessitated swift Swiss action. Calonder 
feared the loss of eastern Switzerland to Germany if Austria succeeded in unifying with 
Germany. Given the political fears about Germany, Calonder argued that financial 
considerations used by those who opposed the union had since lost importance. Loss of 
part of the country would be even more expensive. Calonder also argued that the Federal 
Council’s failure to act would discourage Vorarlbergers, and the pro-Germany movement 
in Vorarlberg would benefit. Calonder therefore asked the Council to take immediate 
steps towards union with Vorarlberg before they lost the opportunity.73 
The Swiss government adopted its final position towards Vorarlberg in November 
1919. In response to Calonder’s requests, the Swiss Federal Council agreed to send a joint 
letter to Ender on 14 November. The Swiss Federal Council announced its refusal to 
interfere in negotiations between Vorarlberg’s Provincial Assembly and the Austrian 
government, viewing it an internal matter. However, if Vorarlberg achieved independence 
from Austria, “the Swiss Federal Council would, at the request of Vorarlberg, use all its 
strength to endeavour to support the realisation of its self-determination, either at the 
League of Nations or at the Paris Peace Conference”.74 In December, a French note to 
the Council in Paris reported that the Swiss government would only support union with 
Vorarlberg in the event of Austria’s collapse, and only to prevent a German annexation of 
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the territory. 75 The Swiss government’s response to the union with Vorarlberg fell short 
of Calonder’s demands, but represented perhaps all that could be expected given the 
amount of official and public opposition.  
A number of different concerns explained popular Swiss opposition to the union 
with Vorarlberg. The Swiss government worried about opposition from the French-
speaking cantons of Switzerland to the addition of another German-speaking region. The 
government also worried that Italy might demand compensation and claim the Italian-
speaking Swiss cantons.76 Meanwhile, Swiss Protestants feared an expansion of 
Catholicism from the influx of Catholic Vorarlbergers.77 One Swiss politician even used 
ethno-linguistic arguments to argue against Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland. On 11 
September 1919, the Vorarlberger Tagblatt reported on a historical debate conducted in the 
Gazette de Lausanne a week earlier under the title, “Is there a Swiss imperialism?”. Albert 
Bonnard, described by the newspaper as one of the best informed and most clear-sighted 
Swiss politicians, reportedly stated: “Beyond our borders there is no area that is Swiss at 
heart, and bound by violence to a foreign state”.78 Vorarlbergers interpreted this quote as 
an emphatic rejection of their desires for union with Switzerland. Bonnard’s viewpoint 
coincides perfectly with that of Hugh Seton-Watson, who argues that “the French-, 
German- and Italian-speaking citizens of Switzerland do not consider themselves 
Frenchmen, Germans or Italians. They violently repudiate any suggestion to this effect. 
They are Swiss and only Swiss”.79 Vorarlbergers were therefore excluded from this 
definition of Swissness. 
The refusal of the Swiss Federal Council to support union with Vorarlberg 
resulted from a number of factors. Low argues that opposition from Allied Powers 
influenced the Swiss government’s decision.80 Cohen argues that the Swiss Federal 
Council preferred Vorarlberg remain with Austria, but wanted to retain the option for 
union with Vorarlberg if the situation in Austria changed.81 Public opposition also 
undoubtedly helped persuade the Swiss government not to intervene. Although Catholics 
mostly supported union with Vorarlberg, the Swiss Radical Party, Swiss peasants, and 
French- and Italian-speakers opposed it.82 Bilgeri argues that Swiss indifference caused the 
failure of Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland, writing “[Switzerland] promised 
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nothingness [Nichtigkeiten] and did not even deliver on those promises”.83 Wambaugh 
agrees, arguing that, “[h]ad the Swiss Federal Council taken an initiative the opposition 
might possibly have diminished. The Swiss Government, however, remained absolutely 
neutral throughout the period”.84 Vorarlberg’s Provincial Assembly could not achieve the 
union alone. 
 
Events in Vorarlberg after the Plebiscite 
 
Although the Treaty of St. Germain prohibited Vorarlberg’s union with 
Switzerland, historian Gerhard Wanner argues that the months from August to December 
1919 played a more decisive role in deciding the question of Vorarlberg’s self-
determination. Logically the Treaty of St Germain meant any further attempt at union 
with Switzerland would be futile, but in actuality the treaty only changed the strategy used. 
Instead, Pro-Switzerland Vorarlbergers attempted to have Vorarlberg recognised as an 
independent country. As an independent country, Vorarlberg’s government would be able 
to contact the League of Nations, which had the authority to approve Vorarlberg’s union 
with Switzerland via Article 19 of the League’s Covenant.85 Vorarlbergers therefore 
continued to advocate for union with Switzerland late into 1919. 
The strength of popular support in Vorarlberg for union with Switzerland steadily 
increased after the plebiscite. As Switzerland celebrated its national holiday on 1 August 
1919, Vorarlbergers lit 200 fires high in the mountains of Vorarlberg as evidence of the 
affinity Vorarlberger’s felt with Switzerland.86 A wave of Pro-Switzerland activities also 
broke out in other parts of Vorarlberg. The Vorarlberger Volksblatt reported that 
Vorarlbergers streamed towards Bregenz from the most remote parts of Vorarlberg “as if 
driven by some invisible force” in order to hear the Provincial Government’s stance on 
Vorarlberg’s independence. At the same time, rallies took place in almost all communities 
of Vorarlberg calling for Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination, using the slogan: 
“Freedom and Swiss” [Liberi e Svizzeri – Freisein und Schweizer!].87 
Despite growing international opposition to their union with Switzerland, 
Vorarlbergers continued to take the initiative towards achieving it. Ender bent under 
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popular pressure and gave a speech to a mass rally at the Bregenz government buildings 
on 11 August. Ender announced that the Provincial Assembly limited the actions of 
Vorarlberg’s Provincial Government, whereas “you, as leaders of the union matter, can go 
a step further than the provincial government”. Ender claimed instead that “the initiative 
for thoughts and actions grows from the people”, asking Vorarlbergers to continue the 
progress towards union with Switzerland themselves. Ender argued that Vorarlbergers 
remained unified in support of Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination, concluding that 
Vorarlbergers should “be assured that the provincial government will adhere to the 
decisions of the popular representatives and will not stray from the advised path”.88 Ender 
therefore gave the task of continuing the fight for Vorarlberg’s self-determination to 
Vorarlbergers themselves. 
A number of Pro-Switzerland Vorarlbergers advocating for union sent open 
letters to Switzerland through Vorarlberg newspapers. One such letter pledged: “We will 
not rest until we find our rights have been recognised, and we belong to a state that gives 
us respect and trust like no other”.89 Another message to the Swiss people claimed that 
Vorarlbergers eagerly looked to union with Switzerland so they could become “a free 
people”. The movement for union received additional support when Vorarlbergers heard 
that many Swiss supported the movement for union.90 These letters suggest that Swiss 
support for union with Vorarlberg gave Vorarlbergers great motivation in continuation to 
advocate for union with Switzerland. 
In early December, Pro-Switzerland Vorarlbergers planned a final action intended 
to show the strength of the political consciousness and will in Vorarlberg to implement 
self-determination and achieve independence from Austria. Within a few days, organisers 
gathered thousands of signatures in Vorarlberg to persuade the provincial government to 
take action towards independence. The signatories claimed that the government in Vienna 
had demonstrated its inability to provide the basics of food, currency, and administration. 
The government’s failure had eroded and destroyed the strong patriotism previously felt 
by Vorarlbergers towards the Austrian state.91 Given the perceived poor treatment of 
Vorarlbergers by the Austrian government, many Vorarlbergers felt justified in seeking 
independence. 
Economic motives played an important part in the continuing campaign for union 
with Switzerland. Vorarlberg suffered a dire economic situation, and although not all 
Vorarlbergers personally experienced the economic decline, local newspapers kept them 
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informed. In late-1919, Vorarlberg newspapers expected Austria to collapse into 
bankruptcy any day.92 Meanwhile, Pro-Switzerland advocates expected union with 
Switzerland to spark an economic recovery and result in an immediate end to the threat of 
starvation.93 Switzerland had already begun supplying Vorarlberg’s embroideries with 
orders for new commissions, reviving Vorarlberg’s textile industry.94 This important 
economic link already established with Switzerland therefore gave one more incentive 
towards union with Switzerland. 
Opposition towards union with Switzerland grew amongst Vorarlberg’s Social 
Democrats after the plebiscite. Vorarlberg’s Social Democratic Party initially took a 
sympathetic stance towards the movement for union with Switzerland.95 However, many 
Social Democrats viewed suggestions of Vorarlberg’s independence as unrealistic, and 
some regarded Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland as treasonous.96 The leaders of the 
party gradually proposed a more pro-Germany course, but only under pressure from the 
party headquarters in Vienna. The official ideological programme of the Social Democrats 
viewed a victorious revolution as possible only with the help of Germany’s revolutionary 
forces.97 The Social Democrats regarded themselves as “the guardians of political 
morality”, both in terms of German nationalism and social revolution. The so-called 
“union opponents” [Anschlussgegner], comprising many Social Democrats, argued that 
material justifications primarily motivated pro-Switzerland advocates. On this basis, union 
opponents criticised pro-Switzerland supporters as “the movement dictated by the empty 
stomach” [Die vom leeren Bauch diktierte Bewegung].98 Although members of the pro-
Switzerland advertising committee might have proudly agreed with this definition, for the 
Social Democratic Party ideological justifications trumped economic ones. 
Most of Vorarlberg’s Christian Socials also initially supported the idea of union 
with Switzerland. Christian Socials hoped the union with Switzerland would help preserve 
their Catholic identity.99 However, many German nationalists and clerics within 
Vorarlberg’s conservative circles began to campaign for retaining an independent Austria. 
Vorarlberg priest Gebhard Gunz argued:  
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An established Ostmark is a vital question for the German people, and these 
“German guards in the East” can only be those ancient ones on the Danube 
who have proven themselves over hundreds of years of history. Austria must 
therefore be retained for the German people, which is why we must not 
weaken it by going over to Switzerland ... Must not we all have in our hearts 
the future of the German people and the future of the Ostmark as a bulwark 
against the Slavic-Magyar influence?100 
 
Conservative Vorarlbergers argued that they had more important “German” 
responsibilities to carry out from within Austria.101  
Despite the signing of the Treaty of St Germain, many countries began efforts to 
influence Vorarlbergers as well. The French ambassador to Switzerland reported on 22 
November that the German government had been carrying out “active propaganda” in an 
attempt to encourage Vorarlbergers to push for annexation to Germany. The report also 
claimed that the Austrian government continued to support union with Germany even 
though the Allies had forbidden it, and that the Austrian government had been assisting 
with their activities. However, despite German propaganda, the report found that “the 
population of Vorarlberg, with the exception of a small but noisy pan-German local 
minority, is not deceived by these intrigues. On the contrary, it is every day more and 
more favourable for an annexation to Switzerland.” German government interest in 
Vorarlberg forced a response from the Swiss government, which countered German 
propaganda efforts by offering supplies to Vorarlbergers. Swiss politicians who favoured 
union with Vorarlberg considered assistance to Vorarlbergers a means of encouraging 
Vorarlberg’s Provincial Assembly to appeal to the League of Nations.102  
The Swiss government’s propaganda efforts in Vorarlberg worried the Austrian 
government. A further French report on 12 December emphasised the Austrian 
government’s increasing concern about the growing separatist movement in Vorarlberg. 
Vorarlberg’s Provincial Assembly repeatedly requested that the Austrian government 
recognise their right to self-determination, and to refer this question to the League of 
Nations. Although the Austrian government responded that it would allow Vorarlbergers 
all legal options to achieve self-determination, it also declared that it would be obliged to 
oppose any action directed against existing laws or treaties.103 The Austrian government 
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therefore relied increasingly on Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain to maintain its 
independence.104  
The Austrian government argued that Vorarlberg’s secession risked the survival of 
the state. Austria’s representatives at the Peace Conference reiterated on 2 December 
1919 that the separation of Vorarlberg from Austria would “lead sooner or later to a 
complete disintegration of Austria”. The Austrian delegation claimed that demonstrations 
by Vorarlbergers had encouraged separatist activities elsewhere in Austria, especially in 
Salzburg and Tyrol. In response, the French delegation recommended that the peace 
conference offer official support to the Austrian government on the Vorarlberg question 
in order to secure Austria’s borders. The French report argued such support would 
destroy Swiss support for union with Vorarlberg, and would remove the justification used 
by those who invoked danger of a union between Vorarlberg and Germany.105  
Allied concerns about the maintenance of Austria’s independence led to further 
Council discussions on 16 December to oppose Vorarlberg’s movement for union with 
Switzerland. Clemenceau’s secretary, Philippe Berthelot, argued that Article 88 of the 
Treaty of St Germain meant separatist activities could not be tolerated without the 
consent of the League of Nations.106 However, British historian J. W. Headlam-Morley, 
present at the peace conference as part of the British delegation, argued that Article 88: 
 
is unfortunately so worded that the reference to the League of Nations seems 
to apply merely to the ‘independence’ of Austria and not to its territorial 
integrity. There is therefore in the Treaty with Austria nothing specifically 
providing for the hypothesis that certain districts might wish to separate 
themselves.107  
 
Therefore, according to Headlam-Morley, Vorarlberg would be free to secede from 
Austria provided Austria maintained its own independence.  
Given this loophole, the Austrian delegation sought stronger support from the 
Council to help stop its separatist movements. Fearful of Austria’s collapse, the Council 
subsequently issued another declaration of support to the Austrian government on 16 
December. The Council vowed it would stand by the Peace Treaty, opposing “every 
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effort which tends to endanger the integrity of Austrian territory”, or which “would result 
in compromising whatever manner, directly or indirectly, the political or economic 
independence of Austria.108 The statement of support to the Austrian government 
represented a more definitive defence of Austria’s territorial integrity, and gave strength to 
those who opposed further division of the Austrian state. Clemenceau also sent a personal 
note of support to Renner, vowing to support the Austrian government in suppressing 
the separatist movements and guaranteeing Austria’s political and economic 
independence.109 With Clemenceau’s personal note, there no longer existed any doubt that 
the Allied Powers opposed Vorarlberg’s efforts to achieve self-determination. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the success of Vorarlberg’s plebiscite, the Allied Powers ultimately 
prohibited union between Vorarlberg and Switzerland. The Allied delegations cited the 
threat of German-Austria’s collapse if Vorarlberg were allowed to set such a precedent.110 
Wambaugh argues that the Allied delegations also opposed Vorarlberg’s self-
determination because the Pro-Switzerland movement was recent in origin, and clearly 
motivated by the recent economic difficulties. The fact that some Vorarlbergers also 
supported union with Germany made Allied delegations question the longevity of popular 
sentiment in Vorarlberg. Official Swiss indifference also failed to help Vorarlbergers 
convince the Allied delegations that they supported union. Opposition from the French 
and Italian delegations for strategic reasons helped persuade the other delegations to 
oppose Vorarlberg’s self-determination.111  
 In fact, many reasons explain why Vorarlbergers sought union with Switzerland 
after the First World War. Much evidence suggests Vorarlberg desires for secession from 
Austria arose only temporarily due to economic conditions. Kevin Mason argues that 
economic issues explained Vorarlberg’s preference for Switzerland.112 Sarah Wambaugh 
claims that Vorarlbergers had essentially abandoned their desire to join Switzerland by 
1922 after economic conditions had begun to improve.113 Many Vorarlbergers referred to 
ethno-linguistic justifications. Ender asserted that Vorarlbergers were racially and 
                                         
108 “Question of Vorarlberg (a),” in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. Germain, 330-331. 
109 “Note from the President of the Peace Conference to Chancellor Renner,” in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. 
Germain, 334-335. 
110 Low, The Anschluss Movement 1918-1919, 393. 
111 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, 514. 
112 Mason, “Building an Unwanted Nation”, 162-163. 
113 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War: 515. 
67 
 
linguistically more similar to the Swiss.114 Gonzague de Reynold, Paul Pirker, and 
Ferdinand Riedmann also highlighted Vorarlberg’s close linguistic ties to Switzerland as 
their justification when seeking union in 1919, as has historian R. J. W. Evans.115 Others 
also criticised Otto Ender for the failure to achieve union. Some historians argue that 
Jodok Fink, German-Austrian Vice-Chancellor and fellow Vorarlberger, helped Renner to 
convince Ender to abandon his efforts to secure self-determination for Vorarlberg.116 
As in German Bohemia, the Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference 
denied Vorarlberg’s right to self-determination. In Vorarlberg’s case, self-determination 
was denied even though the plebiscite had shown Vorarlbergers overwhelmingly favoured 
union with Switzerland. Apart from Vorarlberg, Switzerland and German-Austria had no 
territorial disputes, nor had any existed historically. According to Alfred Low, if the union 
between Vorarlberg and Switzerland had succeeded, it would have been a perfect example 
of a voluntary change of sovereignty, completely in accordance with the principles of self-
determination.117 Instead, the successful implementation of Wilsonian self-determination 
appeared only in Carinthia. 
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Carinthia 
 
This chapter examines Carinthia in the period between the collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the Carinthian plebiscite of October 1920, exploring German-
Austrian and Yugoslav competition for the region. From late-October 1918, both sides 
sought to claim as much of Carinthia as possible for their new states, and violence 
subsequently intensified.  By June 1919, Yugoslav military forces had occupied large parts 
of Carinthia as well as the neighbouring province of Styria.1 The Allied Powers intervened, 
declaring a demilitarised zone in Carinthia and vowing to resolve the dispute at the Paris 
Peace Conference. As in the case of German Bohemia, the German-Austrian government 
requested a plebiscite to ascertain local self-determination, while the Yugoslav 
government sought control of Carinthia without a plebiscite. The Allied delegates proved 
unable to conclusively rule in favour of either side, with disagreements breaking out both 
between and within various Allied delegations. The US and Italian delegates supported 
requests for a plebiscite in Carinthia, and this decision was eventually agreed to by the 
other delegations. Carinthia represents the only successful implementation of self-
determination among the three examined cases, and the border between Austria and 
Yugoslavia outlined in the plebiscite has endured. 
Discussion of the Carinthian plebiscite poses a terminological difficulty because the 
name and borders of the state in conflict with German-Austria changed a number of 
times in the period. During the initial collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, German-
Austrians referred to the state created by the Southern Slavs of the Empire simply as the 
South Slav state. After its official founding in late-October 1918, this state became known 
as the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs [SCS State]. On 1 December 1918, the SCS 
State united with Serbia, officially becoming the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
[SHS State]. Although commonly known as Yugoslavia since 1918, this only became the 
official name in 1929.2 Given these rapid changes, historical actors often referred to the 
state by any one of these names regardless of its official name at the time. Such 
inconsistencies are also present in historical documents, rendering it difficult to ascertain 
precisely which state is being referred to. For the sake of simplicity, this thesis therefore 
                                         
1 Although the focus of the chapter lies predominately on Carinthia and its plebiscite, the discussion of 
Carinthia at the Paris Peace Conference is often linked with that of Styria because the German-Austrian and 
Yugoslav governments initially packaged both provinces together in their demands. In order to avoid 
confusion, this thesis therefore refers to the combined provinces either as the southern German-Austrian 
frontier or the German-Slovene language frontier. 
2 For more on the state see: Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1984); Ivo Banac, “The National Question in Yugoslavia’s Formative Years, 1918-1921” (Ph.D, 
Stanford University, 1975);  R. W. Seton-Watson,  R. W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence 1906-1941 
(London; Zagreb: University of Zagreb, 1976). 
69 
 
refers to the state prior to 1 December 1918 as the South Slav State, and Yugoslavia 
thereafter. 
The 10 October 1920 Carinthian plebiscite has attracted much interest from 
German-language historians.3 However, little work has been written in English, despite 
the availability of English-language primary source documents from the Paris Peace 
Conference and elsewhere. Furthermore, most English-language work has resulted from 
interest in plebiscites rather than immediate post-war developments in Austria. The 
interest has therefore come largely from political scientists rather than from historians.4 
English-language works mentioning the Carinthian plebiscite tend to do so as an 
afterthought in discussions concerning the birth of the Austrian Republic or Yugoslavia, 
and simply report results rather than explaining why the plebiscite took place.5 Vorarlberg 
and Carinthia lack the same level of interest afforded by scholars to Bohemia. Unlike 
Vorarlberg, Carinthia does at least appear in a number of accounts of the period.6  
 
Carinthian Germans and the End of the Empire 
 
The rapidly deteriorating situation in the Austro-Hungarian in late-1918 evoked a 
negative reaction from Germans along the southern language frontier of Cisleithania. In 
this uncertain period, Germans in Carinthia and Styria worried about their future without 
the empire. As in German Bohemia, many of these Germans initially opposed the 
dissolution of the Empire. The Marburger Zeitung argued that the Austro-Hungarian 
government had prematurely capitulated without taking the feelings of German-Austrians 
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into consideration, nor by consulting with their parliamentary representatives.7 In this 
interpretation of events, these Germans considered the collapse of the empire as a 
betrayal of those who opposed its dissolution. 
Many Germans in Carinthia and Styria also found opportunities in the collapse of 
the empire. The Marburger Zeitung argued that the primary concern of German-Austrians 
remained securing “the existence and artistic preservation of our own folkdom”. Self-
determination represented the ideal way for Germans along the frontier to protect what 
they had. However, many also resented that their deputies did not argue more strongly for 
self-determination, expressing amazement that their deputies “did not boisterously 
demand the self-determination of the German people in Austria”, after the Austro-
Hungarian government collapsed. Some thought enthusiastically about the possibilities 
brought by self-determination. The Marburger Zeitung argued that German-Austria’s 
culture, economy, and national order would be greatly improved “if we were free and 
independent, if we could organise and manage and connect ourselves in the way that our 
life interests demand”.8  
Economic issues also helped motivate desires for self-determination amongst 
Germans along the southern frontier. The Marburger Zeitung argued that German-Austrians 
had subsidised other groups in the empire for too long, but with self-determination 
Germans “would no longer have to indulge foreign interests”. The national debt should 
itself be split equally amongst the nations of the empire on the basis of population. The 
Marburger Zeitung spoke confidently of the results of such action, declaring “then we will 
be able to proceed more easily on our own to German self-determination!”9 However, 
German self-determination along the southern language frontier proved difficult to 
achieve. 
 Although many German-Austrians eagerly began to discuss their self-
determination, Austro-Hungarian leaders continued to avoid the issue. On 2 October 
1918 the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers met to discuss the possibility of 
independence for the South Slavs.  Maximilian Hussarek von Heinlein, Cisleithanian 
Minister-President, proposed plans for further federalisation of the empire as a solution to 
the outcries from German nationalist groups. Hussarek still viewed federalism as “both 
the most practical and the most realistic option” to save the empire.10 Despite this, few 
people in the empire considered the salvation of the Empire as feasible or favourable. 
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Uncertainty about the future of the southern frontier encouraged German-
Austrian political parties to begin the discussion of possible contingencies. At a German 
National Association meeting on 3 October, Christian Social and German Social 
Democratic party representatives discussed the possibility of Slavic rule over German-
speaking territories. Social Democratic representatives presented a resolution demanding 
German rights to self-determination, rejecting the possibility that German territory be 
subjugated to Slavic rule. Representatives also requested that all German-speaking regions 
of the Empire be combined into a unified German-Austrian state. Concerned by the 
implications of South Slav independence on Carinthia and Styria, representatives at the 
German National Association declared that German-Austrians would defend “with every 
means” attempts by foreign states to claim German-Austrian territory. Representatives 
also declared the unrestricted right to self-determination for German-Austrians.11 Such 
announcements mirrored those made by Lodgman and German Bohemian leaders. 
German-Austrian politicians from southern Carinthia and southern Styria therefore 
supported self-determination and the unity of German-Austria. 
German-Austrian political parties met again several days later to discuss German-
Austrian relations with the South Slav State. The Marburger Zeitung published an initial 
resolution of the meeting on 5 October, which claimed that the German-Austrian 
government had asked South Slav representatives to clarify their position on whether they 
sought negotiations. The Marburger Zeitung claimed the resolution stressed for clarification 
on whether South Slavs wanted self-determination “carried out in strict accordance with 
its meaning” or if they sought to include German lands in their claims “and wanted to 
rape them”. The Marburger Zeitung denounced claims on German-Austria lands, arguing 
that such a plan “would encounter the heaviest German resistance, because no German, 
whether from the north or south of the Empire, whatever party he may belong to, could 
escape the defensive struggle of the German people”.12 Germans on the southern 
language frontier therefore stressed their willingness to fight to defend their unity with 
German-Austria.  
German-Austrian nationalists along the Slovenian language frontier expressed 
outrage at Slovenian movements towards independence. On 9 October 1918 the 
Marburger Zeitung spoke in favour of local press censorship, citing an article published by 
the “inflammatory Slovenian national-clerical newspaper” Slovenski Gospodar on 3 October. 
According to the Marburger Zeitung, the Slovenski Gospodar had written: 
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The boundaries of the Wendish [Slovene] state have already been 
determined… In Carniola and Slovenian Styria they [Germans] are selling 
their possessions, houses, factories, and large companies. In Laibach 
[Ljubljana] there are almost no German houses remaining. In Marburg 
[Maribor], for example, since 1 January some 65 houses have transferred from 
German to Slovenian possession.13  
 
The Marburger Zeitung responded angrily to the claims made by the Slovenski Gospodar, 
describing them as “blatant Slovenian incitement”. The Marburger Zeitung also accused the 
Slovenski Gospodar of encouraging Slovene persecution and discrimination towards 
Germans. In response the Marburger Zeitung accused local press censors in 
Marburg/Maribor of treason, arguing that “the behaviour of the Marburg censors can 
only give the impression that they are no longer a public institution, but are already an 
organ of the Serbian state”.14 Such sentiment symbolised local German fears about Slavic 
domination. 
While some southern German-Austrians raised concerns about losing German-
speaking territory to the South Slav State, few initially took this seriously. On 21 October 
the Marburger Zeitung argued that the rumour about loss of territories contradicted an 
earlier statement from Emperor Karl, who promised southern German-Austrian 
representatives on 25 May that unity of the Austrian crown lands would be maintained. 
The Marburger Zeitung blamed the Bishop of Laibach/Ljubliana, Anton Bonaventura Jeglič, 
for transforming support for a South Slav Kingdom from a fringe group into a 
mainstream movement, largely by convincing people that “the national aspiration of the 
South Slavs is a godly deed”. The newspaper continued: “While so far all Germans of the 
Styrian lowlands and the majority of Slovenes stand loyal to the Emperor and far from 
these treasonable goings-on, the authority of a Prince-Bishop might conceivably affect the 
great masses”.15 Some Germans remained optimistic of retaining positive relations with 
local Slovenes. 
However, other Germans along the southern German-Austria frontier expressed 
outrage that parts of Carinthia and Styria might be assigned to a South Slav state. The 
Marburger Zeitung regarded the potential for South Slav annexation of the southern 
language frontier as a betrayal of local Germans and Slovenes who had fought for the 
empire during the war.16 Wambaugh notes that Slovenes generally served the empire 
loyally during the war, arguing that the Carniolan Assembly favoured union within the 
empire and that only Southern Slav leaders who had fled during the war supported 
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Slovene secession.17 Discussions about South Slav independence therefore fostered a 
sense of betrayal amongst many Germans along the southern frontier. On 5 November, 
the Marburger Zeitung succinctly summarised German feelings about their defeat in the war, 
stating: “It is not Italian military victories that have brought about this change but the 
events in the hinterland, causes that we all know”.18 According to the Marburger Zeitung, 
blame for the collapse of the empire lay with the empire’s Slavs, and only self-
determination could save local Germans from further ruin. 
Germans along the southern frontier also began to view South Slav secession as 
an accidental victory for German-Austria, as the collapse of the empire opened the way 
for union with Germany. The All-German Party Organisation met in Vienna on 8 
October. Organisation representatives spoke positively of the movement towards the end 
of the monarchy, arguing that it represented a natural and inevitable progression. In a 
similar way the Marburger Zeitung described union with Germany as a natural relationship 
for German-Austria. Slavic independence would allow German-Austria’s union with 
Germany, which would allow it to become nationally and economically secured. The 
Marburger Zeitung remained so optimistic that it eagerly anticipated Slovene apologies for 
Slav betrayal of the empire: “Perhaps soon after such events [Anschluss] the Slovenian 
peasantry will look with envy at our country and regret that they followed Serbophile pied 
pipers”.19 Contemplating union with Germany allowed German-Austrians to take 
positives from the collapse of the empire.  
 Germans along the southern frontier of Cisleithania initially viewed the collapse of 
the empire negatively, but they gradually came to focus on its positives. German self-
determination would allow the population to break away from the Slavs of the empire, 
who were viewed with increasing hostility given their perceived betrayal of the empire. 
Self-determination also offered the possibility for German-Austrian union with Germany.  
The focus on union with Germany meant Germans along the southern frontier of 
German-Austria underestimated the political and military strength of the Southern Slavs. 
Carinthian Germans therefore failed to realise the danger posed by Slav claims on 
territory also claimed by German-Austria. German-Austrians proved completely 
unprepared for the coming Yugoslav occupation of the southern frontier.  
Changes along German-Austria’s Southern Frontier 
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German-Austrians eagerly sought self-determination to maintain the unity of the 
German-speaking lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. On 31 October the 
German Peoples’ Council for Austria held a conference in Vienna for the German 
minority population of German-Austria. The meeting sought to ensure and reassure 
German-Austrian minority population in neighbouring countries would be instead 
incorporated into the German-Austrian state.20 Carinthian and Styrian Germans issued 
declarations to stress their support for the unity of German-Austria, and also their 
opposition to South Slav claims to sovereignty along the southern German-Austrian 
frontier region. 
Faced with claims from Southern Slavs, Germans in along the southern language 
frontier sought self-determination to emphasise their loyalty to German-Austria. The 
community council of the German-speaking city of Cilli/Celje unanimously adopted a 
resolution on 20 October, declaring that:  
 
[T]he local council of the German city of Cilli [Celje] hereby staunchly 
protests against any position to build a Slovenian national state which is to be 
established even in mixed language areas of Styria. Those Germans and 
Slovenes who have lived together in Lower Styria cannot be used for the 
operation of a unilateral Slovenian right to national self-determination.21   
 
The resolution also highlighted the historic unity of Germans and Slovenes in the region, 
and therefore opposed South Slav efforts to destroy this. The Cilli/Celje declaration 
continued:  
 
We hold firmly to our unbreakable Styrian homeland with every fibre of our 
heart. So in this decisive hour we urge our representatives… to mobilise 
everything so that the planned attacks on the Germandom and unity of 
Lower Styria may be stopped, and the Lower Styrian folkdom retain their 
national component secured on their ancestral soil.22 
 
German expressions of self-determination in southern Styria therefore relied on regional 
interpretations of Germanness, but also a wider sense of “Styrianness” which they shared 
with the local Slovene population. 
Following the Styrian declaration from Cilli/Celje of the previous week, the 
National Committee of Carinthia issued its own declaration on 29 October.  The 
Carinthian declaration read: “Taking the view that, excluding Seeland [Jezersko], the 
Slovenes in Carinthia do not live in closed settlements and the land finds its natural limit 
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through the mountain ranges to the south, the National Committee declares Carinthia 
indivisible”.23 This declaration represents one of the few cases in which German-Austrians 
claimed regions based on geographic considerations. Typically German-Austrians had 
been able to rely solely on historic or ethno-linguistic arguments. Nevertheless, such 
declarations attempted to discredit increasing South Slav claims on the southern frontier 
region. 
The city of Marburg/Maribor also issued a declaration in support of German-
Austria. The Community Council of Marburg/Maribor unanimously adopted a resolution 
on 30 October, which stated:  
 
The freely elected local council of the German city of Marburg declares that, 
on the grounds of President Wilson’s established right to self-determination 
of peoples, the city of Marburg together with its German and economic 
associated environment is an integral part of the newly created German-
Austrian state. Fellow Slovenian citizens are assured on the basis of 
reciprocity, in accordance with the declaration of President Wilson, the 
freedom of action of their economic and national interests.24 
 
All the declarations issued by local German officials appeared as a response to increasing 
claims by Southern Slavs along the southern German-Austrian frontier. However, despite 
the number of public declarations aligning Carinthia and Styria to German-Austria, the 
situation on the ground slowly shifted in favour of pro-Yugoslav activists. 
German-Austrian claims on the southern frontier highlighted the fragility and lack 
of control in the region. Josef Schmiderer, the mayor of Marburg/Maribor, issued a 
request for the maintenance of law and order in the city. Schmiderer argued that violence 
had the potential to negatively impact ongoing negotiations about Marburg’s status, as 
well as the larger status of Carinthia and Styria: “I therefore turn to the whole population 
of Marburg, who for our own good always want to act so that peace and harmony will not 
be disturbed by noisy demonstrations, because such is not likely to favourably influence or 
to help support the upcoming negotiations”.25 Schmiderer’s request implied that violence 
had escalated in recent time, and threatened to undermine German-Austrian claims in the 
region. 
Both German-Austrian and South Slav representatives responded to the situation 
by strengthening their position along the language frontier. German-Austrian political 
parties responded to the power vacuum by organising local committees. On 31 October 
the three main political parties of Styria, the German Nationals, Christian Socials, and 
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Social Democrats, each appointed five representatives to a committee to work with the 
welfare committees and prepare for the formation of a large Styrian provincial assembly.26 
South Slav activists also asserted more power along the southern frontier as the Austro-
Hungarian Empire collapsed, just as Czechoslovak activists had in German Bohemia. The 
Marburger Zeitung reported on 5 November that the South Slav government had removed a 
number of German officials from their positions, including Heinrich Christian von 
Attems-Heiligenkreuz, the Carniolan Provincial President.27 Actions by German-Austrian 
and South Slav representatives highlighted the desire by both governments to claim the 
disputed frontier regions. 
Despite recent actions, relations between German-Austrians and South Slavs did 
not deteriorate immediately. David Strong argues that little friction existed between 
German-Austria and Yugoslavia initially, describing relations between the two as “less 
acute” than between German-Austria and its other neighbours.28 The Marburger Zeitung 
attempted to reassure the population of Marburg/Maribor about the possibility for its 
annexation to the South Slav state, reporting on 3 November the recent success of 
negotiations between German-Austrians and Slovenians. The Marburger Zeitung viewed 
such progress optimistically and sought eagerly to protect it, warning against provocations 
and violence which could disrupt negotiations.29 
The German-Austrian and Yugoslav governments also made some efforts to relieve 
tensions. On 7 and 8 November the Styrian provincial government held consultations in 
Graz with representatives from the German-Austrian and Yugoslav governments. A 
major topic of the discussions concerned the supply of food and the maintenance of a 
dialog between the respective countries.30 The consultations concluded on 25 November 
with an agreement to temporarily divide the region between German-Austria and 
Yugoslavia until the Peace Conference could make a final decision.31 This decision sought 
to prevent conflict from escalating into violence. 
Despite some successes to ease tensions, friction between Germans and Slovenes 
eventually developed as some people turned to more violent options to achieve their 
goals. As a result of increasing violence, German-Austrian authorities began actively 
requesting public support for protecting lands they claimed. The German-Austrian State 
Council appealed to Germans in Marburg/Maribor for help on 5 November, warning 
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them of the threat to German-Austrian claims on the city.32 Appeals appeared in the 
Marburger Zeitung calling all able-bodied men to sign up with the Marburg/Maribor militia 
[Schutzwehr].33 Another appeal appeared on 9 November.34 On 12 November the Marburg 
Council announced conscription of all males aged 18-50 into the militia.35  
As in Pilsen/Plzeň, attempts to create a militia in Marburg/Maribor proved 
prudent, as violence intensified along the southern frontier. On 12 November a Slovenian 
military unit on patrol in Marburg reportedly began throwing grenades, causing 
widespread damage to many of the surrounding houses.36 According to a militia witness, 
Slovenians opened fire unprovoked and then threw the grenades.37 Although this report is 
not verified elsewhere, it emphasises the general tensions and escalating violence of the 
period, especially between local Germans and Slovenes. Escalations intensified further 
when the South Slav government announced mobilisation in Laibach/Ljubljana and 
Agram/Zagreb. Otto Bauer strongly protested against these orders, as did the Marburger 
Zeitung, which stressed that the armistice forbid mobilisation in areas whose borders had 
yet to be determined, like Marburg/Maribor.38 Such protests presumably sought to 
prevent the South Slavs from securing further control over these regions.  
As indicated by the Slovene patrol in Marburg and South Slav mobilisation, South 
Slav military presence along the German-Slovene language frontier grew rapidly after the 
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Five hundred Serbian officers arrived in 
Laibach/Ljubljana on 8 November to organise the South Slav garrison.39 Serb officers and 
soldiers also arrived in Marburg/Maribor on 9 November.40 However, despite the arrival 
of Serbian troops, Austro-Hungarian troops technically remained in control of the 
frontier. The Austro-Hungarian military commander of South Styria, Rudolf Maister, held 
a reception in Marburg/Maribor as late as 5 November.41 The survival of Austro-
Hungarian sympathies would prove short-lived however. An Austro-Hungarian Major, 
Maister also held Slovenian loyalties. Judson claims that “Slovene nationalist militia units” 
under Maister’s command had seized control of the three centres of South Styrian 
German nationalism, Marburg/Maribor, Cilli/Celje, and Pettau/Ptuj, as early as 1 
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November.42  The chaos of October and November 1918 meant Maister found himself in 
a great position of strength in a very short amount of time, and he sought to quickly use 
this new strength to exploit the power vacuum along German-Austria’s southern frontier.  
Maister exploited continuing unrest along the southern German-Austrian frontier 
in late-1918. South Slav soldiers under Maister’s command entered Carinthia on 5 
November, occupying most of the region by 30 November except for Klagenfurt, its 
capital.43 Soldiers also advanced northwards across the Mur/Mura River in late November 
to occupy German-speaking towns in Central Styria. Maister’s soldiers faced little 
resistance, as the provincial government in Graz proved unable to organise a military 
response. Maister had by this point been appointed a General in the Yugoslav army. 
Maister established himself in Marburg/Maribor in January 1919 and consolidated his 
control. According to Judson, “[Maister] replaced striking German railway and postal 
workers with Slovene nationalists, fired Austrian civil servants, requisitioned their homes, 
and, fearing resistance, began taking hostages among German nationalist citizens of 
Marburg/Maribor”.44 Maister sought to remove German influences from the area in 
preparation for the region’s annexation to Yugoslavia. 
In response to Maister’s occupation of the frontier region, the Carinthian 
provincial assembly decided on 5 December to begin armed resistance against South Slav 
occupation in what became known as the Carinthian Defensive Struggle [Kärntner 
Abwehrkampf].45 Carinthian German militia repulsed a South Slav attack on Klagenfurt on 
14 December, and on 6 January 1919 militia from the Gailtal/Ziljska dolina region, 
including a number of ethnic Slovenes, launched a counter-attack. Local Slovenes also 
supported Carinthian German militia in Rosental/Rož, forcing South Slav troops there to 
retreat as well.46 By early May Carinthian militia had almost completely driven South Slav 
troops out of Carinthia, but counter-attacks reversed the situation and South Slav troops 
occupied Klagenfurt on 6 June.47  
Violence in Carinthia led the Council of Ten at the Paris Peace Conference to 
establish a neutral zone between German-Austria and Yugoslavia.48 The first decision 
reached by the Allied delegations on the matter of Carinthia implemented a demilitarised 
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zone in the region, and South Slav troops withdrew from Klagenfurt at the end of July.49 
Yugoslavia’s occupation of the frontier, and German-Austria’s political and military 
weakness, forced German-Austrian politicians to appeal to the Paris Peace Conference as 
a last resort for securing self-determination for this as part of the new German-Austrian 
Republic. 
 
Confusion Reigns in Paris: Plebiscites for the Frontier? 
 
Despite the Yugoslav occupation of the German-Slovene frontier region, the 
German-Austrian government remained determined to claim as much of this territory as 
possible. The German-Austrian delegation to the Peace Conference included two 
Carinthian experts, Vinzenz Schumy and Martin Wutte, and an expert on South Styria, 
Franz Kamniker.50 The German-Austrian delegation emphasised historic, economic, and 
geographic claims to Carinthia and Styria, while the Yugoslav delegation emphasised 
ethno-linguistic claims. Committees established by the Allied delegations debated how to 
divide the regions. The dispute over Carinthia and Styria featured prominently amongst 
discussions of the Treaty of St. Germain at the Paris Peace Conference.  
The Yugoslav delegation submitted proposals for its new border with German-
Austria to the Council of Ten on 18 February 1919. Rather than using Austro-Hungarian 
government census data, which the Yugoslav delegation declared untrustworthy, the 
Yugoslav delegation based ethnicity on spoken language as determined by local parish 
registers.51 The Yugoslav delegation also favoured data from the census of 1849-1851, 
claiming that statistics gathered before Germanisation better reflected ethnic realities.52  
The Yugoslav delegation claimed all areas containing a Slovene-speaking 
population on the basis of “forcible germanisation practised since 1850”. Ivan Žolger, a 
member of the Yugoslav delegation, cited numerous cases of Germanisation in the region. 
Commenting on Žolger’s Germanisation claims, the Council of Ten declared: “In fixing 
the frontier between Yugo-Slavia and German Austria, the result of this policy should not 
be perpetuated. Wherever it was possible to show that 50 years previously the Slovenes 
had been in possession, [Žolger] claimed that they should have ownership restored to 
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them”. Using this justification, Žolger claimed not only Carinthia and Styria for 
Yugoslavia, but Eastern Tyrol and Lower Austria too.53  
Following the Yugoslav submission, the Council of Ten met to discuss 
Yugoslavia’s boundary claims. After some initial Italian opposition, the Council 
established a Territorial Committee to examine German-Austrian and Yugoslav claims on 
their shared frontier.54 The Territorial Committee examining the border between German-
Austria and Yugoslavia decided on 6 April to divide the area into two separate regions. 
The Committee subsequently established the Marburg basin, representing southern Styria, 
and the Klagenfurt basin, representing southern Carinthia.55 The future of the two basins 
would henceforth be examined separately. 
Initial discussions on the Marburg basin began shortly thereafter. In the first 
discussions the US, British, and French delegates agreed that Slovenes predominated in 
the Marburg basin. The three delegates also agreed that the Marburg basin shared “close 
economic relations” with the south, and therefore proposed the Marburg basin be given 
to Yugoslavia. The dissenting Italian delegate declared Marburg a German city however, 
dependent on economic ties with German-Austria for its survival.56 Despite Italian 
opposition, the 6 April 1919 draft articles of the peace treaty awarded the Marburg basin 
to Yugoslavia outright, while tentatively proposing the Klagenfurt basin also be given to 
Yugoslavia provided the population consented.57  
Discussions concerning the Klagenfurt basin reached a different conclusion than 
the draft articles of the peace treaty. In continuing discussions on 6 April, the US, British, 
and French delegations recognised that the Klagenfurt region contained a mixed 
population, highlighting that “important Slovene elements” constituted a dense 
population particularly in the east. The delegations also recognised that the 
Karawanken/Karavanke Mountains separated the entire Klagenfurt basin from the south. 
Klagenfurt itself shared close economic ties with the rest of German-Austria as part of an 
economic unit. Despite this, the three delegations determined that they had insufficient 
evidence to determine “the national aspirations” of the Klagenfurt basin. Again the Italian 
delegation dissented, arguing the Klagenfurt basin should be awarded to German-Austria. 
                                         
53 Ibid,   360. 
54 “Discussions in the Council of Ten of the Yugoslav Boundary Claims (a) Procedure Regarding Yugoslav Claims”, in 
Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. Germain, 361-362. 
55 “Reports of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia and the Central 
Committee on Territorial Questions on the Austro-Yugoslav Frontier (a) Report of April 6 of the Committee for the 
Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia”, in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. Germain,  
363-364. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Reports of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia and the Central 
Committee on Territorial Questions on the Austro - Yugoslav Frontier (b) Draft Articles proposed by the Committee 
for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia for insertion in Treaty with Austria”, in 
Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. Germain, 364-366. 
81 
 
The US, British, and French delegations recommended a plebiscite be held in the 
Klagenfurt basin in order to offer the population an opportunity to express their support 
for union with Yugoslavia, despite evidence suggesting the basin shared much stronger 
ties to German-Austria.58 This 6 April report represented the first indication that a 
plebiscite should be held in Carinthia.59 
Disputes arose again between Allied delegates in a 9 May Council of Five meeting 
over the assignment of the Klagenfurt basin. Although remaining neutral in their outlook 
as to which state the Klagenfurt basin should be assigned, the US, British, and French 
delegates no longer assumed the region should go to Yugoslavia. Once again the Italian 
delegation argued that the Klagenfurt basin belonged to German-Austria.60 Unable to 
reach a decision, and with strong Italian opposition to any proposed solution, the Allied 
delegates sought an alternative method for reaching consensus. 
No longer tentatively proposing the Klagenfurt basin be awarded to Yugoslavia, 
the US, British, and French delegations began formulating plans for a “local enquiry or 
consultation” in the Klagenfurt basin. The original purpose of this consultation was to 
ascertain whether the local population opposed union with German-Austria and instead 
supported union with Yugoslavia. This phrasing suggested that the delegations had come 
to favour the Klagenfurt basin’s union with German-Austria. Rather than asking if local 
people supported union with Yugoslavia, the delegates now proposed asking if local 
people opposed union with German-Austria. At this stage the Italian delegation opposed 
a plebiscite in Carinthia on the basis that Yugoslavia’s claims might be accepted. 
Ultimately the 9 May meeting ended without a final decision, and the Council of Five 
agreed to reconvene on 10 May to discuss ethnic and economic considerations submitted 
by the territorial committee.61 
The Committee on Yugoslav Affairs submitted another report on the German-
Slovene frontier on 10 May, reassessing Italian opposition to its decision on the 
Klagenfurt basin. Italy proposed awarding larger portions of southern Carinthia to 
German-Austria. The Committee accepted some of Italy’s arguments but noted that 
under Italy’s plan some 50,000 Slovenes would be assigned to German-Austria.  The 
Committee also ruled on the Tarvis/Trbiž/Tarvisio district, disputed because of its 
important railway. The US, British, and French delegations proposed assigning the region 
to Yugoslavia, while Italy proposed assigning it to German-Austria. The Committee 
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proposed instead to award the region to Italy. The Committee also resized the Klagenfurt 
basin to ensure the railway line would run through German-Austrian territory even if the 
basin voted in favour of union with Yugoslavia. This decision represented another success 
of Italian counter-claims, resulting in a region containing 60,000 Germans being removed 
from the plebiscite basin and being assigned directly to German-Austria.62 Such outcomes 
proved that Italian support for German-Austrian claims benefitted both German-Austria 
and Italy by preventing Yugoslavia from achieving its own claims. 
The Council of Five reconvened on 10 May to discuss the Committee’s report. 
Sidney Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, reaffirmed that it would be justified to 
attribute small numbers of Slovenes to German-Austria to simplify matters, especially 
given some 20,000 Germans in Marburg had already been ceded to Yugoslavia. Arthur 
Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, considered it unfair to assign Slovenes to German-
Austria, while Robert Lansing, the US Secretary of State, accused the Italian delegation of 
hypocrisy given its support for topographical justifications over ethnographic 
justifications in South Tyrol, which they now disavowed in Carinthia. Sonnino ultimately 
agreed to accept the recommendations made by the Committee on Yugoslav Affairs, 
provided the important railway between Italy and German-Austria remained outside 
Yugoslav territory.63 This response highlights that Allied discussions at the Conference 
often concerned themselves more with strategic interests of the delegates rather than the 
desires of the populations concerned. 
After Council of Five discussions on the Committee’s report, the Council of Ten 
met to discuss it on 12 May. All delegates now agreed with the proposal to hold a 
plebiscite in the Klagenfurt basin. According to the plan, the southern part of Carinthia, 
Zone A, would vote first. Only if Zone A voted for Yugoslavia would a vote be in held in 
the northern part of Carinthia, Zone B, around Klagenfurt. Sonnino argued that 
plebiscites should also be held in the Marburg basing and other disputed regions along the 
frontier. However, the other delegates felt that further plebiscites lacked justification, and 
therefore the plebiscite in the Klagenfurt basin should be an “isolated case”. Unsure of 
how to define the area in which the plebiscite would be held, the Council of Ten adopted 
the policy of the Council of Five by ultimately agreeing to accept the frontiers proposed 
by the Committee on Yugoslav Affairs.64 
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Dissenting Opinions about Self-Determination 
 
Although the Council of Five and Council of Ten had reached consensus on the 
recommendations made by the Committee on Yugoslav Affairs, a number of individual 
US delegates issued a complaint on 27 May about this consensus. The delegates 
complaining included Clive Day, Charles Seymour, Sherman Miles, and Douglas Johnson. 
These delegates expressed concern over the frequency with which delegations had 
changed their opinion regarding the Klagenfurt basin. For example, American delegate 
Charles Seymour proposed in November 1918 to award the entire basin to German-
Austria for geographic reasons. However, by February 1919 Seymour instead proposed 
dividing the basin between German-Austria and Yugoslavia, in line with 
recommendations made by various committees. Shortly thereafter the Miles Mission 
presented its findings and Seymour and others such as Douglas Johnson decided instead 
to back the findings of this report, which again proposed the assignment of the entire 
basin to German-Austria.65  
The Miles Mission, also known as the Coolidge Mission or the American 
Commission of Study, led by Sherman Miles and Archibald Cary Coolidge, travelled to 
German-Austria in December 1918 to assess the local frontier and make 
recommendations to the Peace Conference. On 22 January, German-Austrian and 
Slovene representatives meeting in Graz agreed to Miles’ proposal that a plebiscite should 
determine the wishes of the population of southern Carinthia. Beginning on 28 January, 
Miles and others spent ten days travelling through southern Carinthia. The mission 
submitted several reports in February, which “reversed its original opinion that the Basin 
should go to Yugoslavia, for it found that an overwhelming majority of the people did not 
wish Carinthia to be divided”. Instead, the report viewed the basin as a geographic and 
economic unit that “should be given to Austria, as the majority of the people, even of the 
Slovene inhabitants, so desired”. Wambaugh argues that the reports from the Miles 
Mission “greatly strengthened the view to which the majority of the American experts at 
Paris had been tending, namely, that their former proposals should be revised and the 
whole Basin left to Austria”.66 The Miles Mission reports provided a great boost to 
German-Austrian claims to southern Carinthia.  
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Based on the findings of the Miles Mission, Day and Seymour criticised the 
decision reached by the Allied delegations to divide the Klagenfurt basin. They argued 
that the Council of Five and Council of Ten regularly approved recommendations made 
by the Territorial Commission unanimously without questioning its merit.67 The delegates 
argued that the Miles Mission report represented “the most trustworthy evidence” 
available regarding national sympathies in the Klagenfurt basin. Day and Seymour note:  
 
Colonel Miles considers that the evidence available on self-determination is 
that the majority of the people of the Klagenfurt basin desire to remain with 
Austria, and that, until this evidence is reversed by a free expression of the 
people of the whole basin, the admitted economic and geographical unity of 
the basin should not be destroyed by an arbitrary and artificial political 
frontier. 
 
Day and Seymour outlined their support for Miles’ findings that “a majority of the 
Slovene-speaking people in the Klagenfurt basin would prefer not to be separated from 
this historic Austrian province of Carinthia”.68 The delegates therefore argued against the 
planned plebiscite, suggesting the entire basin be awarded to German-Austria without a 
plebiscite rather than risk dividing the basin in half.  
Despite initially supporting the findings of the Miles Mission, Johnson later 
reverted to the Yugoslav proposal to divide the basin, which had by this point also been 
endorsed by the British, French, and Italian delegations.69 Johnson disagreed with Day and 
Seymour, arguing that the Miles Mission failed to accurately register Slovene sympathies. 
Despite the Miles Mission discovering widespread Slovene sympathies for German-
Austria, Johnson argued instead: “[t]he presumption that the Slovene majority has Slovene 
sentiments should be accepted, and the region left with an allied power rather than an 
enemy power”. Johnson recognised that “geographic and economic considerations favor 
assignment to Austria”, but noted that such matters held less importance in “agricultural 
regions like the Klagenfurt basin”. Johnson agreed with the recommendations made by 
the British and French delegations, arguing that “[e]thnographic, strategic and political 
considerations all favor assignment of the area to Jugo-Slavia”.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
70 Despite the appeals made by Day, Seymour, and Miles on the basis of local self-
determination, the Allied delegations accepted Johnson’s position and continued with 
their plan for a potential division of the basin. 
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The Yugoslav delegation also expressed its opposition to a plebiscite in the 
Klagenfurt basin. Seeking a compromise, the delegation abandoned claims on northern 
and western areas of the basin but asked for southern and eastern areas to be assigned to 
Yugoslavia without a plebiscite.71 On 31 May, Nikola Pasič, the head of the Yugoslav 
delegation, argued that the frontiers agreed by the Allied delegations not only failed to 
acknowledge Yugoslavia’s “original claims” or their subsequently “reduced demands”, but 
in some areas outright contradicted their claims. Pasič claimed the Yugoslav delegation “is 
under the depressing impression that an effort is being made to exclude their state from 
Carinthia”.72   
According to Wambaugh, such Yugoslav pressure was so great that it forced the 
British, French, and Italian delegations and the Commission of Yugoslav Affairs to 
modify the agreement reached on 6 April. The new proposal assigned southern Carinthia 
to Yugoslavia outright, removing the plebiscite “in order to avoid the agitation which 
must necessarily be caused by a consultation of the population”. However, the American 
delegates of the commission continued to support the original decision to hold a 
plebiscite, perhaps based on the Miles Mission report. The national leaders held similar 
views to their national delegations. Wilson supported a border along the south of the 
basin, while Clemenceau and Lloyd George supported division of the basin.73 The Allied 
delegations agreed to the original decision to hold a plebiscite, based largely on US 
opposition to the assignment of the basin to Yugoslavia without a plebiscite.  
 
Indecision regarding the Plebiscite Decision 
 
After lengthy initial discussions about the German-Slovene language frontier, the 
Allied delegations began the difficult task of finalising plans for a plebiscite in Carinthia. 
After much negotiation amongst the Allied delegations, and after hearing claims presented 
by the German-Austrian and Yugoslav delegations, the Council of Four began further 
discussions about the Klagenfurt basin in early June 1919. The main purpose of these 
discussions was to establish a plan for holding the plebiscite in the Klagenfurt basin. 
Yugoslav representatives continued their opposition to a plebiscite in Carinthia. 
On 4 June, Milenko Vesnić, another of the Yugoslav delegates, cited his fears of potential 
“confusion and unrest” resulting from the plebiscite, repeating claims that the Allied 
delegations should give Zone A to Yugoslavia outright. Wilson disagreed, arguing it would 
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be fairest to allow self-determination for the inhabitants in a plebiscite. The Council of 
Heads of Delegations agreed with Wilson. On 6 June, Vesnić proposed a compromise to 
award Zone A to Yugoslavia and Zone B to Austria outright, with an allowance to hold 
plebiscites within 6 months if the local population desired.74 The Council ignored this plan 
because it simply reduced the likelihood of a plebiscite and went against the principles of 
self-determination which they had agree on. 
Although the Allied delegations ignored Vesnić’s proposal, they tentatively 
supported the idea of provisionally awarding the plebiscite zones. This provisional 
awarding of Zone A to Yugoslavia and Zone B to German-Austria would allow the region 
to be governed while the Allies organised the plebiscite. Once again the Italian delegation 
upset consensus, arguing that Zone A and B should be divided vertically rather than 
horizontally. The delegations finally reached a consensus whereby the plebiscite would 
proceed, and the two zones would be governed locally by Carinthians prior to the 
plebiscite, rather than by the German-Austrian and Yugoslav governments.75 
Events in June spurred the Allied delegations to make final preparations for 
resolving frontier disputes in southern Carinthia.  On 18 June 1919, the Council of Five 
raised concerns about breaches to the demilitarisation of the plebiscite zone. Reports 
indicated that the Yugoslav military had broken the armistice and advanced north to 
reoccupy Klagenfurt. The Council immediately demanded the Yugoslavs leave Klagenfurt 
and withdraw from Zone B of the plebiscite zone.76 The Yugoslav reoccupation of 
Carinthia was motivated by the decision to hold a plebiscite in the Klagenfurt basin, 
which Yugoslav officials interpreted as an Allied rejection of Yugoslav claims on the 
region.77 Yugoslav troops slowly began to withdraw from 13 June after Italian troops 
arrived in Carinthia.78 
On 21 June the Council of Five ordered German-Austria and Yugoslavia to 
respect the demilitarisation of the two zones. The Council proposed to hold the first vote 
in the plebiscite in Zone A within three months of the signing of the Treaty of St. 
Germain, followed within three weeks by the second vote in Zone B if Zone A voted for 
Yugoslavia.79 On 16 July 1919, the Council of the Heads of Delegations finalised the 
                                         
74 “Annotations on the discussions of the Council of Four on the Klagenfurt area”, in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty 
of St. Germain, 508-509. 
75 Ibid, 509-510. 
76 “Evacuation of the Klagenfurt basin and the meeting of the Council of Five on June 18 (a) Minutes of the Council 
Meeting”, in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty of St. Germain, 511. 
77 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, 176-177. 
78 Ibid, 181. 
79 “Annotations on the discussions of the Council of Four on the Klagenfurt area”, in Almond and Lutz, ed., The Treaty 
of St. Germain, 510. 
87 
 
Carinthian frontier to be used in the peace treaty.80 It took until 29 July before German-
Austria and Yugoslavia agreed to evacuate Zone B of the Klagenfurt basin in preparation 
for the plebiscite, with Yugoslav troops agreeing to withdraw from Klagenfurt. The 
frontier decided on by the Supreme Council on 23 June went into effect on 31 July.81 
Yugoslav troops finally left Klagenfurt on 31 July.82 
The German-Austrian delegation welcomed news of the plebiscite in Carinthia. 
However, the German-Austrian delegation now requested a plebiscite in southern Styria 
as well, “on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination”, arguing such a 
plebiscite would reveal overwhelming support in favour of union with German-Austria.83 
The German-Austrian delegation viewed the circumstances in Carinthia and Styria as 
similar, and questioned why requests for a plebiscite had been refused in Styria: “In what 
concerns Carinthia, it seems quite evident that the principle of economic unity has 
determined the decision of the Peace Conference; in regard to Styria, this same principle 
was however abandoned”. The German-Austrian delegation abandoned claims on the city 
of Pettau/Ptuj to increase its chances of success elsewhere, but reaffirmed its demand on 
the Marburg/Maribor basin. German-Austrian delegates argued that the Peace 
Conference had accepted that Carinthia formed a unit tied to German-Austria, and argued 
that same was also true for Styria. The German-Austrian delegation proposed dividing 
Styria up into plebiscite zones as had occurred in Carinthia, hoping to retain at least parts 
of southern Styria which would otherwise be awarded to Yugoslavia.84 
The Yugoslav delegation responded critically to the German-Austrian delegation’s 
claims to the Klagenfurt and Marburg basins. The Yugoslav delegation opposed a 
plebiscite in the Marburg basin primarily because it felt plebiscites unfairly favoured 
German-Austria. The delegation countered that the Marburg basin shared closer ties with 
southern Styria than with central Styria, and should therefore remain with Yugoslavia.85 
On 26 August, Pasič and the Yugoslav delegation reiterated Marburg’s historic role as the 
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capital of Slovene-speaking southern Styria, and southern Styria’s historic ties as separate 
from central Styria.86 
Discussions about Carinthia’s frontiers encountered numerous problems because 
several committees examined the same issue at the same time and reached different 
conclusions. On 27 August, the US, British, French, and Japanese delegates from the 
Council of Heads of Delegations announced that they had abandoned the idea of holding 
a plebiscite in Styria. The Italian delegate “reserved his agreement”.87 Meanwhile, the 
Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs issued its own report on 28 August, 
which considered a plebiscite in southern Styria still possible. The British and French 
delegates in this commission opposed the proposed Marburg basin plebiscite area, arguing 
that it was arbitrary, politically motivated, and that it divided the Marburg basin. However, 
both the American and Italian delegates accepted the German-Austrian outline of the 
Marburg basin plebiscite zone, opposing the British and French proposals “because this 
arrangement would unbalance the vote in favour of the Jugo-Slavs and would impose a 
plebiscite upon peoples who do not desire it, and for whom no one has requested it”.88 At 
the same time, a further resolution by the Council on 29 August confirmed that no 
plebiscite would be held in Styria.89 The existence of multiple committees was therefore 
clearly problematic. 
Disagreement broke out between the Allied delegates to the Commission on 
Yugoslav Affairs over holding a plebiscite in Styria. The British and French delegations 
continued their opposition to a plebiscite in the Marburg basin, while the US and Italian 
delegations continued their support.  The British and French delegations argued that too 
many Slovenes lived in the Marburg basin for them to consider awarding the region to 
German-Austria, and noted that the Central Territorial Commission and the Supreme 
Council had already ruled out a plebiscite. However, the US and Italian delegations 
countered these claims, arguing that it was entirely possible that Slovenes would vote in 
favour of union with German-Austria. The delegations also attacked British and French 
arguments that a plebiscite would disadvantage the Yugoslavs, arguing instead that “the 
disadvantages are all on the side of the Austrians”. The US and Italian delegations 
concluded by stressing the value of allowing people to express their self-determination. 
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They proposed that the already established Klagenfurt Plebiscite Commission could also 
organise and manage a plebiscite in Styria.90 
The Allied delegations reached a final decision about holding plebiscites in the 
Marburg basin of Styria on 2 September. The Allied delegations recognised the role played 
by Germanisation in undermining Slovene language and culture, determining that 
Slovenes ought to join Yugoslavia. The Allied delegations also argued that the Marburg 
basin belonged geographically, ethnographically, and economically to Yugoslavia. They 
felt the dominance of Slovenes in rural areas outweighed the dominance of the German 
population in urban areas, and that the rural population represented the more natural 
historic population of the basin. Therefore the Allied delegations decided to assign the 
Marburg basin to Yugoslavia without a plebiscite.91  
The Allied delegations viewed the Klagenfurt basin of Carinthia differently 
however. They regarded the mountains along the south of the Klagenfurt basin as a clear 
and obvious border with lands to the south, orienting the basin naturally towards 
German-Austria. However, Slovene minorities existing in the east and south convinced 
the Allied delegations that a plebiscite was necessary to gauge local sympathies. The Allied 
delegations therefore adopted the plans earlier proposed to divide the basin into two 
zones. In their explanation the Allied Powers claimed both zones to be ethnically 
homogenous, which explained the justification for the zones to be separated for the 
purposes of the plebiscite.92 
The Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference took many months to decide 
how to deal with the frontiers of Carinthia and Styria. Despite much disagreement, the 
delegations eventually decided to hold a plebiscite in Carinthia, More disagreements 
occurred regarding the terms of the plebiscite. Other disagreements occurred regarding a 
possible plebiscite in Styria, but the delegations eventually rejected this proposal and 
awarded the Marburg basin to Yugoslavia without a plebiscite. After these two decisions 
had been reached, the Allied delegations handed over control of the Klagenfurt basin to 
the newly created Klagenfurt Plebiscite Commission, which would organise the plebiscite. 
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Zone Divisions for the Carinthian Plebiscite93 
 
 
Organising Self-Determination 
 
The Treaty of St. Germain, signed on 10 September 1919, confirmed that a 
plebiscite would determine the new border in Carinthia separating Austria and Yugoslavia. 
Article 49 of the Treaty outlined the resolution of the Klagenfurt basin, stating: “The 
inhabitants of the Klagenfurt area will be called upon, to the extent stated below, to 
indicate by a vote the State to which they wish the territory to belong”. Allied delegates 
appointed the members of the Klagenfurt Plebiscite Commission in April 1920, with 
British army officer Sydney Capel Peck as President.94 Britain, France, Italy, Austria, and 
Yugoslavia each had one representative in the commission, while the US abstained.95 Prior 
to the plebiscite, Carinthia would be under the control of the Plebiscite Commission, 
“entrusted with the duty of preparing the plebiscite in that area and running the impartial 
administration thereof”. In the meantime, the Austrian government remained responsible 
for the administration of Zone B and the Yugoslav government for Zone A.96  
On arrival in Klagenfurt on 21 July 1920, the representatives of the Plebiscite 
Commission announced their intention “to preside over a work of wisdom and justice”.97 
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Peck initially sought to rectify problems created by the demilitarisation of the Klagenfurt 
basin. The Plebiscite Commission sought to free up the movement of goods and 
displaced persons between the two zones, and return confiscated property to their original 
owners.98 The Commission eventually succeeding in reopening the border between the 
two zones, an action which both the Yugoslavs and French opposed for fears it would 
strengthen Austria’s campaign.99 On 3 August 1920 the Austrian government removed 
barriers between the two zones. In response, the Yugoslav government reinforced their 
garrisons, prevented refugees from crossing back into Zone A, temporarily imprisoning 
some 3000, and also stopped British and Italian trucks from transporting food north to 
Klagenfurt..100 
Efforts by the Plebiscite Commission to improve security in the Klagenfurt basin 
reflected previous outbreaks of violence.  A Carinthian administrator complained of 
increasing Yugoslav violence in Zone A as early as 7 September 1919, prior to the signing 
of the Treaty of St. Germain. The Yugoslav government refused to agree to Allied 
demands placed on it in Zone A, including the withdrawal of troops. According to the 
unnamed administrator, Yugoslav troops continued to conduct a “reign of tyranny” in 
Zone A of the Klagenfurt basin, ultimately claiming it would be impossible for the 
population “to express their true wishes by a plebiscite”. The Yugoslav government had 
also continued to deport German-speaking officials and citizens from Zone A, and 
refused to permit displaced German-speakers who had fled Zone A during the fighting to 
return. As a solution, the Carinthian Provincial Government requested that forces from 
the Allied Powers occupy the entirety of the Klagenfurt basin until after the plebiscite.101  
The Commission asked for a month in absence of troops prior to the plebiscite, and 
insisted on evacuation by 10 September so the plebiscite could be held 10 October. 
Yugoslavs began withdrawing troops on 1 September 1920, completed by 14 September. 
However, some remained behind in a civilian capacity.102   
Demilitarisation succeeded in calming events in the Klagenfurt basin until 
immediately prior to the plebiscite. On 26 September 1920, a Yugoslav gendarme attacked 
an Italian officer in Bleiburg/Pliberk in southern Carinthia. The Italian officer had 
attempted to calm an excited crowd when the incident occurred. The Klagenfurt 
Commission feared that, given the limited forces it had under its command, it would be 
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unable to guarantee that order could be restored and maintained by 10 October, the 
planned date of the plebiscite, or even by 16 October, the latest date the plebiscite could 
be held. The Klagenfurt Commission therefore proposed sending 300 additional troops 
each from Italy, France, and Britain to ensure the smooth running of the plebiscite. The 
Austrian government also asked for additional officers to be present on the date of the 
plebiscite.103 
Despite Allied intervention, Yugoslav officials and military forces continued 
attempts to influence the outcome of the plebiscite. Peck reported on 30 September 1920, 
less than two weeks before the plebiscite, that Maister remained in the plebiscite zone and 
continued to spread propaganda, despite the demilitarisation of the zones. The 
commission asked that he return immediately to Belgrade. Additionally, Peck reported 
that, although the Yugoslav military had officially withdrawn from Zone A, many soldiers 
had remained behind in civilian clothing.104 Almond and Lutz report that, “between May 
22, 1919, and October 16, 1920, the Austrian Delegation sent at least forty-one separate 
notes to the Peace Conference protesting against Serb-Croat-Slovene activities in 
Carinthia and Styria, especially in Klagenfurt and the region of Radkersburg”.105 Yet 
despite their efforts, Yugoslav actions failed to disrupt the plebiscite. 
 
Results of the Plebiscite in Carinthia106 
 
The Klagenfurt plebiscite proceeded as planned on 10 October 1920. Mattern and 
Wambaugh report a different number of total votes, but both agree that roughly 59 
percent of voters in Zone A voted in favour of union with Austria.107 The fact that Zone 
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A voted in favour of union with Austria meant a plebiscite in Zone B was not necessary. 
The Klagenfurt Plebiscite Commission issued a final report on the plebiscite on 27 
October 1920. The Commission reported no problems on voting day, and expressed 
surprise at the 96 percent voter turnout. Although the “scrutiny” of the votes continued 
until 13 October, the Commission had encountered no problems. Similarly, both the 
Yugoslav and Austrian representatives on the Plebiscite Commission, Jovan Jovanović 
and Albert Peter-Pirkham, accepted the results.108 Jovanović later admitted that no 
irregularities has occurred during the plebiscite.109 
Despite the outcome of the plebiscite, Yugoslav troops and police immediately 
began reoccupying the Klagenfurt basin on 13 October. A Yugoslav representative 
informed the Commission that he had given the order to reoccupy the basin because he 
felt the plebiscite had been “disadvantageous for us”. The Klagenfurt Commission 
ordered the Yugoslav troops withdraw immediately.110 The Commission reiterated the 
importance of Yugoslav troops withdrawing from the basin, requesting that the 
Ambassador’s Conference take action to achieve this.111 Yugoslav actions throughout the 
border dispute negotiations only further supported German-Austrian claims that much of 
the Slovene population supported union with Austria.  
The Commission argued that one of the reasons for the success of the plebiscite 
resulted from the fact that the Austrian and Yugoslav governments both felt confident of 
success.112  Austria’s victory surprised the Yugoslav government because this meant 
“10,000 Slovene-speaking voters and twenty-one of the predominantly Slovene 
communes had voted for Austria”. Wambaugh also notes that: “There can be no doubt 
that the plebiscite was conclusive, for the advantage in Zone I [A] lay with Yugoslavia 
through the fact that the administrative officials and the laws in force there were her 
own”. Overconfidence meant that neither side seriously sought to undermine the 
plebiscite, allowing for free expression of self-determination by the inhabitants of the 
Klagenfurt basin. Wambaugh suggests that the result of the plebiscite hinged on the 
indifferent 20 percent of the population, largely composed of ethnic Slovenes. Wambaugh 
argues that this group voted overwhelmingly for Austria primarily for economic reasons 
and out of loyalty to Carinthia and Austria. Voters were also swayed because the capital of 
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Yugoslavia was in Belgrade rather than Ljubljana or Zagreb, the majority of its citizens 
were Orthodox and not Catholics, and because Yugoslavia had implemented military 
conscription. Wambaugh also suggests that the violence of Yugoslavia’s occupation of 
Carinthia dissuaded many Slovenes.113  
 
Conclusion 
 
The case of Carinthia differed in many ways from German Bohemia and Vorarlberg 
during the same period. In German Bohemia, the Allied delegations had decided on the 
borders of Czechoslovakia even before the war had ended, and therefore found it easy to 
refuse German Bohemian requests for self-determination. Despite Vorarlberg’s plebiscite, 
the Allied delegations also found it easy to ignore Vorarlberg’s requests for self-
determination. Plebiscites in German Bohemia and Vorarlberg risked Allied support for 
Czechoslovakia and Austria, respectively. Meanwhile, the result of the Carinthian 
plebiscite did not threaten Austria’s existence, nor could it substantially change the size 
and power of Yugoslavia.  
Allied delegations made an important contribution to the successful 
implementation of Carinthian self-determination. Both Strong and Wambaugh argue that 
Italian support for Austrian claims in Carinthia resulted not from any feelings of 
friendship, but rather because Yugoslav territorial claims threatened Italian strategic 
interests. Supporting Austria proved to be the most effective way for Italy to counter 
Yugoslav aims at the Paris Peace Conference.114 The Miles Missions report crucially 
influenced US delegates to support self-determination in Carinthia as well. The influence 
of US delegates ultimately helped to convince the other delegations to support a plebiscite 
in the Klagenfurt basin. 115 
The Allied Powers approached the situation in Carinthia far differently than they 
did in Bohemia. The Czechoslovak political leadership proved to be far more effective 
and persuasive than the Yugoslav delegation. Indecision resulting from the more 
contested claims led the Allied delegations to grant German-Austria a plebiscite in 
Carinthia, despite strong Yugoslav objections. Unlike in Vorarlberg, the Allied delegations 
at the Peace Conference regarded the plebiscite in Carinthia as binding, and based the new 
frontier borders on the wishes of the local population. Carinthia therefore represents a 
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unique case in that the Allied delegations accepted requests to hold a plebiscite, and 
accepted the results of the plebiscite as a legitimate expression of self-determination on 
which to determine political borders, unlike the two cases in German Bohemia and 
Vorarlberg. Despite the difficulties and complications of the Carinthian frontier, history 
suggests that the majority of people have subsequently supported the decision made in 
1920. As Franz Cede argues, the plebiscite in Carinthia represents an example “in support 
of the argument that disputes over borders in ethnically mixed areas can be managed 
though the means of direct democracy”.116 
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Conclusion 
 
Despite the ubiquitous rhetoric of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference, 
Allied delegations rarely relied on local self-determination when creating new borders. In 
contrast to Manela’s claims of a “Wilsonian Moment” in 1919, this moment more 
accurately represented the failure to implement Wilsonian principles. Allied delegations 
never seriously sought to implement self-determination on a just and even basis. On the 
one occasion where Allied delegations did implement self-determination, in Carinthia, it 
proved to be a great success. Allied delegates instead looked to the post-war balance of 
power, and applied whichever justifications benefitted them the most in each case they 
examined. Rarely were the same arguments made in different cases, highlighting the 
inconsistency of decision-making at the Paris Peace Conference. Allied delegations 
admittedly faced pressures from a number of sources, such as their own domestic 
populations. Nevertheless, had the principle of self-determination been implemented 
evenly in 1919, with plebiscites permitted in all disputed regions, the Paris Peace 
Conference might have resulted in the true “World Revolution” which Masaryk had  
envisioned.  
 The failure of Allied delegates at the Peace Conference to implement self-
determination in 1919 prompted notable criticism from Albert Schweitzer, 1952 Nobel 
Peace Prize laureate. Schweitzer argues that the delegates at the peace conference “could 
not aspire to establishing relations between peoples on a just and proper basis”. Allied 
delegates instead focussed on preventing “the most unreasonable of the demands made 
by the victors from becoming reality”, promoting compromise wherever disagreements 
arose.117 The difficult circumstances of the post-war period forced Allied delegates to 
balance competing and often contradictory goals. While they might have sought to 
implement national self-determination universally, they also conceded that the people of 
the victorious countries demanded harsh treatment of certain groups because of the war. 
The Allied delegations ultimately failed to balance their competing obligations. 
The delegates gave too much weight to their own interests, those of their state, and those 
of states they supported. According to Schweitzer,  
 
Not enough thought was given to the realities of historical fact and, 
consequently, to what is just and beneficial… Historical reality is trampled 
                                         
117 Albert Schweitzer, “Nobel Lecture: The Price of Peace", cited from: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1952/schweitzer-lecture.html 
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underfoot if, when two peoples have rival historical claims to the same 
country, the claims of only one are recognized.  
 
Despite the potential for self-determination to create what Schweitzer refers to as “a just 
and objective solution”, Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference were either 
prevented or refused from pursuing such a solution.118 Gullberg argues that, “[i]ronically, 
the doctrine of self-determination had become a leading principle in the peace process 
precisely through the traditional diplomatic games that Wilson wished to eradicate”. 
Gullberg argues instead that self-determination was used only as a “prop”.119 Allied 
delegates did not necessarily reject self-determination outright, but abandoned it often to 
favour alternative criteria. Despite idealistic rhetoric, the final Austrian frontier 
determined at the Paris Peace Conference suggests that Allied delegates routinely 
favoured strategic arguments over self-determination. 
In the three cases examined in this thesis, self-determination as determined by 
plebiscite was implemented only in Carinthia. Allied delegates refused German Bohemian 
claims to self-determination in the Czech lands and ignored the results of Vorarlberg’s 
plebiscite to join Switzerland. In Carinthia, Allied delegations allowed a plebiscite to verify 
Carinthian political loyalties, and the implementation of this self-determination resulted in 
a more successful resolution of local borders. The new Carinthian border therefore 
uniquely reflected the desires of the local population. In both German Bohemia and 
Vorarlberg, by contrast, Allied delegations refused to allow German Bohemians to express 
their political sympathies in a plebiscite and refused equal weight to Vorarlberg 
representatives to present their case for self-determination.  
Allied delegates frequently cited strategic justification in their decision-making, 
especially referring to historic, geographic, and economic arguments. Historic arguments 
proved particularly popular when assigning territory at the Paris Peace Conference. Claims 
to historic borders proved very subjective, however, and in all three cases historic 
justifications could arguably have been used to support both sides of the same argument. 
Allied delegates also selectively invoked geographic justifications. The strategic location of 
mountains and rivers were routinely cited in some cases but ignored in others, and 
economic arguments concerning the locations of railways and dams were similarly applied 
in some cases more than others. 
The German-Austrian delegation noticed such inconsistencies but lacked the 
political strength to present its counter-claims, negotiating often from a position of 
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98 
 
weakness. David Strong argues that the German-Austrian government failed to press its 
claims out of fears that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would cut off supplies of food 
and fuel. According to Strong, “[t]his dependence upon the neighbors for food forced 
German-Austrians to adopt a meticulously legal attitude toward territorial questions”.120 
Restraint meant the German-Austrian delegation failed in pressing its claims in German-
Bohemia, but not in Carinthia. However, the German-Austrian delegation could argue 
against Vorarlberg’s union with Switzerland from a much stronger position, as it was able 
to attract the support of Allied delegations which feared the collapse of the German-
Austrian state. 
Internal conflict within the German-Austrian delegation at the Conference 
directed the focus of its negotiations away from self-determination for German Bohemia 
and Vorarlberg. Although the German-Austrian government offered support to Lodgman 
and Ender’s efforts on behalf of German Bohemia and Vorarlberg prior to the Peace 
Conference, the German-Austrian delegation opposed these efforts once the Peace 
Conference had begun. The German-Austrian delegation worried that support for 
Lodgman would compromise its claims on the Bohemian Woods and German South 
Moravia, while support for Ender would only encourage separatist movements elsewhere 
in German-Austria. The German-Austrian delegation’s support for Carinthia meant that 
Carinthia’s representatives had little need to make an impression at the conference. Such 
unequal support between representatives suggests that the German-Austrian delegation 
decided to pick its battles carefully. 
The contrast between the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav delegations illustrates how 
decisions at the Conference were rendered. The Yugoslav delegation simply failed to 
generate as much support for its cause as the Czechoslovak delegation. The charisma of 
Masaryk and Beneš proved greatly beneficial to Czechoslovakia, while Pašić was unable to 
generate similar support for Yugoslavia. Instead, Yugoslavia’s conflict with Italy over 
disputed territories in Carniola and Istria meant that the Italian delegation at the 
Conference used its influence to support German-Austrian claims on Carinthia. Greater 
Allied support for the Czechoslovak delegation in the Czech lands, meanwhile, meant 
German Bohemian representatives won support only from the German-Austrian 
delegation, and even this proved limited. In Carinthia, therefore, the Italian delegation 
became an important ally to the German-Austrian delegation, while German Bohemian 
representatives found no such support.  
                                         
120 Strong, Austria, 155-156. 
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Local German-speaking indifference towards self-determination also somewhat 
eroded the mandate of their representatives at the Peace Conference. Although German 
Bohemian politicians stressed the unity of German Bohemian sentiment, widespread 
indifference for self-determination helped to limit Allied sympathy for German Bohemian 
self-determination. Both Vorarlbergers and Carinthian Germans, however, 
overwhelmingly supported their representatives, pressuring the Allied delegations to 
support self-determination in Vorarlberg and Carinthia. The crucial distinction between 
these two regions, therefore, is that the German-Austrian delegation convinced the Allied 
delegations to later abandon their support for Vorarlberg’s self-determination. Of the 
three cases, the German-Austrian delegation received support both from the local 
population and the Allied delegations only in Carinthia, which explains why they won 
support for a binding plebiscite. 
Czechoslovak, Swiss, and Slovenian public opinion also influenced Allied 
delegations at the Conference. German Bohemian politicians considered their province to 
be a German one, which prevented any possible support from local Czechoslovaks who 
might otherwise have support an autonomous German Bohemian province. Efforts to 
achieve self-determination in Vorarlberg and Carinthia were meanwhile encouraged by 
substantial support from the Swiss and Carinthian Slovene populations. The Swiss Federal 
Council’s initial openness to union with Vorarlberg allowed the Allied delegations to offer 
their support. However, after the signing of the Treaty of St. Germain, the Federal 
Council maintained its neutrality after repeated requests by Vorarlbergers for union, 
which meant Allied support evaporated. Carinthian Slovene sympathies with the German-
Austrian state, made prominent at the Peace Conference by the Miles Mission, helped 
persuade the US delegation in particular that Slovenes did not automatically favour union 
with Yugoslavia.  The US delegation subsequently convinced the other Allied delegations 
that a plebiscite should determine the borders of Carinthia. No evidence suggested a 
similar Styrian Slovene affinity with German-Austria, perhaps explaining the lack of 
success for a plebiscite in Styria. 
Decisions reached at the Paris Peace Conference have had great political 
significance in subsequent years. Events outside the period 1918-1920 lie beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but the borders of German Bohemia and Vorarlberg have both been 
revisited since the decisions reached at the Paris Peace Conference. Disputes over the 
status of German Bohemia caused more than a decade of violent conflict between 
Germans and Czechoslovaks. Although Vorarlberg’s borders have remained stable since 
1919, recent polls suggest that half of Vorarlbergers continue to favour union with 
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Switzerland.121  In contrast, the Carinthian border has enjoyed lasting stability. Wambaugh 
notes that Carinthian Slovenes in 1930 focused on cultural autonomy within Austria 
rather than separation, suggesting the success of self-determination in 1920.122 The 
Carinthian plebiscite therefore represents a rare instance of successfully implemented self-
determination at the Paris Peace Conference, an ideal which the Paris Peace Conference 
promised but ultimately failed to deliver. 
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